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CHANNELING: IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND PUBLIC LAW
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.'
Law profesgors have a lot to learn from sociologists and political
scientists who have studied social movements. Social movements gen-
erated many important statutes we now take for granted, such as the
environmental and civil rights laws. The dynamics of statutory evolu-
tion are strongly influenced by those movements and their internal
dynamics.' Social movements have been one engine driving constitu-
tional evolution as well. The modern meaning of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause owes much more to the power and norms of the civil
rights and women's liberation movements than to the original intent
of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers.2 If these positive proposi-
tions are true, it behooves us to understand and teach our students
more about social movement theories.
Three kinds of social movement theories are particularly perti-
nent to law.3 Cultural change theories concern themselves with the evo-
lution of social norms and the dynamic interaction between new
movements and old norms.4 Resource mobilization theories ask why self-
interested persons would participate in social movements and develop
Deputy Dean and John A. Carver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. I
am grateful to Michael Shomsky, Yale Law Class of 2003, for excellent research assis-
tance.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 107-275
(1994) for an elaboration on this argument. See also Cary Coglianese, Social Movements,
Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
85 (2001) (examining the environmental movement's interaction with law and soci-
ety).-
e See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162 (suggesting that the Supreme Court's sex
discrimination jurisprudence is defensible under a feminist understanding of equality
but not as a matter of original constitutional expectations).
3 For differently useful surveys of the social movements theoretical literature, see
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 1-
13 (1999); and Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001).
' See, e.g., RALPH TURNER & LEWIS KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 7 (1957)
(studying how social groups influence individuals); Joseph Gusfield, The Study of Social
Movements, 14 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 443, 444 (1968) (analyzing the evolution
of social movements in different cultures).
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rational-actor models for the origins and dynamics of different kinds
of social movements.' Political process theories address the evolving in-
stitutional contexts of social movements. 6 All of these theories are
relevant to lawyers' understanding of social movements and to the le-
gal and constitutional dynamics those movements drive.
Conversely, law professors ought to be able to make some contri-
bution to these theories. We bring our own intellectual experience
with theories of the dynamics of culture and meaning, ongoing deci-
sion making under the rational-choice paradigm, and institutional
and political context More important, social movements are sur-
rounded by and seek to influence law. In the modern regulatory
state, we are saturated with law. Any kind of collective action, however
"spontaneous" (a favorite word among social movement theorists),
occurs in the context of the regulatory state. The norms challenged
by this kind of collective action are likely to be codified in legal codes,
and the movement's struggle will inevitably involve law. If the social
movement generates institutional forms, they will be affected by and
will seek to affect the law. Intuitively, the law professor would suggest
that law has strong effects on social movements; law does not drive
them, but it is a pervasive positive and normative context in which the
social movement operates.
The social movements literature does not adequately reflect the
importance of law. Consider, for example, Jean Cohen's important
model for the evolution of social movements into political ones: (1)
social movements arise when many individuals reject established social
norms and when modes of social control cannot suppress their rejec-
tion; (2) the spontaneous action of similarly situated individuals is fol-
5 See, e.g., JOHN D. MCCARTHY & MAYER N. ZALD, THE TREND OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION ]
(1973) (emphasizing the structural conditions and resources that become available to
potential social movements); CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 10
(1978) (examining various collective action movements, ranging from brawls to
strikes); John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:
A Partial Theory, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 15 (Mayer N.
Zald &John D. McCarthy eds., 1987) (explaining the relationship of social movements
to the media, government authorities, and other parties).
6 See, e.g., Bert Klandermans & Sidney Tarrow, Mobilization into Social Movements:
Synthesizing European and American Approaches, I INT'L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 1, 23
(1988) ("[N]ational political traditions and alignments condition the formation, the
strategies, and outcomes of the new movements, however much they operate outside
of politics.").
7 The theories in the text generally parallel the critical, economic, and legal proc-
ess methodologies honed and applied to policy and legal issues by law professors.
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lowed by the formation of subcultural mores and institutions, which in
turn (3) generate a political movement." The law is marginal in her
model, except as an object of political change once a social movement
is underway. Cohen's model is typical; law and even legal actors usu-
ally do not show up except as bit players in the thick analysis of social
movements by other influential authors. One reason law is so ne-
glected is social scientists' adherence to Talcott Parsons's distinction
among the political (legal), economic, and social spheres.!' This
strikes a law professor as naive.
One goal of this Article is to suggest that social movements cannot
be completely understood without getting beyond the separate
spheres idea. Law and society are interconnected in many different
ways. Accordingly, there ought to be an important rather than mar-
ginal role for law and legal theory in the social movements literature.
I shall explore that idea in the context of a kind of social movement
distinctive to the late twentieth century, the identity-based social move-
ment (IBSM). 0 Law and legal actors are critical to the instigation and
H SeeJean L. Cohen, Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary
Social Movements, 52 SOc. REs. 663, 671-72 (1985) (evaluating competing theoretical
paradigms for studying new social movements). I have reduced Cohen's six-pronged
synthetic model into three prongs, but I do not think I have distorted Cohen's synthe-
sis. For similarly influential but law-impoverished accounts of the academic object of
the social movements literature, see DELLA PORTA & DIANI, supra note 3, at 16-19; Jo
Freeman, On the Origins of Social Movements, in WAVES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
SINCE THE SIXTIES 7 Uo Freeman & Victoria Johnson eds., 1999); McCarthy & Zald,
supra note 5, at 15; and Charles Tilly, Social Movements and National Politics, in
STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 297, 305 (Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds.,
1984). Some sociologists have recognized a limited role of law for the dynamics of
these new social movements. E.g., Paul Burstein, Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement
Tactic: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity, 96 AM. J. SOC. 1201, 1204 (1991)
("It is, in fact, impossible to understand the American struggle for equal opportunity
without focusing on the courts and on activities intended to influence judicial deci-
sions.").
f See TALCoTr PARSONS, POLITICS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, at ix (1969) (discussing
the Parsonian treatment of political life and theory); TALCOTr PARSONS, THE SYSTEM
OF MODERN SOCIETIES 2 (1971) (examining the adaptive capacity of modern societies).
1) The IBSMs discussed in this Article are similar to or the same as the "identity-
oriented" movements discussed by sociologists. E.g., ALAIN TOURAINE, THE VOICE AND
THE EYE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 31-32 (Alan Duff trans., 1981) ("The
social role attributed to conflicts and in particular to class conflicts and social move-
ments.., is an indication from the outset that I am unprepared to consider any social
category whatsoever, no matter how dominated it may be, as a non-actor."); Jan Willem
Duyvendak & Marco G. Giugni, Social Movement Types and Policy Domains, in HANSPETER
KRIESI ET AL., NEW SOCIAl. MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 82-110 (1995) (classifying new social movements according to their logic of
action, including their identity orientation). Unlike many of these "new social move-
ments" theorists, I see IBSMs as both identity-expressive and legal-instrumental. For a
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dynamics, as well as the goals, of this kind of movement. Just as law
professors have much to learn from social movement scholarship
about the dynamics of public law," so sociology professors have much
to learn from us about the dynamics of social movements, or so I shall
argue.
The first Part of this Article poses a descriptive, sociological-type
model of the multifaceted influence of law on the birth of the primary
IBSMs of the latter half of the twentieth century. Legal rules and their
enforcers strongly reinforced stigmas and disadvantages that not only
provided important incentives and goals for minorities, but helped
give concrete meaning to the "minority group" itself. Much of what
made it intelligible (as well as denigrating) to be a "colored person"
or a "homosexual" or a "retarded person" was the line drawn by law
and the discourse stimulated by legal actors. Naturally, therefore, the
law was also one forum where the objects of the stigmas contested
their status denigration. If the law was an agent of people's objectifi-
cation, law's institutions were a situs for those people to reclaim their
personhood. In the United States, courts as much as legislatures have
been avenues for the IBSM to contest its interconnected legal and so-
cial stigmas. Most surprisingly, legal forums and actors provided the
backdrop for many of the dramatic events that helped turn a nascent
reform movement into a mass social movement. Once that occurred,
changes in the law were inexorable. In short, law helped define the
contours of the minority group itself, gave the group both incentives
and forums in which to resist their stigmas, and provided dramatic
events and campaigns that helped turn a reform movement into a
mass social movement.
Part II of this Article develops a descriptive, sociological-type
model for understanding the politics of IBSMs once they have taken
off. All over the world, IBSMs have presented themselves and their
goals as rights-oriented, as have their traditionalist opponents. In this
country, both IBSMs and their opponents have articulated their rights
as rooted in the Constitution, making those rights not just fundamen-
tal but also beyond the reach of the ordinary political process. In
their effort to present their goals as beyond the political process, how-
similar understanding, see Mary Bernstein, Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses
oIdentity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement, 103 AM.J. SoC. 531 (1997).
See Rubin, supra note 3, at 63-83 (maintaining that contact with social movements
literature enhances the ability of legal scholars to provide descriptions of and prescrip-
tions for the legal system and offers a new approach for understanding the origin and
meaning of legal concepts).
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ever, IBSMs have subjected themselves to the legal process. The phe-
nomenon by which social groups have presented their goals in consti-
tutional terms has had a channeling effect on both the IBSMs and their
inevitable countermovements.
The channeling effect is not one-way. Just as constitutional law
has influenced the rhetoric, strategies, and norms of social move-
ments, so the movements have affected the rhetoric, strategies, and
norms of American public law. The third and final Part of the Article
starts with a descriptive model of the influence of IBSMs on the evolu-
tion of public statutory and constitutional law and then turns to the
primary normative question for constitutional law professors: What
ought to be the role of judges in the evolution of social movements?
If emerging social movements are not assured both the protections of
the rule of law and, potentially, the recognition suggested by the
Equal Protection Clause, the danger of violent conflict is theoretically
increased. If the goal of our constitutional polity is preservation and
adaptation of a peaceable pluralism, the judiciary is a necessary safety
valve. Therefore, I argue that the judiciary needs to accommodate
emerging social movements-as well as countermovements. Under
the premises of pluralist theory, this accommodation is in the interests
of the country but may not be in the interests of some elements of the
social movements, for a clever judicial strategy empowers the move-
ment, moderates over the radicals, and channels the movement's dis-
course in assimilative directions. I conclude that the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence has usually served the pluralist polity
pretty well. Its jurisprudence is less defensible if one rejects the rele-
vance of pluralist premises for constitutional theory.
I. A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL: LAW AND THE ORIGINS OF
IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Among the most important social movements of the second half
of the twentieth century were those seeking integration and equal
treatment for people of color;12 equality and liberty for women, in-
21 For accounts of the social movement to obtain civil rights for blacks, see DAVID
J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986) [hereinafter CARROW, BEARING THE
CROSS]; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BoAIR) OF'
hIEDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); and ALDON D.
MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES
ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984). For accounts of the social movement to obtain
equal rights for Native Americans, see MARK GROSSMAN, THE ABC-CLIO COMPANION
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cluding the freedom to choose contraception and abortion as means
of family planning;13 rights for gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and trans-
gendered people;'I and equal treatment and access to opportunities
for people with disabilities.'5 Scholars tend to view these movements
as fundamentally different from the social movements of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries." The labor movement of this
[0 THE NATIVE AMERICAN RIGii'S MOVEMENT (1996); THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA:
GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE (M. Annette jaimes ed., 1992); and Joane
Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity, 60 AM. Soc.
REV. 947 (1995). For an account of the movement to obtain rights for Asian Ameri-
cans, see ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(1998); for Latinos, see HISPANICS/LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES: ETINICI'IY, RACE,
AND RIGHTS (Jorge J.E. Gracia & Pablo De Greiff eds., 2000); for Mexican Americans,
see RUBEN DONATO, THE OTHER STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL SCHOOLS: MEXICAN
AMERICANS DURING THE CIVIL RIGITS ERA (1997).
1' For accounts of the women's liberation movement, see LINDA K. KERBER, NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES (1998); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND
GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1989); and Jo Freeman, The Origins of the
Women's Liberation Movement, 78 AM. J. Soc. 792 (1973). See also T1lE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (Mary Fainsod Katzenstein
& Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1987) (providing an international perspective). For
accounts of the social movement to obtain contraception and abortion rights for
women, see generally ABORTION WARS (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998); ELLEN CIESLER,
WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA (1992); NANCY F. Co'r, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM (1987);
DAVIDJ. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING
OF ROE V. WADE (1994) [hereinafter GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY]; KRISTIN
LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984); JANE .] MANSBRIDGE,
WHYWE LosTTHE ERA (1986); DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX,
GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF ERA: A STATE AND THE NATION (1990); and SUZANNE
STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE
ABORTION CONFLICr (1991).
1 For accounts of the gay rights movement, see JO-IN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS,
SEXUAL COMMUNIFIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 1940-1970 (1983); and WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARITIEID OF THE CLOSET (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYIAW]. See also BARRY D.
ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (1987) (providing an international
perspective).
15 Accounts of the disability rights movement can be found in MARITIA A. FIELD &
VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION
(1999); DORIS ZAMES FIEISCHER & FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
FROM CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION (2001); RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL
'TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY (2d ed. 2001); Josh
Gamson, Silence, Death, and the Invisible Enemy: AIDS Activism and Social Movement "New-
ness", 36 SOC. PROBS. 351 (1989); and Richard K. Scotch, Disability as the Basis for a So-
cial Movement: Advocacy and the Politics of Definition, 44 J. Soc. ISSUES 15) (1988). See
alsoJANE CAMPBELL & MIKE OLIVER, DISABILITY POLITICS: UNDERSTANDING OUR PAST,
CHANGING OUR FUTURE (1996) (detailing an account of the British disabled people's
movement).
H; On "new social movements" generally, see ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE
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earlier period, for example, sought reallocation of economic rights
and workplace entitlements. Theirs was a politics of economic redis-
tribution. The abolitionist temperance, and purity movements of the
earlier period sought to change private as well as public ethics and
moral practices. Theirs was a politics of morality. Although ultimately
entailing some economic redistribution and seeking to revise public
morality, the new social movements of the late twentieth century
sought to change the status of marginalized groups. Theirs was a poli-
tics of recognition.7  For these civil rights, women's liberation, pro-
choice, gay liberation, and disability fights movements, the core goal
was to force society to recognize the movements' constituents as equal
citizens and persons who were just as worthy as the social norm-
namely, the white heterosexual male.
Law and legal discourse played an unusually important role in the
formation of these IBSMs. Indeed, legal rules and institutions were
keys to each of three preconditions for an IBSM.' s First, law helped
define a class of people whose social identity was dominated by a le-
gally stigmatizing trait. The extra economic and psychic costs im-
posed by law gave various groups stronger reasons to band together
and to transform social attitudes. Second, legal institutions simulta-
neously provided stigmatized minorities with forums where they could
PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
(1989); Bert liandermans, New Social Movements and Resource Mobilization: The European
and American Approach, 4 INT'LJ. MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 13 (1986); and
supra note 10, which identifies additional sources. See also RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING
RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH 69-124 (1998) (examining the politics of respect and the
ability to contest social status);JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE, at xi (1978) (detailing new
social movements' successes in the arena of law reform);J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of
Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321-32 (1997) (discussing cultural movements centered on
social status and group identity); Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition?: Di-
lemmas ofJustice in a "Postsocialist"Age, inJUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION 18-19 (1997) (exploring the social motivations of
the gay rights movement).
,7 Nancy Fraser has commented that
Gays and lesbians suffer from heterosexism: the authoritative construction of
norms that privilege heterosexuality .... The remedy for the injustice, conse-
quently, is recognition, not redistribution. Overcoming homophobia and het-
erosexism requires changing the cultural valuations (as well as their legal and
practical expressions) that privilege heterosexuality, deny equal respect to gays
and lesbians, and refuse to recognize homosexuality as a legitimate way of be-
ing sexual.
Fraser, supra note 16, at 18-19. For parallel ideas in the legal literature, see ABEL, supra
note 16, at 69-124, and Balkin, supra note 16, at 2321-32.
I See Freeman, supra note 13, at 802 (describing the preconditions for the stirring
of a social movement).
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object to exclusion and discrimination. Sometimes legal actors di-
rectly prodded minorities to object; more often, governmental forums
provided minorities with opportunities to form informational net-
works. Third, other legal actors hostile to minorities gave minority
agenda entrepreneurs the crises or dramatic events they needed to
trigger mass mobilization against stigmatizing policies and attitudes.
In short, the mass mobilization characteristic of IBSMs in the twenti-
eth century was not easily possible without the state as both adversary
(state enforcers) and ally (legislatures sometimes, the judiciary more
often).
A. The Seeds of IBSMs: Legalized Discriminations and World War II
At the end of World War II, when America's campaign of freedom
against the Nazis was ending and America's campaign of freedom
against the Communists in the Cold War was beginning, citizens of
the United States lived under a caste system. People were categorized
and privileged (or not) according to various identifying traits. Impor-
tant preferences and higher status were accorded persons who were
white, male, heterosexual, mentally and physically healthy, Protestant,
right-handed, slender, and good-looking (in a Cary Grant/Deborah
Kerr sense). Persons encountered limits and disadvantages if they
were nonwhite, female, homosexual, disabled, Jewish or Catholic, left-
handed, overweight, or ugly. Such persons occupied a lower status
than those who possessed the desired traits. Between 1945 and 2000,
mass social movements formed around the traits of race, sex, sexual
orientation, and disability."' They did not form around the traits of
religion, ethnicity, left-handedness, weight, or attractiveness.
The main variable that sorts the movement-generating traits from
the others is whether or not the law deployed the trait as the basis for
a regulatory regime that valorized the dominant characteristic and
" One could also add rich/poor to my list of preference-generating traits, and
poor people did organize in social movements. See generally FRANCIS Fox PIVEN &
RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY
FAIL 2 (1979) (outlining the evolution of poverty movements); MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 3 (1993)
(exploring the origins and evolution of the welfare rights movement). I do not ad-
dress poor people's movements because they are more like traditional redistributive
movements (akin to the labor movement) than to identity movements such as the civil
rights one. The politics of redistribution thoroughly dominates the politics of recogni-
tion in poor people's movements. Thus, the welfare rights movement of the late 1960s
was less interested in promoting poverty as "good," or even "tolerable," and much
more interested in providing life essentials for people on welfare.
[Vol. 150:419
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imposed exclusions and hardships on those possessing the subordi-
nate characteristic. Law circa 1945 pervasively discriminated on the
basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, and disability:
Criminal Sanctions. There were special criminal sanctions aimed at
regulating certain minorities' control of their own bodies and sexuali-
ties. It was a crime in every state for a woman to have an abortion,
usually with a potentially malleable exception. Oral and anal sex be-
21
tween consenting adults was a crime in every state. In many states it
was a crime to have sex with a mentally disabled person.2 In most ju-
risdictions, it was both a state and municipal crime for a woman or a
homosexual man to solicit sex from a man or to engage in sex for
23
compensation. In southern states, sex between people of different
races was a crime; a black man accused (often without foundation) of
raping a white woman usually faced execution, either by law or by
24
lynch mobs. All over the country, vagrancy and loitering laws were
aimed at the disruption of presumably illicit activities by people of
color, homosexuals, and unmarried women. 5 In most major cities, it
was a crime to cross-dress in public.26 At least one metropolis made it
a crime for a "diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed"
211 SeeRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174-77 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (provid-
ing a state-by-state account of abortion laws).
21 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at app. Al (listing state consensual sod-
omy laws).
22 See Susan Stefan, Whose Egg Is It Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Insti-
tutionalized and Incompetent Women, 13 NOVA L. REV. 405, 410-27 (1989) (discussing state
regulation of the reproductive rights of women who are incarcerated, institutionalized,
or adjudicated incompetent).
23 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLW, supra note 14, at 29-31, app. A2 (detailing lewd solicita-
tion statutes).
24 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Mind That Burns in Each Body": Women, Rape, and Ra-
cial Violence, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 328, 334 (Ann Snitow
et al. eds., 1983); seeJOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 105-07 (1988) (detailing how sexuality became one
of the central means of reasserting white social control over blacks during Reconstruc-
tion); LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM Too LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY
274-91 (1979) (describing how white Southerners dominated blacks through the use of
intimidation, violence, and discriminatory laws during Reconstruction).
21 See generally DAVID J. PIVAR, PURITY CRUSADE: SEXUAL MORALITY AND SOCIAL
CONTROL, 1868-1900, at 204-77 (1973) (discussing how purity reformers developed a
political movement to destroy prostitution); RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD:
PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA, 1900-1918, at 1-50 (1982) (describing how Americans at-
tempted to legislate morality during the Progressive Era by abolishing prostitution).
26 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at app. A2 (listing the municipalities
criminalizing cross-dressing).
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person to be found in any of the "public places in this city."' 7
State Control of the Body. At any point in your life as one of these le-
gally stigmatized minorities, the state could exercise normative control
over how you deployed your body. For example, the United States de-
tained Japanese-American citizens in camps during World War II
without any finding of criminal activity.2" More than 116,000 people
with mental and other kinds of disabilities were hospitalized by the
state, usually without their consent, and subjected to any number of
medical tortures. ' As of 1950, thirty-one states authorized the sterili-
zation of people with specified disabilities; more than 70,000 people
were so treated by the state during the twentieth century.' Women
who were also racial minorities were most commonly subjected to
state-sanctioned sterilization.'' By 1961, twenty-nine states and the
District of Columbia required the hospitalization of "psychopathic
persons," a term that was often a code for homosexuals. In state
hospitals, people charged with sex crimes, as well as the disabled, were
27 FLEISCHER & ZAMES, supra note 15, at 12 (quoting a Chicago ordinance of 1911,
which was repealed in 1974).
28 See PAGE SMITH, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL: THE JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUATION
AND RELOCATION IN WORLD WAR II, at 170-237 (1995) (detailing the relocation of
Japanese Americans into Assembly Centers).
F2IELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 15, at 67; see R.C. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF
MENTAL RETARDATION 158 (1983) (presenting documentation of the increase in the
number of mentally retarded persons admitted to institutions from 1900 to 1930).
30 JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 982 (3d ed. 1992); see
FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 15, at 67-68 (discussing the advent of the eugenics
movement as the subjection of institutionalized persons to compulsory sterilization);
DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN TIIIE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN
HEREDITY 110-12 (1985) (discussing Buck v. Bell in which the Supreme Court upheld
the sterilization of the plaintiff because the state determined that she, her mother, and
her daughter were "feebleminded," thereby falling within the scope of a Virginia ster-
ilization statute); Paul K. Longmore, The Life of Randolph Bourne and the Need for a His-
tory of Disabled People, 13 REvs. AM. HISr. 581, 584 (1985) (reviewing BRUCE CLAYTON,
FORGOITEN PROPIHET: THE LIFE OF RANDOLPH BOURNE (1984)) (describing steriliza-
tion and mercy killings of people with disabilities, as a matter of state law); Note, Hu-
man Sterilization, 35 IOWA L. REv. 251, 253 nn.12, 13 (1950) (listing state sterilization
statutes that were enacted following the decision in Buck v. Belt).
31 See Carlos G. Velez-l., The Nonconsenting Sterilization of Mexican Women in Los Ange-
les, in TWICE A MINORITY: MEXICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 235, 239-40 (Margarita B. Mel-
ville ed., 1980) (describing how Mexican women were sterilized in public hospitals
without their consent or after coercive measures were taken to obtain consent in order
for medical students to gain experience in sterilization procedures).
.42 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at app. BI (listing "sodomy," "unnatural
acts," and "crimes against public morals" as state sexual psychopath laws); PHILIP
JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN
AMERICA 49-93 (1998) (discussing "sex psychopaths" and statutes aimed at preventing
sex crimes).
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subjected to chemical and electrical experimentation.3 Working-class
women were often incarcerated for prostitution and other sex of-
fenses. Women of all classes were theoretically subject to state control
of their bodies through restrictive abortion laws.
Limitations in Ability to Form Families. States refused to recognize
homosexual marriages, interracial marriages, and marriages to or be-
35
tween mentally and sometimes physically disabled people. These un-
ions were often considered crimes as well. For women, marriage
meant a loss of rights. The most notable example was that married
women were subject to rape by their husbands without any legal re-
course because of state laws preserving "marital -rape exemptions.
People with disabilities and homosexuals were considered per se unfit
parents, and their children were sometimes taken away from them by
37
the state without their consent.,
Voting Exclusions. People of color were disenfranchised in the
South through intimidation, poll taxes, and discriminatorily adminis-
tered literacy tests and other registration r Sd8terd iteac s an terreistatonrequirements. exual and
33 See Samuel Liebman, Electroshock: My Vision of the World on Fire, in GAY AMERICAN
HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 170 (Jonathan Katz ed., 1976) (pre-
senting a doctor's case study of the effect of electroshock therapy on a homosexual).
" Cf. LUKER, supra note 13, at 45-46 (discussing how medical discretion to perform
therapeutic abortions was exercised in a completely haphazard way, such that the
chance of getting a therapeutic abortion seems to have been almost completely ran-
dom).
" See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 87-122 (1996)
(documenting traditional American refusal to recognize lesbian or gay marriages);
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 226-29 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock
eds., rev. ed. 1971) (discussing the bar in most states against allowing people with men-
tal disabilities to marry); Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before
Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 624-25, 635 (noting that interracial sexuality was taboo and
illegal in most of America before the war).
" SeeJill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal Hist"ry of Marital Rape, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1373, 1375-1406 (2000) (giving a history of the marital rape exemption in the
nineteenth century); Jaye Sitton, Note, Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Al-
lowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261, 261-68 (1993) (explaining the common law marital rape
exemption). See generally DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982) (discussing
"wiferape"); Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemp-
tion, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 941-47 (1996) (discussing the history of the marital
rape exemption).
" See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 15, at 20, 350 n.68 (discussing states with ex-
plicit rules against parenting by people with mental disabilities); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30
HASTINGS LI. 799, 883-904 (1979) (discussing discrimination against lesbian and gay
parents in custody battles).
3 See LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF
JIM CROW 218-29, 363-73 (1998) (detailing how some blacks had to brave threats and
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gender minorities were theoretically disenfranchised if they were con-
victed of sodomy or lewdness or other "crimes of moral turpitude. ,M
Immigration Exclusions. Since the late nineteenth century, Ameri-
can federal immigration policy had excluded immigrants because of
their race or ethnicity.40 The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 carried
forward most of the earlier race-based exclusions, as well as exclusions
of people "afflicted with psychopathic personality"-a code word for
homosexuals and bisexuals 41-epileptics and people with other speci-
fied physical disabilities, 42 people who were "feeble-minded" or "in-
sane, 43 and women whom immigration authorities suspected of being
"prostitutes.
Jury Exclusions. People of color and women were routinely ex-
cluded or-in the case of women-excused from juries in many states
either by law or by discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.5
Open homosexuals and people with disabilities were probably ex-
cluded by reason of challenges.
Employment Exclusions. The federal government and most state
governments would not employ homosexuals in either the civil or
violence in order to vote); Frank R. Parker et al., Mississippi, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN
THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF T1HE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 137-38 (Chandler
Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (describing how through the use of literacy
tests, other similar requirements, and violence, whites diluted black voting power in
the South).
'19 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1987) (striking down an Alabama
law that disenfranchised people convicted of consensual sodomy, inter alia, because
the law was drafted with the intent to disenfranchise people of color, against whom
sodomy laws were disproportionately applied).
40 See generally IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE 37-39 (1996) (describing the operation of race-based exclusions in immigration
policies).
41 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a) (4), 66 Stat. 163,
182 (1952), construed in Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118,118 (1967).
42 See § 212(a)(4) (epileptics); § 212(a)(5) (drug addicts and alcoholics);
§ 212(a)(6) (those afflicted with tuberculosis); § 212(a)(7) (others having a "physical
defect, disease, or disability").
41 § 212(a)(1)-(2).
44 § 212(a) (12)-(13).
45 On the exclusion of African Americans from juries until the 1960s, see RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAw 168-80 (1997). Even in mid-century, women's
jury service was typically voluntary, whereas men's was compulsory. See Fay v. New York,
332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947) (noting that in 1942 only twenty-eight states allowed
women to serve on juries and, in fifteen of those twenty-eight states, they might claim
an exemption because of their sex); see also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-63 (1961)
(holding that a jury without women is constitutional); KERBER, supra note 13, at 124-
220 (discussing women's limited role in juries throughout history).
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military service. People of color were often excluded from higher-
status govermmentjobs and were typically segregated in the workplace,
most prominently in the U.S. armed forces.47 Women were excluded
by law from many jobs, including prime roles in the armed forces,
some professions (through state-sponsored licensing commissions),
and various other occupations like running a bar.4 The armed forces
and some civil service employers would not accept people with dis-
abilities.
Education Discrimination. In much of the United States, education
was segregated by race and sometimes by ethnicity; minorities almost
always got inferior facilities and resources as a result of this arrange-
ment.4  While some states denied public education altogether to
many people with disabilities, others separated mentally disabled
children from their families to commit them to facilities that were
"educational" in name, but brutally punitive in effect.5' Women were
usually discouraged by state and local authorities from seeking higher
46 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 67-74 (relating the desire of some gov-
ernment officials to rid homosexuals from government jobs and military service).
41 See generally BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY OF BLACK
AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY (1986) (describing the armed forces' traditional exclusion
of, then segregation of, people of color).
48 SeeJEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 68-79
(1982) (describing the armed forces' traditional exclusion of, and later discrimination
against, women); SUSAN LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR
WOMEN 1905-1925, at 3-40 (1987) (discussing how a woman's place was thought to be
in the home and not in the working world).
49 See HENRY ALLEN BULLOCK, A HISTORY OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH,
FROM 1619 TO THE PRESENT 167-93 (1967) (discussing segregation of black school
children and the inherent unfairness of the separate but equal doctrine); GILBERT G.
GONZALEZ, CHICANO EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF SEGREGATION 21-22 (1990) (discuss-
ing a mid-1930s study that found that eighty-five percent of surveyed districts in the
Southwest contained segregated schools for Mexican-American children); KLUGER,
supra note 12, at 169 (describing the inadequate facilities and instructors available to
blacks as a result of school segregation); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian-American
Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1243, 1293 (1993) (describing school segregation of Asian-American children).
5, See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. State ex rel. Goldman, 191 N.E. 914, 916 (Ohio Ct. App.
1934) ("As a matter of common sense it is apparent that a moron of very low type, or
an idiot or imbecile who is incapable of absorbing knowledge or making progress in
the schools ought to be excluded."); FLEISCHER & ZAMES, supra note 15, at 12 (describ-
ing the expulsion of a disabled child in Wisconsin).
5' See RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 4-5 (1995) (identifying state statutes that mandated segregation of the
"feeble-minded" in institutions and discussing cases that addressed the institutionaliza-
tion of disabled individuals).
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education. 2 Homosexuals were sometimes expelled from state col-
leges and universities for consensual sexual activities.3
Public Facilities and Transport. Southern states had a comprehen-
sive array of laws requiring the segregation of people of color from
white people in public transportation, municipal swimming pools and
parks, restaurants and hotels, public drinking fountains and rest-
rooms, and a myriad of other facilities." The other minorities were
not expressly governed by this kind of exclusion, but the effect of state
policies had an analogous effect on them. Whereas black people were
physically segregated by law, many disabled people were de facto seg-
regated in separate institutions, most homosexuals were psychically
segregated in the closet, and most women were essentially confined to
the home by state and social pressures.
Nothing like this regime of government discrimination afflicted
religious, ethnic, and body-weight or physical-appearance minorities.
The contrast between racism, sexism, and homophobia on one side,
and anti-Semitism on the other, is especially striking. Jews have been
the object of vicious and continuous social discrimination in the
United States, but in 1945 they were generally not the objects of open
discrimination as a matter of law.5' Accordingly, Jews in the twentieth
century did not mobilize in a mass social movement the way African-
Americans or gays and lesbians did.
It is incorrect to say that legal exclusions and stigmas were a suffi-
cient condition for an IBSM,"' but they seem to have been a necessary
52 See BARBARA MILLER SOLOMON, IN THE COMPANY OF EDUCATED WOMEN: A
HIsTORY OF WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 172-85 (1985) (discussing
the debate over whether women of the 1920s, '30s, and '40s should be allowed to pur-
sue higher education instead of raising a family).
53 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet,
1946-1961, 24 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 703, 749-50 (1997) (reporting dozens of students
who were expelled or who withdrew from the University of Florida in response to the
state's anti-homosexual witch hunt).
51 Seegenerally LIVACK, supra note 24 (discussing southern "Jim Crow" laws).
M See, e.g., LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA 154-55 (1994) (not-
ing that although numerous state laws prohibited employment discrimination against
Jews in the 1940s and '50s, Jews continued to suffer from unofficial or private discrimi-
nation).
56 Many other disabilities and discriminations embedded in law related to traits
that did not give rise to identity-based social movements. Such traits include intelli-
gence, age (for the most part), and addiction. Because society as a whole and even
those who are disadvantaged by these traits-the less intelligent, the elderly, and the
addicted-continue to believe that such traits serve legitimate social functions, they
have not generated social movements challenging exclusions and discriminations
based on them.
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condition: they helped trigger IBSMs that otherwise would not have
developed. The law not only helped define the class of people stigma-
tized by their defining traits, but also strongly contributed to the
class's willingness to challenge not only legal, but also social stigmas.
The law did that by simultaneously raising the costs of the stigma and
bringing members of the stigmatized class together, both physically
and intellectually. The law did not assure that minority people would
form a social movement, for law could also raise the costs of objecting
to stigmatic exclusions. The particular configuration of public law in
the mid-twentieth century was probably a precondition for a series of
IBSMs and pressed these otherwise different movements toward strik-
ingly similar rhetoric, agendas, and political dynamics. 7
1. Defining the Class and the Disadvantage
Law contributed to the process by which groups of otherwise dis-
similar people came to feel that they were, because of their classifica-
tion, "similarly situated." Because law helped render particular traits
salient and ensured that they would be the subject of official discourse
and application, it contributed to rigidly conceptualized trait-based
identities. One's identity as a "colored" man was reinforced by lan-
guage in the statute books and the proceedings in courts and adminis-
trative tribunals. One could say that social attitudes preceded and
motivated legal rules, 5 but during the apartheid period those rules
did more than reflect social attitudes. For birth certificates, voting,
licensing, and other government-sponsored activities, state officials
needed to categorize every person by race in order to enforce the
apartheid regime. In this way, segregation yielded an ongoing public
as well as private attention to race, and a discourse about who was
"colored" and who was not.5' This was also true at the national level:
57 I do not equate the birth control, women's, pro-choice, gay rights, civil rights,
and disability rights movements. They were distinct movements with different features.
For example, the first four movements involved gender roles in ways not directly impli-
cated by the last two. Sexuality and reproduction, in contrast, were expressly impli-
cated in all six. The civil rights movement was uniquely linked with slavery. The birth
control, women's, and pro-choice movements related to cooperative arrangements be-
tween men and women. The birth control, pro-choice, and gay rights movements im-
plicated conduct more directly than the others. And so on.
There is reason to debate this proposition because the social attitudes were
themselves the product of slavery, creating a legal as well as social institution that re-
stilted in longstanding rules and regulations that treated "colored" people differently
from "white" people.
" See, e.g., HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 40, at 111-53 (analyzing the legal discourse by
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officials of the armed forces and immigration officers had to make
race-based determinations for every person who served in the military
or tried to immigrate to the United States."° Some people resisted
their state-based racial categorizations, and a few litigated the matter
all the way to the Supreme Court.' Likewise, one's identity as "men-
tally retarded" was a legal determination and not purely a natural one.
Carrie Buck, the defendant sterilized by Virginia in the leading case of
Buck v. Bell, 112 was ruled to be congenitally feebleminded, a determina-
tion that medical examinations later suggested was unfounded. 3
Scholars maintain that the diagnosis of feeblemindedness was a con-
sequence of racial, class, and gender biases as much as scientific
measurements of people's intelligence. 4
Law's entrenchment of sexual orientation as a totalizing social
trait was just as dramatic. Women who were sexually attracted to
other women had little in common with men attracted to other men
except by operation of law and social attitudes. By the end of World
War II, military policy had established lesbians and (male) "homo-
sexuals" as similarly predatory and unfit for military service. 65 After
which race was determined); SCOrr L. MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD: THE
AMERICAN MISADVENTURE OF RACE (2000) (tracing the evolution of race in American
society); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nine-
teenth Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998) (examining trial records where racial de-
terminations were made); Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8 RARITAN 39
(1988) (analyzing miscegenation law from the first case in 1819 through the last case
in 1970).
60 See HANEI LPEZ, supra note 40, at 45, 59, 88-89 (describing categories drawn by
immigration officials to enforce race-based exclusions); see also Gerald Torres & Kath-
ryn Milthn, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case,
1990 DUKE L.J. 625 (arguing that judicial application of the Non-Intercourse Act de-
pended on whether a group continuously qualified as an American Indian tribe).
6 The most famous was Homer Plessy, whose African-American great-grandparent
led the state and federal judiciary to classify him as "colored" in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 541 (1896). For background on Plessy v. Ferguson, see CHARLES A. LOFGREN,
THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1987). See HANEY LOPEZ,
supra note 40, for an exhaustive study ofjudges' and administrators' race judgments in
immigration cases.
62 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
63 See KEVLES, supra note 30, at 110-12 (noting that evidence of Carrie Buck's low
intelligence would be considered weak today, and that her daughter was considered
bright).
(" See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 331 (1985)
(analyzing Buck v. Bell and arguing that Carrie Buck in fact was not mentally disabled).
See generally Ruii COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS
UNDER AMERICAN LAW 163-93 (1996) (discussing the identification and treatment of
the disabled by the law).
65 On the evolution of the exclusion of homosexual men, see ALLAN BILRUBK,
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the war, "homosexuals and sex perverts" of both sexes were firmly es-
tablished in the statute books and case law, not only as outlaws but
also as supposed child molesters episodically hunted by the state.r;
Moreover, the sex-regulatory state worked with Puritan social norms to
create a pervasive discourse about homosexuality. Policemen, army
doctors and navy investigators, liquor inspectors, public school boards
and principals, film and book censors, FBI agents, state investigating
committees, immigration officials, and other agents of the federal,
state, and local government interrogated people about their own and
other people's sexuality. 7 These interrogations yielded social knowl-
edge that not only reinforced the salience of sexual orientation as an
identity trait but also created curiosity about it. For example, many
first realized they were homosexuals after they had been interrogated
by state agents, such as the doctors who examined military recruits
during World War I1.r8
Law also played a role in the overdetermination of sex and gen-
der. Cross-dressing laws explicitly served to police gender conformity,
even as to attire. Marriage and birth certificate requirements contrib-
uted to doctors' snap binary judgments about a newborn's sex-"it's a
boy" or "it's a girl"-that were sometimes oversimple and occasionally
flat wrong.) State policies "protecting" women against working in cer-
tain occupations or for longer hours than men, excusing them from
compulsory service on juries and the armed forces, and rewarding
them for marriage to men were more indirect policies reinforcing the
traditional notion of separate spheres, whereby men operated in the
COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR
TwO (1990). Regarding the exclusion of lesbians, see LEISA D. MEYER, CREATING G1
JANE: SEXUALITY AND POWER IN THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS DURING WORLD WAR II
158-59 (1996).
r~r, See George ChaunceyJr., The Postwar Sex Crime Panic, in TRUE STORIES FROM THE
AMERICAN PAST 160, 170 (William Graebner ed., 1993) (discussing the rise of public
hysteria over sex crimes against children and women during the early 1950s and the
resulting societal response to those perceived as sexually deviant, including homosexu-
als); Estelle B. Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the Sexual Psychopath,
1920-1960, 74J. AM. HIsT. 83, 94 (1987) (discussing how the police frequently targeted
homosexuals when rounding up "perverts" and child molesters).
67 See D'EMILIO, supra note 14, at 41-48 (detailing the many examples of state in-
terrogation about sexual orientation).
CIBS RUBIZ, supra note 65, at 22-25, 243-44.
69 See, e.g.,John Money et al., An Examination of Some Basic Sexual Concepts: The Evi-
dence of Human Hermaphroditism, 97 BULL.JOHNS HOPKINS HosP. 301, 301 (1955) ("De-
spite advancements of knowledge in embryology and endocrinology, most people have
continued to make an absolute dichotomy between male and female .... ").
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public sphere and women in the domestic one.7O
Legal discriminations also provided concrete manifestations of in-
choate social prejudices and stereotypes that could be identified and
challenged. Racism and homophobia were sprawling social attitudes
or collections of beliefs not easily susceptible to open discourse or re-
sistance by their victims. 7 1 There was not a clear process for changing
those attitudes, either in individuals or in society as a whole. Because
attitudes could be cloaked, one could not even know whether one has
ever refuted or erased them. In contrast, racist statutes or anti-
homosexual rules of enforcement were much more concrete targets.
The person of color or the homosexual could identify the state's
stance and, oftentimes, the rationale undergirding it. There were es-
tablished procedures for changing or modifying the rules. That which
could be identified could be resisted, and official rationales could be
refuted or debated. Their debate and reform or repeal could be con-
ducted wholesale-society-wide-and not just retail-individual by in-
dividual.
The modern era thrives on sharply drawn classifications and con-
crete rules. Law is the epitome of both. If an IBSM consists of per-
sons and their allies who resist their stigmatization because of bad
classifications, and requires concrete advances to attract members (as
we shall see below), law is all but necessary for such a movement to ex-
ist.
2. Raising the Costs of the Stigmatized Trait and
Lowering the Costs of Challenging the Trait
Another effect of law was to raise the costs of the stigmatized trait
to the minority person. If Jews were excluded from Harvard and Yale
in the 1920s because of their ethnicity, they could still go to public
universities, such as City College, and their pre-college public school
70 See, e.g., ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING
WOMEN IN THE UNITEI) STATES 181 (1982) ("[Protective labor legislation] therefore
bears some of the responsibility for successfilly institutionalizing women's secondary
labor force position."); JULIE A. MA'rTIAEL, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN
AMERICA: WOMEN'S WORK, THE SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOR, AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CAPITALISM 217-18 (1982) (arguing that protective labor legislation for women was
enacted to limit the competitive effect that their lower wages were having on working
men as well as to preserve women for their roles as homemakers and mothers).
71 A literature along these lines matured after World War II. See, e.g., GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 12-13, 371 (abr. ed. 1958) (arguing that preju-
dice consists of an attitude of favor/disfavor stemming from an overgeneralized belief,
a combination that often becomes entrenched in one's personality).
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education helped them achieve an upward mobility. When the state
has internalized the social norm, the costs of the stigma to the pariah
are higher. Thus, people of color growing up in the South were not
only excluded from prestigious private universities and colleges such
as Duke and Davidson, but also from all public institutions such as the
Universities of Texas and Virginia. Nor did they have much hope of
getting into Harvard and Yale, because apartheid limited their aspira-
tions even at the grade and secondary school levels. Similarly, women
were excluded from most prestigious institutions of learning,2 and
their pre-college education was not encouraging.
Education is merely one example of the effect of state discrimina-
tion on a social group. State discrimination raised the tangible disad-
vantages for stigmatized groups in other ways as well. People of color
and homosexuals were more likely to be arrested and sent to prison
than whites and heterosexuals. The mentally retarded and homo-
sexuals were more likely than their mainstream counterparts to be in-
carcerated in psychiatric institutions and tortured physically as well as
mentally. Women, people of color, and disabled folks were less likely
to have access to government jobs and, hence, were likely to have
overall lower incomes than white men without disabilities. Homo-
sexuals, people with disabilities, and persons attracted to different-
race partners were unable to marry the people with whom they were
in love and were, instead, episodically persecuted for what the state
considered forbidden love.
For many marginalized Americans, the greatest cost of state stigma
was intangible, taking the form of shame that they internalized as a
consequence of pervasive state and social signals. This was the point
of the "doll studies": African-American children ashamed of their own
skin color preferred white dolls over darker ones.7  Gay people and
people with disabilities felt a similar shame. Their deviation from the
normal, however, was something much worse than a misfortune: it
72 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536-37 (1996) (documenting the
long-time exclusion of women from public and private universities).
73 See Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Prejerence in Ne-
gro Children, in READINGS SOC. PSYCtHOL. 169, 175-78 (Theodore M. Newcomb &
Eugene L. Hartley eds., 1947) (describing a controlled test where African-American
children were asked to pick racially marked dolls according to which doll they liked
"best," which doll was "nice," or which doll looked "bad"); see also Patricia 1. Williams,
Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singudar Times, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 525, 542-43 (1990) (relating author's experience of passing by a five-and-dime
store and observing a bin of identically molded doll sets for sale: white doll sets for
$3.99, and black doll sets for $1.99).
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was felt as a mark of Cain, a moral as well as psychic or physical de-
fect.14 State discrimination played an indeterminate but surely signifi-
cant role in this internalized stigma.
In short, when the law, as well as society, engages in trait-based
shaming and discrimination, the cost of the norm is higher, and pos-
sibly much higher, to stigmatized persons. This higher cost provides a
reason for marginalized people to engage in activism to change the
norm through well-established procedures to change a law. The high
cost of a stigma, however, does not provide a sufficient reason for this
activism; the rational person will not participate in a social movement
if the costs of participation are higher than the expected benefits.
Southern states were able to sustain apartheid in part by making it
very costly for people of color to protest the arrangement. Dissidents
were met with social ostracism, loss of employment, state harassment,
and sometimes imprisonment or lynching.75 The NAACP, the primary
civil rights organization for decades, was originally organized in the
North, where the costs of organizing were much lower than in the
South.7"
For similar reasons, homosexuals not only failed to organize
against state discrimination, but few even dared to come out of their
closets before the 1960s. The only homophile organization founded
between 1900 and 1951 was in Chicago. The local police busted the
organization and arrested its founder, Henry Gerber, who also lost his
job with the postal service.77 Not only was the state able to abort this
effort at social reform, but its draconian response had a deterrent ef-
fect for years to come. In contrast to people of color and homosexu-
als, women and some disabled people were able to organize before
the war because the state did not mobilize against them. Their or-
ganizations were able to achieve some political progress-including
federal programs for disabled veterans,' local and state laws requiring
74 See, e.g, BERI'RAM J. COHLER & ROBERT M. GALATZER-LEVY, THE COURSE OF GAY
AND LESBIAN LIVES: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES 263-73 (2000) (de-
scribing the shame and self-hatred felt by homosexuals as a result of antigay preju-
dice); Ilan H. Meyer, Minority Stress and Mental Health in Gay Men, 36J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 38, 40 (1995) ("Long before they begin to realize their own homosexuality,
homosexually-oriented people internalize societal antihomosexual attitudes.").
75 See LITWACK, supra note 38, at 217-79 (detailing the means by which southern
society discouraged black resistance and organization).
76 See generally CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP 9-45 (1967) (recounting the early
history of the NAACP).
77 See Henry Gerber, The Society for Human Rights-1925, ONE, Sept. 1962, at 5 (giv-
ing a first-person account of his arrest, trial, and discharge from the postal service).
78 See FLEISCHER & ZAMES, sulpra note 15, at 170-74 (describing veterans' rehabilita-
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accommodations for blind people,7 and suffrage for women as well as
national debate over the ERA, which was first introduced in the 1923
session of Congress."
One feature of American law that potentially reduces the costs of
social dissent is objectors' access to courts that will protect them. Be-
fore 1945, the Supreme Court had set forth constitutional principles
that potentially served to protect dissidents from government censor-
ship. In 1925, for example, the Court suggested that the First
Amendment applied to the states,81 a constitutional assumption ampli-
fied by subsequent cases protecting political speech against state syn-1182
dicalism laws and prior restraints. Theoretically, the NAACP and
homophile groups could rely on the Freedom of Speech Clause of the
First Amendment to protect their members, but as of 1945 it was not
clear exactly what the Speech Clause protected. For example, nothing
in the Speech Clause protects people's freedom to associate, nor was it
clear that the clause covered expressive conduct, like marching. Fur-
thermore, there was reason to doubt that federal judges would stick
their necks out for despised minorities, especially in those parts of the
country most hostile to them. In short, people of color and homo-
sexuals were unable to organize effectively, in substantial part because
officers of the law as well as private citizens could be expected to re-
taliate with impunity against activists.
3. Shared Group Consciousness
A social group defined and penalized by legal stigmas will not
have an incentive to organize so long as most of its members view
their stigma as justified, acceptable, or inevitable. Although modern
educated discourse considers it shameful for someone to have atti-
tudes that are racist, sexist, or homophobic, throughout most of
American history educated folks thought that way. In 1900, people
tion programs adopted after both world wars).
79 See SCOTCH, supra note 15, at 28-29 (discussing the guide dog laws and white
cane laws enacted to accommodate blind people starting in the 1930s).
80 See MANSBRIDGE, sup/ra note 13, at 8-14 (providing an early history of the ERA);
Verta Taylor, Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance, 54 AM. SOC.
REV. 761, 762-64 (1989) (describing a peak in the women's movement during the pe-
riod between 1900 and 1920).
81 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), overruled on other grounds by Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
82 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1937) (overturning a conviction un-
der a state's syndicalism law); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23
(1931) (holding unconstitutional a state's prior restraint law).
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stigmatized because of their race, sex, disabilities, or (what we call)
sexual orientation would have accepted, for the most part, their de-
graded status as natural or acceptable or would have just acquiesced in
"the way things are." Other circumstances were necessary before a
stigmatized social group could form a consensus that its subordination
was unjustified. Those circumstances were falling into place during
the 1940s, in part owing to government and the law.
The most important variable was probably urbanization, which
concentrated blacks and homosexuals in big cities and offered women
the prospect of smaller families and more employment opportuni-
ties.' Urbanization generally occurred without state action, but the
state accelerated the effects of urbanization on minority consciousness
with the greatest governmental venture of the last century: World War
II8 The war's unprecedented mobilization of an entire country was a
tremendous stimulus to minority "groupthink," as it brought people
of color and homosexuals into the war effort, albeit as second-class
citizens, and put millions of women and people with disabilities to
work on the home frontii Accordingly, women experienced the re-
sponsibilities of work outside the home, people of color experienced
the responsibilities of military service, and homosexuals experienced
the responsibilities of fighting side by side with heterosexuals-and
most of them not only enjoyed the new roles thrust upon them, but
also were proud of their own contributions. By putting "colored"
people together into segregated units, throwing women together in
sex-segregated workforces, and reminding homosexuals of their
stigma at the same time the armed forces were throwing men together
into situations that often became sexualized, the state's war effort had
83 Numerous authors have commented on the concentration of Americans in big
cities and its effect on minority groups. See, e.g., CAROLINE BIRD ET AL., WHAT WOMEN
WANT 106 (1979) (linking women's job opportunities outside the home to their equal-
ity demands); LITWACK, supra note 38, at 481-96 (describing the migration of blacks to
northern cities during the twentieth century); John D'Emilio, Capitalismn and Gay Iden-
tity, in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 24, at 100, 105-08 (emphasizing the importance
of capitalism and urbanization for gay people's consciousness).
84 On the synergistic effect of World War II and urbanization, see D'EMILIO, supra
note 14, at 29; HAROLD R. ISAACS, THE NEW WORLD OF NEGRO AMERICANS 41-44
(1963); NEIL A. WYNN, THE AFRO-AMERICAN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 12-20
(1976); Richard M. Dalfiume, The "Forgolen Years" of the Negro Revolution, 55 J. AM.
HIST. 90, 99-100, 102 (1968).
85 See generally BERUBE, sulira note 65 (relating the war experience tZ homosexu-
als); FLEISCHER & ZAMES, supra note 15, at 12-13 (relating the war experience of peo-
ple with disabilities); MORRISJ. MACGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES:
1940-1965 (1989) (detailing the integration of the U.S. military); MEYER, su/nra note 65
(relating the war experience of women).
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the effect of promoting a group consciousness among stigmatized mi-
norities. After the war normalization returned with a vengeance;
people of color went back to hometown apartheid, women and blind
people lost their wartime jobs, women married to mother the baby
boom, and homosexuals were hounded out of the armed forces and
the federal government in a series of witch hunts and purges. But
these people, who were supposed to be at the bottom of society, had
enjoyed a shared taste of camaraderie with fellow group members and
a taste of equality with straight white men-and many of them could
not get it out of their systems. Trait-based disadvantages that were ac-
cepted as natural or inevitable before the war became grating and
contingent after the war. Also, the war created a whole new class of
disabled people: paralyzed veterans.
Another cluster of state policies fueled this aborning solidarity
with information and ideas that undermined the foundations of stig-
matizing discrimination. A central policy of the modern American
state has been public education available to all. This policy yielded
high levels of literacy in the United States by mid-century, and the ex-
panding literate public had some access to ideas and books that criti-
cized old prejudices and stereotypes. An educated person is much
more likely to object to a stigma, and certain books created an infor-
mal national network of minority readers thinking along the same
iconoclastic lines. Although the public school system loyally indoctri-
nated children with traditional myths and stereotypes, the public-
schooled black person read An American Dilemma7 and Invisible Man"
and realized that his resentment at serving a country with racist poli-
cies was widely shared. The literate lesbian read The Well of Lonelinessr9
and realized that other women felt as she did, while the homosexual
read about scientific papers criticizing the idea that homosexuals were
mentally ill, and started thinking that the shrinks were the crazy ones.
Similarly, educated women read A Room of One's Own,") Planned Par-
8; But cf ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF
MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 24-33 (1961) (providing examples of certain
situations where stigmatized people do not necessarily form social groups).
17 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944) (giving a devastating depiction
of American racism and apartheid).
8 RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1947) (providing a searing account of the mar-
ginalization and erasure of a human being because of his race).
89 RADCLYFFE HALL, THE WELL OF LONELINESS (1928) (presenting a liberating de-
piction of love between women).
90 VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN (1929) (rejecting the patriarchal idea
that women must exist only in relation to their husbands and children).
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enthood's pamphlets, and magazine articles on abortion and realized
that women all over the world were taking control of their own bodies
and minds. Local governments often tried to censor literature and
magazines bringing subversive ideas and images into their locales, but
the judiciary was usually willing to overturn these efforts.' Public
education also worked synergistically with the federal government's
opposition to, and then war against, Nazi Germany. Even before our
entry into World War II, American state policy and educated opinion
were hostile to fascism, and many Americans were associating the Na-
zis' racist and eugenic philosophy with hated fascism. Both minorities
and some mainstream Americans identified our democracy as stand-
ing resolutely against prejudice-and came to believe that our own
apartheid and other discriminations were inconsistent with our ideals
and our anti-totalitarian stance .) The Nazis, in short, gave racism and
eugenics a bad name. This process continued after World War II,
when Communism replaced fascism as the alien enemy.93
B. State Forums as a (Partial) Solution to Collective Action Problems
Even if many individuals realize they would be better off working
together to end or reduce discrimination against them, and even if
they could engage in activism with little cost, few of them will actually
contribute to the collective good. Limiting the production of "public
goods," which are goods shared by all members of the group, is the
free rider problem: unless sharing the public good can be denied to
those who do not contribute to its formation, individuals in the group
" See, e.g., United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1936) (pro-
tecting birth control materials from seizure); People ex rel. Savery v. Gotham Book
Mart, 285 N.Y.S. 563, 568-70 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1936) (protecting the autobiography
of homosexual author Andr6 Gide); VERA BRITTAIN, RADCLYFFE HALL: A CASE OF
OBSCENITY? 147-49 (1968) (explaining a court's decision to overturn censorship of The
Well of Loneliness).
92 See, e.g., CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND
REVIvAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT, 202-05 (1991) (arguing that
anti-Nazi feelings dampened enthusiasm for eugenics among Americans); Mary L.
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 68-70 (1988) (argu-
ing that anti-Nazi feelings called American apartheid into question); Richard Weiss,
Ethnicity and Reform: Minorities and the Ambience of the Depression Years, 66 J. AM. HIST.
566, 571-72 (1979) (arguing that anti-Nazi feelings supported tolerance for a wide
range of American minorities).
93As to the importance of anti-Communism to the American anti-apartheid
movement, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Conveyance Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980); Dudziak, supra note 92, at 73-76.
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have insufficient incentives to contribute. : 4 Why should I engage in a
costly activity when I shall share in the benefit regardless of my level of
participation? If most people think this way, few will contribute to the
public good, and comparatively little of it will be produced.
The free rider problem, however, does not foreclose group or-
ganization completely. Minority group members and their sympathiz-
ers who gain positive benefit or utility from working with like-minded
reformers toward a goal they value for its own sake, will still engage in
activism, notwithstanding the failure of most other group members to
contribute. Also, sympathetic outsiders can create organizations that
virtually represent the interests of minorities without any participation
by beneficiaries in the early stages. Associations staffed by such group-
minded altruists or agenda entrepreneurs can be viewed as elite organi-
zations because they are staffed by a small number of the relatively ad-
vantaged and well-educated members of the minority or its sympathiz-
ers. Primary examples of such organizations from the mid-twentieth
century include the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP), Planned Parenthood, the National Federation
of the Blind (NFB), the National Women's Party (NWP), and the Mat-
tachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis (early homophile
groups) .'' It is easier for elite organizations to petition agencies,
courts, and legislatures than to change public opinion directly. If any
of these state organs is receptive to the reformist message of the elite
organizations, the reformers can make headway and thrive. The
above-listed organizations followed a variety of different strategies,
depending on the nature of their claims and the institutional motiva-
tions of the possible state audiences. All of the strategies depended
critically on appeals to unelectedjudges and administrators.
Minority groups whose members were subject to intense commu-
nity prejudice had little choice but to appeal primarily to the judiciary.
State and (especially) federal judges were relatively more receptive to
,J' See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11, at 11 (1989) ("The impossibility of
exclusion raises the likelihood that purely voluntary schemes for providing a public
good will break down."); MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (rev. ed., Schocken Books 1971) (1965)
(describing the disincentives for individuals to contribute to group action).
95 For accounts of these groups, see D'EMILIO, supra note 14, at 57-125, discussing
homophile groups; GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, sup ra note 13, at 1-37, 100-06,
discussing Connecticut's Planned Parenthood and its predecessor association;
SCOTCH, supra note 15, at 33-34, discussing the NFB; MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S
LEGAL STRAIEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987), discussing the
NAACP; and Taylor, supra note 80, profiling the NWP.
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these groups than legislators were because judges were partly insu-
lated from local political pressure and were more committed to the
constitutional values of due process, equal protection, and free ex-
pression and association."c' Also, the lack of a large membership base
was less of a disadvantage for elite organizations when they were suing
in court than when they were petitioning the legislature. While the
judiciary was the best hope for such groups, this did not ensure that
the hope would be anything but hollow. For their own institutional
and political reasons, however, federal judges in the mid-twentieth
century were willing to respond to these groups by recognizing uni-
versal human rights under the U.S. Constitution.97
The NAACP was the primary organizational critic of race-based
discriminations in the prewar period, and its strategy for change was
dominated by constitutional challenges to segregation laws in federal
court. This organization, dedicated to resisting the principle and
policies of apartheid, never enjoyed a large membership, and people
of color were not, for most of the century, a potent political group,
even in the northern states. While the NAACP energetically publi-
cized the wrongs of segregation and persuaded many intellectuals of
the rightness of its agenda, moral suasion had little impact on legisla-
tures. In contrast, federal judges were a receptive audience, partly be-
cause of their comparative independence and partly because they
were responsible to a national constituency that was increasingly em-
barrassed by the racist policies of the South.:' For example, the ag-
gressive deployment of the death penalty against people of color ac-
cused (often without foundation) of raping white women found no
effective remedies in the legislatures or courts of the South, but fed-
96 The statements in the text are, on the whole, more characteristic of federal than
statejudges because the former are appointed for life and do not have to be confirmed
by local electors or legislative bodies, while the latter typically are elected for fixed
terms and are relatively more beholden to local opinion.
97 On the strong conceptual turn from positivism and toward universal human
rights among Supreme Court Justices, see David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Demo-
cratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J.
741, 746-79 (1981), and Robert M. Cover, The Origins of.ludicial Activism in the Protection
of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982). See also RICHARD A. PRIMUs, THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 180, 180-233 (1999) ("A major change in American conceptions
of rights occurred sometime between the 1920s and the 1960s, but many scholars fail
to give sufficient emphasis to anti-totalitarianism and especially anti-Nazism when try-
ing to account for that transformation.").
98 See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVil. RiGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 95-101 (2000) (discussing the successes of the NAACP before
the Supreme Court); Bixby, supra note 97, at 762-79 (documenting individual justices'
views on civil rights circa 1940).
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eral judges found the practice barbaric. The Supreme Court's con-
struction of the Due Process Clause requiring state-appointed counsel
in death penalty cases came as a result of precisely such a prosecu-
tion. The federal judiciary, moreover, was populated by New Deal
lawyers and activists who were more sympathetic to the plight of the
disenfranchised than the old order of judges had been. Civil rights
attorneys and the new order of federal judges formed a symbiotic rela-
tionship that proved incredibly fruitful.""
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. (the "Inc. Fund") in the
1940s and 1950s successfully challenged particular apartheid laws and
practices as violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.'0 ' The New Deal Court, appalled by the predicament of racial
minorities and the racist policies permeating the South, was deter-
mined to shape constitutional law to eradicate racially motivated injus-
tice. ' 2 Once this judicial inclination became clear, civil rights lawyers
openly challenged the apartheid regime itself.0 3 In a careful litigation
campaign, the NAACP drew support from local activists, national ad-
vocates, and its own lawyers to bring a series of cases seeking racial in-
tegration of the public schools. After a series of small victories, in
which the Court invalidated specific instances of segregation but not
the overall practice, the NAACP won a momentous legal victory in
Brown v. Board of Education,0 4 where the Court ruled that dejure racial
segregation of public schools is inconsistent with the Equal Protection
y Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49-50, 71-73 (1932); see Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (overturning a state conviction tainted by lynch mob pressure).
Both cases are discussed in KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 94-104.
'w For a glimpse of this symbiosis, see the first-hand account in Philip Elman, The
Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral
History, 100 HARV. L. REv. 817, 824-26 (1987), discussing the coordinated strategy by
civil rights attorneys and some of the Supreme CourtJustices to wait and gain strength
before attempting to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson in the legal fight to end discrimination.
101 The string of successful NAACP-sponsored lawsuits began with Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347, 367 (1915), which declared grandfather clauses used to take the
vote from blacks to be violative of the Fifteenth Amendment, and ran through Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), which outlawed segregation in public
schools, and continued with cases implementing Brown. See generally KLUGER, supra
note 12 (discussing the many nuances of Brown and placing them in the context of the
civil rights movement); TuSHNET, supra note 95, at 1-2 (describing the NAACP coordi-
nated litigation campaign of 1925 to 1950).
112 See Bixby, supra note 97, at 762-79 (providing documentation for the motiva-
tions of most of the Justices in the 1940s).
103 See TUSHNET, supra note 95, at 114-15 (describing how in 1948 the NAACP re-
solved to attack apartheid directly).
104 347 U.S. at 495.
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Clause. Brown did not immediately result in desegregation, however.
It merely stimulated a decades-long process by which school boards,
episodically prodded by judges and powerfully prodded by the federal
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) after 1965,




Both before and after Brown, local groups of African Americans
challenged busing segregation policies in the South. The most cele-
brated challenge was the boycott organized in Montgomery, Alabama,
after activist Rosa Parks refused to sit in the back of a bus. The Mont-
gomery bus boycott, which thrust Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. into na-
tional prominence and spawned the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) as a grassroots complement to the NAACP, was
resolved in favor of the boycotters by the Supreme Court's invalida-
tion of Montgomery's bus segregation laws in November 1956.0'  In
the case of the seminal Montgomery boycott, the role of Brown was
threefold. First, Brown emboldened people of color to work together
by increasing the likelihood that federal judges would support their
107campaign. Second, the ultimate success of the boycott was not as-
10, Numerous authors have presented a variety of perspectives on the uneven im-
plementation of Brown. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAw
594-601 (3d ed. 1992) (noting the obstacles to proper implementation that allow for
continued racial segregation in America's schools); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, Ill, FROM
BROWN'rO BAKKI2 THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 66-
69 (1979) (defending the Court's implementation decision in Brown Has pragmatically
sound); Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 755 (1986) (taking note of the "freedom of choice" alternative
to implementation by government-ordered integration).
NA; Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (per curiam); see MORRIS, supra note
12, at 63 (detailing the court's decision and discussing its import). For an account of
the bus boycotts of the 1950s, see id. at 17-25, 40-76.
107 See GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 12, at 59-63 (noting how blacks in
Montgomery rallied behind King and the bus boycotts while the legal process moved
along); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOwARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY
STORY 53, 191 (1958) (providing a first-hand account of the Montgomery boycott).
Michael Klarman argues that Brown had only some, but not much, inspirational effect
on civil rights activists. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 77-79 (1994). Although there is much evidence to dispute
Klarman's claims, see id. at 77 n.333 & 79 n.342 (collecting sources); David j. Garrow,
Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L.
REV. 151, 152-57 (1994) (demonstrating Brown's direct relevance to the success of the
Montgomery bus boycott), my assertion does not depend on an inspirational theory
alone: for rational actors considering whether to instigate or cooperate in the Mont-
gomery bus boycott, Brown increased the odds of success and the costs of white resis-
tance. For a more radical critique of Brown's impact, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING AIiOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 107-56 (1991).
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sured until the Supreme Court applied Brown to invalidate Montgom-
ery's policy of bus segregation.0 8 Third, in part because of Brown, sev-
eral of the violent showdowns between boycotters and law enforce-
ment attracted unprecedented national press coverage to the struggle
against apartheid and helped turn opinion against the segregation-
ists. 109
Homosexuals scored fewer litigation successes before 1961 but,
like civil rights groups, looked to the courts as primary venues for ad-
vancing their goals within a system that discriminated against them.
This decision is an easy one to understand; legislators were almost
unrelentingly hostile to "degenerates," "psychopaths," and "sex per-
verts," as homosexuals were labeled in the statute books. While hardly.
friendly to gay litigants, judges were less hostile to their interests and
modestly protected homophile efforts to preserve spaces for their as-
sociation and information-sharing. New York courts in the 1930s, for
example, enjoined state censorship of books realistically depicting
lesbian and gay lives."0 The first public homophile association was the
Mattachine Society, whose initial public relations coup came in the
courtroom, where it successfully defended (on grounds of entrap-
ment) one of its members who had been arrested for lewd solicita-
tion."' The first public homophile publication was One magazine,
published by One, Inc. When the United States Postal Service im-
108 Because the Supreme Court decision affirming the lower court decision against
bus segregation in Montgomery, Gayle, 352 U.S. at 903, came on the same day that a
state judge had enjoined the boycott under state law as unfair competition with the bus
companies, African-American boycotters received an immediate victory and the faith to
persevere in their worthwhile cause. See GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 12,
at 80-82 (discussing the sense of relief and high emotion felt in response to the Su-
preme Court's decision).
"00 See GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 12, at 63-66, 70-75 (discussing the
change in sentiment as Montgomery blacks and whites came under increased media
attention). In a recurring pattern, the civil rights bus victory was followed by a white
backlash that included violence against blacks. See id. at 83-86 (describing attacks on
King, associates of King, and Montgomery bus riders following the legal victory). See
generally Klarman, supra note 107, at 11, 141-49 (arguing that Brown's greatest contribu-
tion was to trigger violent white resistance in the South, which mobilized more pro-
gressive opinions on civil rights in the North).
"0 See, e.g., People ex rel. Savery v. Gotham Book Mart Inc., 285 N.Y.S. 563, 570
(N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1936) (holding that material about homosexual life did not vio-
late an obscenity statute).
"1 See DaleJennings, To Be Accused Is to Be Guilty, ONE, Jan. 1953, at 12-13 (giving a
first-person account of the man charged with lewd solicitation); see also STUART
TIMMONS, THE TROUBLE WITH HARRY HAY: FOUNDER OF THE MODERN GAY MOVEMENT
163-68 (1990) (exploring the role of Dale Jennings' lewd solicitation case as a mile-
stone in the Mattachine Society's evolution).
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pounded copies of its October 1954 issue on grounds of obscenity, the
journal went to court and ultimately won a ruling that the impound-
ment was unconstitutional, in the first Supreme Court opinion pro-
tecting homosexuals against state intrusion.' 12 Judges in New York and
the District of Columbia imposed burdens of proof on prosecutors
that slowed down police dragnets of male homosexuals after the
war. 11 During the 19 50s, the California Supreme Court protected gay
bars from being closed down by the state simply because "homosexu-
als and sex perverts" hung out in them. ' 4 None of these victories was
as momentous as the NAACP's victory in Brown, and for every court
victory there were a dozen rebuffs.
Women were neither as dependent on nor as successful as African
Americans and gay people in seeking the aid of judges in advancing
their equality interests. Before 1970, there was no feminist litigating
group comparable to the NAACP's Inc. Fund, and equal protection
challenges to the many state statutory sex discriminations were uni-
formly unsuccessful at the Supreme Court until 1971." An Equal
Rights Amendment was introduced in Congress as early as 1923 and
developed broad general support; but it did not pass both chambers
of Congress until 1972, and even that effort failed at the state ratifica-
tion stage.''](
Women's most controversial claims were for the control of the
conditions of their pregnancies. A rule of thumb was that when
women could form coalitions with established male groups, like doc-
tors and lawyers, they could achieve their goals in the legislature.
Courts were most useful when those coalitions were blocked by in-
tensely interested local groups, especially religious ones. Margaret
Sanger's birth control movement, for example, first sought judicial
nullification or narrowing of anti-contraception laws. Although
Sanger went to jail, the New York Court of Appeals construed the anti-
112 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371,371 (1958) (per curiam).
113 See ESKRIDGE, GAYIAW, supra note 14, at 85-86 (describing these cases).
Id. at 93-95 (describing a California case where the court held that a well-known
gay bar could not have its license revoked "without proof of the commission of illegal
or immoral acts on the premises").
1.5 See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a Michigan
statute forbidding licensed female bartenders except in instances where they were the
wives or daughters of male liquor establishment owners).
H,; See MANSBRII)GE, supra note 13, at 8-10 (discussing the progress of the Equal
Rights Amendment through Congress and barriers to the Amendment posed by sev-
eral women's organizations); RiODE, suifra note 13, at 63-80 (recounting the failed
ERA campaign).
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Sanger's approach was a rational strategy for an elite organization
without powerful political support. Once the Supreme Court signaled
interest in enforcing the Speech Clause, lower court judges narrowed
the federal Comstock Act to allow birth control devices and informa-
tion to flow freely across state lines."8 At the state level, Sanger and
her allies worked through legislation as well as lawsuits. Most state
laws barring dissemination of contraceptives or birth control advice
were formally repealed by legislatures, but it required constitutional
decisions by the Supreme Court to clear away the remaining laws in
Griswold v. Connecticut' " and Eisenstadt v. Baird.""
The pro-choice movement also demonstrates how elite organiza-
tions could work through legislatures as well as courts to achieve their
goals. Abortion reform efforts in the 1960s generally were pressed by
elite organizations of doctors and lawyers (the American Law Institute
(ALI) and the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws
(NARAL), founded in 1968) and did not reflect mass involvement by
women. Legislatures in California and nine other states adopted laws
reflecting the abortion reform perspective of the ALI in the late 1960s.
In 1970, Hawaii enacted a repeal law reflecting the NARAL approach,
followed by New York, Alaska, and Washington.
2 1 Unlike black and
gay groups before them, the pro-choice movement succeeded in state
17 People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637, 683 (N.Y. 1918), appeal dismissed, 251 U.S. 537
(1919); see MARGARET SANGER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 216 (Dover Publications, Inc.
1971) (1938) (chronicling the opening of the first American birth control clinic).
"' See United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1936) (holding that
the Comstock Act does not bar importation of physician-prescribed birth control de-
vices); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding that the
Comstock Act cannot be applied to the distribution of sex education materials).
... 381 U.S. 491, 516 (1965) (striking down Connecticut's ban on contraception as
violative of the sanctity of the home and the rights of married persons). By 1940, only
Connecticut and Massachusetts had absolute bars on the distribution of birth control
devices, but their Roman Catholic-dominated legislatures were unlikely to repeal the
laws. Birth control advocates lost in state court challenges and won at the U.S. Su-
preme Court only after a quarter-century of effort. See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44,
46 (1943) (per curiam) (rejecting a physician's challenge to a state statute prohibiting
the giving of advice about the use of contraceptives because he lacked standing); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961) (barring a challenge to the same law challenged in
Tileston as not "ripe").
120 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating Massachusetts's contraception regula-
tions on the basis that the right of privacy protects an individual from "unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget child").
12' The reform and repeal efforts are described in LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION lI:
MAKINGTHE REVOLUTION 70,116-18,172 (1973).
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legislatures because abortion choice advocates were well organized,
represented elite (medical) opinion, and could plausibly claim to rep-
resent the views of the largest voting block in the state-women.
Nonetheless, women also litigated with remarkable success. Per-
haps judges recognized the emerging pro-choice movement as a po-
litical force to be reckoned with, a force which could be accommo-
dated because its pro-choice constitutional arguments fit within
several lines of substantive due process precedent. The first big litiga-
tion victories involved claims that abortion laws with exceptions for
the mother's "health" were too vague to provide doctors notice of
what is unlawful, as required by the Due Process Clause. The Califor-
nia and U.S. Supreme Courts declined to invalidate abortion laws on
this ground but construed the mother's health allowance to include
the mother's mental as well as physical health. l2  Activists also main-
tained that abortion on demand was entailed in the Griswold/Eisenstadt
privacy cases. The pro-choice victory in Roe v. Wade went beyond any-
body's expectations in sweeping away all state abortion laws, including
the liberalized ones in California and other states.
If a minority group were able to win the support of executive de-
partment officials, it could sometimes achieve results legislatures are
unwilling to give and courts unable to direct. The best-known exam-
ple is the desegregation of the United States armed forces, which was
ordered by President Truman in 1948.'" For a less well-known exam-
ple, the President's Committee on the Employment of the Handi-
capped (PCEH) was created after World War II in order to promote
the employment of disabled veterans. Although the PCEH mainly
concerned itself with traditional education and rehabilitation pro-
grams, it created a focal group of activists through the annual meet-
ings it sponsored on disability issues. The network of disability activ-
ists spawned by these meetings worked toward better programs for the
disabled and objected to state and federal discrimination against peo-
ple with disabilities. Although the PCEH and other disability rights
122 See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971) (requiring that the prose-
cution prove that an abortion was not needed for the preservation of the mother's
physical or mental health or life); People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 205 (Cal. 1969)
("Thus, the test established is a medical one, whether the pregnant woman's physical
and mental health will be furthered by abortion or by bearing the child to term, and
the assessment does not involve considerations beyond medical competence.").
12:1 See RICHARD M. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES:
FIGHTING ON TWO FRONrs, 1939-1953, at 115-121 (1969). See generally MACGREGOR,
supra note 85 (describing the fall of the legal, administrative, and social barriers to
black Americans' full participation in the United States armed forces).
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groups had modest successes in Congress and with the executive be-
fore 1973,' 24 their most dramatic pre-1973 victories were in federal
courts. Federaljudges of the 1960s and 1970s were hostile to any law
or practice which broadly excluded disabled people from public edu-
cation or other services.
12 5
C. A Prophylactic First Amendment and Over-Enforcement of
Discriminatory Laws as Triggers for Mass Social Movements
As the foregoing account suggests, law contributed to group con-
sciousness and motivation to seek greater equality by people of color,
gay people, women, and people with disabilities; it also offered
forums (especially courts) where even small and despised minorities
could press their claims. But the NAACP, the Mattachine Society,
Planned Parenthood, NWP, NFB, and the PCEH groups did not con-
stitute mass social movements, because they were not able to mobilize
great numbers of the minority on behalf of their causes. The last
stage in the creation of a social movement is the mobilization of many
people, notwithstanding collective action problems. At this point, a
psychological change occurs: what were previously considered per-
sonal "costs" in making sacrifices for a collective good (change in the
law) became "benefits" for a lot more people. The dynamics of collec-
tive action start to seem less like a prisoners' dilemma game and more
like an assurance game. Everyone understands that joint action would
benefit them all and would like to participate in the creation of this
public good, but no one is inclined to participate unless everyone else
(or a specified portion of the group) is also participating or is ex-
pected to participate.1
Law mattered critically in the transition of a reform movement led
by elite organizations (NAACP, Mattachine, NWP, PCEH) to a mass
social movement, where lots of people spontaneously became in-
,24 See SCOTCH, supra note 15, at 139-68 (describing federal administrative and leg-
islative measures taken to protect the rights of disabled people).
12, See id. at 37-40 (describing federal court decisions assuring equality for children
with disabilities).
126 DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 103-
140 (1991). On assurance games generally, see Thomas A. Schelling, Hockey Helmets,
Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Savings: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities, 17 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 381, 383-406 (1973), analyzing in technical and graphical fashion
binary choices with externalities, as found with coalitions, in the context of the pris-
oner's dilemma framework; and Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance, and the Social Rate
of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 113-15 (1967), discussing problems arising with the as-
surance game, including the need for enforcement.
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volved. ' Different legal actors unwittingly contributed in different
ways. The Supreme Court created an enormous constitutionally pro-
tected public space for dissent and protest. Under the auspices of the
Speech Clause, the Supreme Court ruled that state and local govern-
ments could not censor unorthodox or disrespectful identity speech,
nor vituperative criticisms of traditional policies;1 were barred from
outlawing or probing dissident organizations and associations;' had
to allow protest marches and rallies (subject to nondiscriminatory
time, place, and manner restrictions);"') could not harass unconven-
tional people without probable cause that they were violating a legiti-
mate law;"' could not discipline state teachers and other employees
simply because of their public political expression;"' and were re-
quired to allow objectionable groups equal space at public colleges
and universities." This body of law came together as an elaborate
program of strongly libertarian rules between 1963 and 1972, with vir-
tually no coordinated or effective opposition from state and federal
127 1 am thinking specifically of the civil rights movement's sit-ins and 1963 March
on Washington; the pro-choice as well as the women's liberation movements of the
1960s; and the gay liberation movement of the 1970s.
128 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (protecting an anti-draft
jacket with an emblazoned obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969)
(per curiam) (striking down a law that prohibited the Ku Klux Klan from advocating
violence and law-breaking); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135-37 (1966) (holding that a
state legislator has the right to make statements supporting those who choose to burn
their draft cards).
129 See Gibson v. Fl. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1963)
("[G]roups which themselves are neither engaged in subversive or other illegal or im-
proper activities... are to be protected in their rights of free and private associa-
tion."); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (protecting the
NAACP from state attempts to view its membership lists).
130 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 (1969) (finding ob-
structive use of permit requirement for public demonstrations unconstitutional); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 574 (1965) (holding that fair warning as to where a protest
could take place is mandated by the First Amendment).
131 See Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (striking down
an ordinance that allowed vagrancy convictions where racially mixed individuals rode
together in a car).
132 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) ("[A] teacher's exercise
of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment.").
':':' See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 (1972) (holding that a group which may
have a philosophy of disruption and violence must be allowed access to university stu-
dent group resources if it is found willing to obey reasonable campus rules and regula-
tions); Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 663 (1st Cir.
1974) (holding that a state university cannot ban a group's social activities where they
do not disrupt the work and discipline of the school).
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officials. Federal and state appellate court judges enthusiastically car-
ried out the program.
The effect of the Supreme Court's decisions is impossible to cali-
brate exactly, but it surely contributed to mass mobilization (as well as
vice versa). On the one hand, the expression-protective program sig-
nificantly lowered one of the bars to mass mobilization against state
discrimination. Many ordinary people would have been less likely to
join in an assurance game if they thought they would go to jail for par-
ticipating in its activities. The availability of federal courts as a remedy
made state censorship and obstruction less likely in 1961 than it had
been in 1951-and vastly less likely in 1971 than it had been in 1961.
On the other hand, when the state did clamp down on protest move-
ments, the foregoing jurisprudence gave the protesters good argu-
ments to persuade uncommitted observers that it was the state, and
not the protesters, that was behaving lawlessly.
This brings us to a critical point. For all of the IBSMs, there were
important showdowns between the state enforcing the status quo and
minorities objecting to it. Confrontational and seemingly arbitrary
enforcements of discriminatory laws quickened the transition of nas-
cent social movements into mass movements.
The revolutionary idea that women should have access to birth
control materials became the foundation of a social movement as a
result of a series of well-publicized clashes between the government
and Margaret Sanger. Her federal indictment in 1914 for violating
the Comstock Act drove her into self-imposed exile for a year, but she
returned to New York as a heroine whom the federal prosecutors
dared not prosecute. When they dropped the indictment in 1916,
Sanger was a "celebrity.' ' 3 4 Perhaps perceiving what tonic government
prosecution was for a social movement, Sanger thereupon opened a
birth control clinic in New York, dispensing materials that were illegal
under state law. The state arrested her and tried her in early 1917.
Sanger's trial and 30 days in jail were a public sensation that attracted
thousands of people to her cause."' In a piece de resistance, city po-
.' GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 13, at 11; see CHIESLER, supra note
13, at 126-40 (describing Sanger's personal struggles during the time of her emergence
as a celebrity); DAVID M. KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERIcA: THE CAREER OF
MARGARET SANGER 72-73 (1970) (describing husband William Sanger's arrest and trial
for the distribution of his wife's birth control pamphlets, a government action aimed at
flushing Margaret Sanger from hiding); SANGER, supra note 117, at 176-89 (containing
Margaret Sanger's description of the arrest and trial of her husband, and of how
prosecutors sought to use this trial to coerce her into pleading guilty).
135 See CHESLER, supra note 13, at 152-58 (chronicling Sanger's trial and the events
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lice disrupted the first national birth control conference, held in No-
vember 1921. With every move reported by the press, the officers re-
moved a speaker from the stage and arrested Sanger, to universal dis-
approval. Thanks to this incident, "the outlook for the birth control
movement [became] brighter than it ever was."'' 6 Sanger established
the American Birth Control League-the parent of Planned Parent-
hood-and the mass social movement had commenced.
The civil rights movement presents an even more dramatic exam-
ple. After a decade of bus boycotts, sit-ins, and sloth-like desegrega-
tion, the SCLC in 1963 targeted Birmingham as the object of its con-
centrated efforts. The goals of the campaign were to desegregate
public facilities, to establish fair hiring procedures for the city's busi-
nesses, to free activists who had been arrested for their protest activi-
ties, to reopen public parks and playgrounds the city had closed
rather than comply with a court order for integration, and to appoint
a biracial commission to advance school desegregation. 7 The cam-
paign involved a boycott of all segregated businesses and repeated
demonstrations and marches. While it was the boycott that brought
business leaders around, the demonstrations yielded the moments
that galvanized people of conscience everywhere: Commissioner
Eugene "Bull" Connor's turning firehoses and attack dogs onto black
children protesting their exclusion; Dr. King's and Reverend Shut-
tlesworth's arrests for violating a state court injunction against protest
marches, which begat Dr. King's famous Letter from a Birmingham Jail;
and near riots after a series of racist bombings, which the ministers
and other leaders quelled in personal appeals through the night. All
of these events received worldwide publicity. Business leaders capitu-
lated, over the objections of Connor, who soon thereafter lost his of-
fice to a more moderate segregationist. Changes in Birmingham were
just the first of the boycott's effects. In the ten weeks after the SCLC's
victory in May 1963, at least 758 demonstrations occurred in 186 cities
across the South, with 14,733 people arrested. 3 8 Within six months of
leading up to it); SANGER, sufyra note 117, at 224-37 (explaining which phrases and ac-
tions became pivotal at trial).
136 Birth Control and Taboo, Editorial, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1921, at 9; see
CHESLER, supra note 13, at 200-05 (discussing the birth control movement's broaden-
ing base of support); SANGER, supra note 117, at 301-15 (describing the increasingly
difficult task of opposing the birth control movement).
1:17 MORRIS, supra note 12, at 250-51. For accounts of the campaign from begin-
ning to end, see id. at 250-74; and GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, su)ra note 12, at 231-
64.
13 THOMAS R. BROOKS, WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
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the Birmingham capitulation, Dr. King had engineered a March on
Washington that established the civil rights movement as a powerful
national force. 13 1' A year after the march, President Lyndon Johnson
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. SCLC's campaign became a mass
social movement in 1963 and 1964, and the law was a critical backdrop
for that transition.
140
A galvanizing moment for the pro-choice movement arose out of
the case of Sherri Finkbine.141 She was pregnant with her fifth child in
1962, when she discovered that Thalidomide, a drug she had been
taking, was believed to cause severe birth defects. Finkbine consulted
a doctor, who recommended an abortion and assured her that a local
hospital would okay the procedure as a "therapeutic" abortion allowed
by state law. On the eve of the scheduled procedure, a local newspa-
per publicized her decision, and the story was picked up nationally.
The story was sensational because an abortion to avoid having a child
with birth defects tested the boundaries of prevailing abortion law. A
strict construction of the therapeutic abortion allowance would re-
quire that the mother's life or physical health be endangered by the
pregnancy, which was not the case with Finkbine, while a liberal con-
struction would allow the abortion, perhaps for the mental health of
the mother. Once there was publicity, the hospital cancelled the pro-
cedure, and Finkbine, her husband, and her physician sued for a
court order. 42 According to historian Kristin Luker, "with the Fink-
bine case, what had been a trickle of public interest in the issue of
abortion became a torrent"'143 contributing to California's liberaliza-
tion law in 1967, which in turn was followed by the creation of the pro-
choice stance as a branch of the women's movement.1
44
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940-1970, at 210 (1974).
"' See GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 12, at 277-86 (discussing some of
the events which motivated the March on Washington).
140 The Montgomery and Birmingham boycotts reflected the transition from a pris-
oner's dilemfma for people of color-resulting in few people participating-to an assur-
ance game in which everyone wants to participate if others do as well. Cf. Michael J.
Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83 CEO. L.J. 433,
453-54 (1994) (documenting the utility of these confrontations in changing public
opinion outside the state).
141 For a detailed discussion of the case of Sherri Finkbine, see LUKER, supra note
13, at 62-65.
142 Finkbine ultimately had the abortion in Sweden. Id. at 64.
143 Id. at 65.
144 See generally id. at 66-125 (discussing the political struggles preceding both Cali-
fornia's liberalized abortion law and the creation of the pro-choice movement). An
additional impetus for California's liberalization came in 1966, when the head of the
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For the women's movement generally, the critical encounter was
less dramatic than for the others. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibited workplace discrimination based on sex as well as race.
The amendment adding "sex" to the title was regarded as a lark, and
early enforcement of the sex discrimination bar was lackluster.45
Nonetheless, women filed one-third of the employment discrimina-
tion complaints received by the EEOC in the early years of the stat-
ute's operation. 14" Feminists objected to the EEOC's policy and soon
had a public forum for their objections. At the Third National Con-
ference of Commissions on the Status of Women, criticisms of state as
well as federal enforcement of sex discrimination laws were voiced,
and a resolution was offered to insist on more vigorous enforcement.
The conference organizers ruled the resolution out of order, inflam-
ing feminists. Led by Betty Friedan, the famous author of The Feminine
Mystique, twenty-eight women founded the National Organization for
Women on June 26, 1966, the last day of the conference.17 As Friedan
recalls, "it only took a few of us to get together to ignite the spark"
that grassroots feminist consciousness raising and thinking had al-
ready created-"and it spread like a nuclear chain-reaction.' 48
Like the civil rights movement, the gay rights movement offers
several dramatic showdowns.' 4' The most famous started on the night
after Judy Garland died, June 27, 1969. The Stonewall Inn, a queer
people's hangout in New York City's Greenwich Village, was periodi-
cally raided by the police, especially when the Inn's mob-linked own-
ers failed to make their payments to the local authorities. Such raids
were typically demeaning for the customers, whom officers of the law
California State Board of Medical Examiners said he would "get" any doctor who per-
formed an abortion for a woman afflicted with rubella. This had the effect of solidify-
ing physician support for a liberalized abortion law. Id. at 86-87.
145 See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1977, at 136-39 (1990) (describing the origins of the sex
discrimination addition to Title VII); id. at 211-32 (explaining the EEOC's ambivalent
enforcement of the sex discrimination prohibition).
146 RHODE, supra note 13, at 58.
117 CAROLINE BIRD, BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN DOWN 209
(rev. ed. 1970); Freeman, supra note 13, at 798-99.
149 JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 81 (1971) (quoting Betty
Friedan, N. 0. W.-How It Began, WOMEN SPEAKING, Apr. 1967, at 4).
149 For accounts of a January 1, 1965, confrontation between police and a gay-
friendly society in San Francisco, see EDWARD ALWOOD, STRAIGHT NiWS: GAYS,
LESBIANS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA 40 (1996) and SUSAN STRYKER & JIM VAN BuSKIRK,
GAY BY THE BAY: A HISTORY OF QUEER CULTURE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 41-42
(1996).
150 MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL 190-91 (1993).
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routinely threatened, physically assaulted, and humiliated. On the
night of June 27, a few of the denizens fought back, assaulting the of-
ficers with punches, coins, and bottles. What started as a routine po-
lice harassment of "fags and dykes" became a police rout. Not only
was the motley assortment of customers aroused to unaccustomed acts
of resistance, but the entire community seemed to be. For the next
several nights, thousands of queer people demonstrated and rioted in
Greenwich Village. Although their havoc was relegated to a few para-
graphs deep within the stately New York Times, the Village Voice covered
it extensively, and word of mouth made Stonewall a national sensa-
tion. 1  Literally overnight, the riots transformed a homophile move-
ment of several hundred earnest homosexuals into a gay liberation
movement populated by tens of thousands of lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals who formed hundreds of new organizations demanding
radical changes in the way gay people are treated by the state.
15
2
A final example recalls the origins of disability as a mass social
movement. People with disabilities as well as federal administrators
worked for enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, which included a
broad anti-discrimination provision drafted and inserted by friendly
staffers. They were stunned when President Nixon pocket-vetoed the
law in 1972, and supporters demonstrated against Nixon's veto.15 In
1973, activists demonstrated in favor of the Rehabilitation Act and
created a new organization for disability rights at a PCEH workshop
session.1 4 Nixon signed the Rehabilitation Act into law in 1973. The
new American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities (ACCD) then
conducted a grassroots protest and an inside-the-Beltway lobbying
campaign between 1975 and 1977 to press HEW into adopting broad
regulations to implement section 504.1
These angry encounters with government law enforcers both gal-
vanized and defined the birth control, civil rights, pro-choice,
151 See Lucian Truscott IV, Gay Power Comes to Sheridan Square, VILLAGE VOICE (New
York),July 3, 1969, at I (describing the Stonewall riots); Dick Leitsch, First Gay Riot,
ADvOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 1969 (describing the chain-reaction response to
Stonewall).
152 For a collection of homosexual experiences and struggles with the gay libera-
tion movement, see OUT OF THE CLOSETS (Karlajay & Allen Young eds., 1972).
"' FLEISCHER & ZAMES, supra note 15, at 49.
154 For a discussion on how the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities
linked both local and particular disability associations into a national organization that
was at the center of future campaigns for laws protecting people with disabilities
against discrimination, SCOTCH, supra note 15, at 82-86.
155 FLEISCHER & ZAMES, supra note 15, at 52-53; SCOTCH, supra note 15, at 55-57.
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women's rights, gay liberation, and disability rights movements. And
they were encounters thoroughly immersed in law. The events played
out in legal buildings-courthouses, city halls, police stations, and
jails-and intimately involved legal actors-judges, legislators, police
officers, governors, and presidents. The episodes were part of an on-
going drama in which legal actors were the villains but law and consti-
tutional rights were the common language of the participants and the
object of the conflict. Bull Connor surrounded his infamy with the
shrouds of law-but it was a corrupt law disobeyed in the name of the
Constitution as well as in the name of God. One powerful conse-
quence of the events in Birmingham in May, 1963, was a sea change in
public sentiment, as many people were persuaded that the freedom
marchers' dignified understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
must trump the attack dogs and fire hoses of apartheid.5  Margaret
Sanger, Sherri Finkbine and other women seeking abortions of un-
wanted pregnancies, Betty Friedan and the other dissenters at the dis-
crimination conference, the customers at Stonewall, and the disabled
people protesting Nixon's vetoes were less dramatic players of the po-
litical theater that Bull Connor and Martin Luther King perfected.
All of these episodes were group mobilization moments, where repre-
sentatives of the old status regime took a firm position against identity-
based protesters insisting on a new normative regime-but with disas-
trous consequences for the old regime.
151; Klarman, supra note 107, at 11.
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Ordinary people who happen to be stigmatized minorities
petition for relief from unfair state discrimination against them
Public officials reaffirm strict (draconian) enforcement of
the old status regime
Protesters refuse to back down, insist on their equality
rights, place their bodies on the line;
media interest in the confrontation
Public officials overreact; media portrays them as brutes;
public sympathy for minority victims
Thousands of minority group members (and allies)
become active in what becomes a mass social movement
Bruce Ackerman talks of constitutional moments, where one branch
of government committed to an old regime backs down when con-
fronted with other branches that are backed up by public sentiment.
157
In contrast, group mobilization moments involve clashes between
state law enforcers and minority citizens, where the main effect is not
the backing down of the law enforcers (though that might happen)
but is instead the instigating of thousands of previously quiescent mi-
nority citizens to oppose the law's discriminations.
II. DESCRIPTIVE MODEL: LAW AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
IBSMs spawned by law have also been sustained by law. Most mass
mobilizations have flickered across history like comets falling in the
sky. They have left marks, but transient ones. A feature of the IBSMs
of the twentieth century is that they did not burn out; their fires have
raged for decades. This was possible because of the institutionaliza-
tion of the political energy of those movements. Institutionalization
was possible in large part because of the legal system, which required a
long-term effort to change the discriminations that were a target of
157 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FoUNDATIONS 59-60 (1990).
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the social movements, and then offered the possibility of the state as
an ally in achieving the social goals of the movement. In short, the pas
de deux between the state and the IBSM helped, to perpetuate the lat-
ter. Another feature that ensured the perpetuation of these social
movements was the inevitability of countermovements, themselves pe-
titioning the state to preserve old rules that the IBSMs considered dis-
criminatory but that traditionalists considered morally sound.
Eliminating oppressive law is originally the goal of an IBSM, so
most legal actors are adversaries in the movement's early stages. If the
social movement endures, its objectives shift toward obtaining helpful
laws, rather than just nullifying bad laws. Legal actors become poten-
tial allies, even partners in the movement. Legal actors were impor-
tant partners in the disability rights movement even during its incipi-
ency. Indeed, once a countermovement arises, there is a competition
for the attention and loyalty of legal actors. For judges, the competi-
tion is for the generation of constitutional discourse and statutory in-
terpretations favorable to one's group. And a feature long-obscured
in the movement's history becomes clear: even when law is the en-
emy, and even more when law becomes a potential ally, law channels
notjust the strategies of IBSMs and their countermovements but their
discourses as well. As law channels the movements' discourses, law
changes those discourses, and those movements.
A. Incremental Legal Remediation and the Institutionalization of
Identity-Based Social Movements
Once thousands or even millions of people were mobilized on
behalf of an IBSM, existing institutions enlisted them, and new institu-
tions were formed. Because the meta-goal of each movement was to
change people's attitudes about the minority, it is easily imaginable
that the activists and their organizations would engage in moral sua-
sion, educate the public, and work to cultivate subcultural mores and
institutions. And so they did. But each movement learned soon
enough what its members suspected from their bitter personal experi-
ences: that people do not change their attitudes, and especially their
prejudices, overnight. Because the minority's identifying trait was also
the object. of pervasive legal stigma, these social movements also
sought to change the letter and application of the law. Some legal
change was easier to accomplish, and the results were tangible. But it
took a long time, and headway was made step by step, at best. The
length of the process of legal reform required that the movement de-
velop institutions for long-term political action, and thereby ensured
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the longevity of the movement.
Once a minority group had organized itself as an ongoing institu-
tional force in politics, it was able to move the law and bend the po-
litical process to be friendlier to the minority, no matter how tradi-
tionally despised. As before, the minority was savvy, targeting the most
vulnerable and outdated public discriminations and seeking redress
from the level of government (federal/state/local) and the organ of
government (legislature/agency/court) most likely to give it. For ex-
ample, lesbians and gay men had most of their early successes at the
local and state level; once thousands came out of their closets, they
appeared, overnight, as an important voting block in the big cities to
which so many of them had gravitated. Their initial target was laws
criminalizing consensual sodomy, measures to which legal elites were
already hostile and against which Americans' libertarian impulses and
the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence could be mobilized. Be-
fore Stonewall, forty-nine states criminalized consensual sodomy, most
penalizing it as a serious felony. By 1981, twenty-six states had abro-
gated their consensual sodomy laws, either by legislative repeal or ju-
dicial invalidation, and another eleven had reduced consensual sod-
omy to a misdemeanor.'
5" Each state repeal was heralded by the new
gay press and provided encouragement for the next repeal effort.
Lesbian and gay groups and their allies (like the ACLU) also went to
court to nullify or curtail other laws penalizing them; courts were will-
ing to trim back or override laws criminalizing lewd solicitation, con-
gregation of gay people, vagrancy, and cross-dressing.'"
Once gay people were no longer presumptive criminals, they
sought legal recognition of a new status as equal citizens. In urban
centers, gay/lesbian/bisexual/transsexual ("GLBT") groups were of-
ten successful in procuring laws prohibiting private as well as public
discrimination on the basis of sexual or gender orientation.'
° Wis-
:' The states that abrogated their consensual sodomy laws were Alaska (1978),
California (1975), Colorado (1971), Connecticut (1969), Delaware (1972), Florida
(1974), Hawaii (1972), Idaho (1971), Illinois (1961), Indiana (1976), Iowa (1976),
Maine (1975), Nebraska (1977), New Hampshire (1973), NewJersey (1978), New Mex-
ico (1975), New York (1980), North Dakota (1973), Ohio (1972), Oregon (1971),
Pennsylvania (1980), South Dakota (1976), Vermont (1977), Washington (1975), West
Virginia (1976), and Wyoming (1977). ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at app. Al.
Consensual sodomy was reduced to a misdemeanor in Alabama (1977), Arizona
(1977), Arkansas (1977), Kansas (1969), Kentucky (1974), Minnesota (1977), Missouri
(1977), Nevada (1977), Texas (1973), Utah (1973), and Wisconsin (1977). Id.
", See id. at 108-11 (discussing state and federal cases refusing to enforce such
laws).
1o See, e.g., id. at 125-41, 205-38, app. B2 (surveying state and municipal anti-
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consin was the first state to prohibit private discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation, and other states have followed. " ' As before,
each new ordinance or law was heralded by the gay media and in-
spired further efforts and initiatives, including proposed federal legis-
lation. "  Success in baby steps at the local level was a spur to the social
movement, both by demonstrating to still-closeted gay people that the
movement could be successful and by illustrating how far gay people
had to go to achieve full legal equality.
Even though each one of these legal success stories had little dis-
cernible effect on the life of the average lesbian or gay man, they had
a cumulative effect on people's lives and contributed to the persever-
ance of gay liberation as a social movement. Stonewall triggered
thousands of coming-out stories and hundreds of organizations but
did not guarantee that this social movement could be sustained.
(Most of the post-Stonewall organizations, in fact, expired within two
years.) In order for a social movement to last, new waves of lesbians
or gay men had to edge out of their closets and get involved in an as-
sociation that could organize their contributions. The more partici-
pants and the more success stories, the more likely it was that the gay
person at the closet door would join the assurance game. No one
wanted to be part of a quixotic social movement; a lot of gay people
liked being just a little bit ahead of their time, in a social movement
inching toward success. ""'
The gay and lesbian rights experience can be generalized to other
discrimination laws).
161 States that adopted laws prohibiting discrimination by private employers are
California (1979 (by court decision)), Connecticut (1991), Hawaii (1991), Massachu-
setts (1989), Minnesota (1993), Nevada (1999), New Hampshire (1997), NewJersey
(1991), Rhode Island (1995), Vermont (1991), and Wisconsin (1982). Id. at app. B2.
A number of other states, starting with Pennsylvania in 1975, bar sexual orientation
discrimination in state employment. See id. (listing the states). Maryland adopted leg-
islation in 2001 barring private as well as public discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientations.
162 Although bills prohibiting private discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion were introduced in Congress as early as 1974, none received the benefit of con-
gressional hearings until 1983, and none reached the floor of either chamber until
1996.
163 See BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS AND DEMOCRACY 30 (1978)
("[M]ore enthusiasm for [a movement's] pursuit is likely to be elicited if it looks as if it
has a chance of succeeding than if it appears to be a forlorn hope."); CHONG, supra
note 126, at 90-102 (explaining how the social and psychological benefits of participa-
tion are contingent upon the success of the movement); George Klosko, The Principle ofFairness and Political Obligation, 97 ETHICS 353, 358 (1987) (arguing that one makes so-
cial contributions only to the extent to which one sees other individuals making similar
sacrifices).
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social movements. The ongoing sustainability of an IBSM has been
tied to its ability to generate a series of successful efforts to reform the
law, but with each success leaving room for further progress. Anecdo-
tal evidence of changed attitudes ("I came out to my Mother, and she
said: 'I used to fear you people but now realize that gay is great!"')
will not suffice unless widely experienced and reported. Well-
publicized evidence of legal victories, even little ones, serves this goal
admirably. Ironically, therefore, the legal discrimination that was an
original impetus for the social movement can in its bit-by-bit demise
provide fuel for sustaining the movement. Correspondingly, gay lib-
eration inexorably transmuted into a gay rights movement, as it de-
voted an increasing amount of resources to its campaigns to change
the law, through litigation, legislation, administration, or some com-
bination.
In contrast to gays, blacks worked disproportionately at the na-
tional level, because local politics was so biased against them in the
southern states where they were most disadvantaged."
4 Blacks also
worked disproportionately in courts, because judges had the values
and the political independence needed to shift the burden of inertia
from apartheid policies to nondiscriminatory ones. The strategy paid
off with momentous changes in national law and policy: desegrega-
tion of the armed forces, termination of sit-at-the-back-of-the-bus poli-
cies and of apartheid in Brown and its progeny, the Civil Rights Act's
prohibition of race discrimination by private employers and public ac-
commodations as well as by state and federal governments (as
amended in 1972), the Voting Rights Act's assurance of the right to
vote, and the Fair Housing Act's ban on discrimination in renting and
home sales.1 65 These developments at the national level erased the de
jure discriminations at the state level. As a result, the civil rights
movement was uniquely successful in purging American law of almost
all of its invidious race-based classifications. But that was only the be-
ginning.
The gay rights and civil rights movements illustrate the tendency
of IBSM law-reform institutions to become self-sustaining. Even after
164 Even though the SCLC's local boycotts and sit-ins were key to transforming civil
rights into a mass mobilization between 1955 and 1963, after 1963 the SCLC, like other
civil rights groups, concentrated on federal legislative and administrative efforts.
165 See GRAHAM, supra note 145, at 177-204 (providing a detailed survey of federal
civil rights laws and executive orders, as well as their early enforcement); see also
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 51-101 (1971) (discussing
federal equal employment opportunity laws and their early effectiveness).
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the long struggle to nullify or repeal openly discriminatory laws is
won, struggles against the discriminatory application of facially neutral
laws continue. The struggle against discrimination by the state must
be never-ending, so long as some law enforcers harbor prejudice or
stereotypes regarding the minority. Additionally, institutions will seek
the state's aid against private discrimination and violence. That effort
requires legislation and then similar problems of enforcement. Fi-
nally, the minority will sometimes ask for state subsidies or rules that
seek to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
Diagram 2
The Ongoing Law Reform Campaign Against Discrimination
[1] Repeal or nullification of laws that
openly discriminate against the minority : Struggle over implementation
group
[2] Expansion of the duty of fairness to
private employers, public accommodations, Struggle over implementation
private persons
[3] State remedial subsidies or protections
benefiting the minority group members
The disability and women's rights movements fit the pattern described
by Diagram 2. ""
1[ I ] Between 1930 and 1970, disabled people were able to repeal many laws that
discriminated against them. [2] The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was an important
milestone, sealed by vigorous lobbying by disability rights groups to procure aggressive
regulations. See SCoTcii, supra note 15, at 82-120 (providing a detailed account of
HEW regulations concerning disability rights); see also STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY,
CIVIL RIGH-TS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 64-82 (1989)
(discussing the implementation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). [3] Their legal ef-
forts culminated in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which imposes broad
nondiscrimination obligations on private and federal entities and requires reasonable
accommodations for the disabled as well. Seegenerally COLKER, supra note 51 (detailing
the legislation, regulations, and case law thereunder).
Likewise, [1] women's groups first sought repeal of "protective" as well as exclu-
sionary legislation precluding them from equal opportunities between 1930 and 1970;
the proposed ERA would have swept most of these away, but they were repealed orju-
dicially invalidated beforehand. [2] Title VII, amended to include pregnancy-based
discrimination, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title IX, and other legislation between 1963
and 1994 imposed extensive nondiscrimination obligations on private as well as public
entities. [3] Finally, Firms and government bodies adopted a range of affirmative ac-
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Although it fits the pattern of Diagram 2, the pro-choice move-
ment presents interesting variations. The Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade invalidated all existing abortion statutes, comparable to stage
one in Diagram 2. If states had simply left abortion deregulated after
Roe, the pro-choice movement might have waned, because the Su-
preme Court's decision would have given activists the complete relief
their movement was then seeking. Indeed, there was a fall-off of in-
tensity in the pro-choice movement after Roe.'
67 But like Brown, Roe
created a lengthy dialogue between federal courts and state legisla-
tures as to the limits of the state's duties under the new regime. Just
as the Supreme Court left Brown not fully enforced (from the point of
view of the "winners"), so the Supreme Court has left Roe not fully en-
forced (from the point of view of the "winners"). Even when reaffirm-
ing Roe as a precedent, the Court has permitted the state to burden
the right to choose an abortion with many procedural and some sub-
stantive hurdles-essentially allowing a fair amount of state variation
as to policy and therefore opening tip intense political contests at the
state level between the pro-choice movement 
and traditionalists. 16
Stage two in Diagram 2 looks somewhat different for the pro-
choice movement. Private discrimination against a woman because
she has had an abortion-at least in the workplace and in public ac-
commodations-has not been documented as an important prob-
lem. ' Hence, the pro-choice movement has not sought omnibus
anti-discrimination laws, as have the women's rights, civil rights, gay
rights, and disability rights movements. But it has sought public inter-
vention to head off private disruption of abortion clinics. Operation
Rescue and other pro-life groups have picketed abortion clinics, lob-
bied women to change their minds, and sometimes engaged in vio-
lence or assaults against women seeking abortions or their health pro-
tion, maternity leave, and other remedial policies in the 1980s and 1990s. The best
introduction to the statutes, regulations, and case law is BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET
AL., SEX DIScIMINATION AND THE LAw: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY (2d ed.
1996). For a shorter treatment, see RHODE, Supra note 13, at 111-304.
'67 See STAGGENBORG, supra note 13, at 57-65 (discussing how strategies and tactics
narrowed afterJanuary 22, 1973).
"' See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-901 (1992) (reaffirming Roe
but re-articulating its rule to allow significant state regulation of the decision to abort).
"' Better documented has been the obverse: employers frequently discriminate
against women who are pregnant, especially if the woman is not married. The em-
ployer typically does not even know when an unmarried employee terminates her
pregnancy with an abortion, but of course does find out about the pregnancy if carried
to term.
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viders."7 Pro-choice groups have engaged in an ongoing effort to pro-
tect clinics against what they consider illegal harassment, and these
disputes have often ended up in court to determine how much space
for this kind of dissent and persuasion the Speech Clause requires.'71
Stage three is the pro-choice movement's ongoing struggle to per-
suade federal and state medical insurance and welfare programs to
subsidize or pay for abortions, particularly for women who cannot af-
ford them. This struggle has not been notably successful."'
As Diagram 2 suggests, IBSM organizations that work for changes
in the law or law enforcement always have an agenda that could keep
them busy-and that is beneficial to minority group members who
can be expected to support the organizations with varying degrees of
enthusiasm (depending on the operation of the various collective ac-
tion difficulties). The punchline is that an IBSM's legal organizations
have had a durability that its community activist counterparts have
not. For example, the Inc. Fund and the SCLC both preceded and
long outlasted SNCC; Planned Parenthood, NARAL, and the National
Organization for Women (NOW) have achieved a national status that
counseling and community-support groups have not; Lambda Legal
Defense & Education Fund and the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders of Boston have eclipsed the hundreds of radical queer
groups that spontaneously formed in the wake of Stonewall and dis-
appeared almost as quickly.
This organizational sociology suggests, further, that lawyers have
played a disproportionate and increasing role in IBSMs. For example,
the period after Stonewall saw gay activists of all sorts-artists, hippies,
drag performers, shopkeepers, students, writers-participate as initia-
tors and spokespersons, but most of them failed to sustain a leader-
170 See Faye Ginsburg, Rescuing the Nation: Operation Rescue and the Rise of Anti-
Abortion Militance, in ABORTION WARS, supra note 13, at 227-50 (tracing the rise and
decline of Operation Rescue from 1988 to 1993); Victoria Johnson, The Strategic Deter-
minants of a Countermovement: The Emergence and Impact of Operation Rescue Blockades, in
WAVES OF PROTESTr, supra note 8, at 241, 245-65 (describing Operation Rescue and its
tactical interactions aimed at deterring abortions); see also RANDALL A. TERRY,
OPERATION RESCUE (1988) (explicating the activist pro-life philosophy underlying Op-
eration Rescue).
17 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (upholding
those parts of an injunction against abortion clinic protesters that do not unnecessarily
burden free speech); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 374
(1997) (following and applying Madsen).
172 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (allowing the federal government
to exclude abortions from funded medical services); Maher v. Rose, 432 U.S. 464, 479
(1977) (giving a similar account for state-funded medical services).
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ship role for long. The leaders who persevered, like Tom Stoddard
and Nan Hunter, were often lawyers or paralegals like the famous
Frank Kameny. Generally speaking, a social movement seeking to
overturn a melange of antigay state rules and practices requires the
assistance of lawyers, but once the lawyers get involved, legal reform
comes to dominate other kinds of action more than before, and the
movement as a whole tends to assume an increasingly lawyerly aura.
This has consequences for the social movement: formal equality has
dominated other goals of the movement, because lawyers feast on
formalisms; the movement has tended toward assimilationist and re-
formist rather than separatist and radical stances, because lawyers
cannot defend the latter before judges and legislators who are their
audience; and members of the minority who are least like the main-
stream American have tended to be left behind.
B. The Life Cycle of an IBSM: From a Politics of Protection
to Culture Clashes to Normal Politics
IBSMs seek to change law and law enforcement not just for pru-
dential reasons but also for idealistic ones. The social movement
arises as a response to law's stigmatization of its members based upon
their malign variation from the norm. So long as members of the mi-
nority group accept their inferiority, there can be no social move-
ment. Once some group members come to believe-and then organ-
ize together to insist-that their trait is a tolerable or even a benign
variation from the norm, there is the possibility of a social move-
ment.173 If an IBSM does form and achieve any successes, a counter-
movement will arise, however, because others in society will not only
continue to accept the old norm but will also continue to bind up
their own identities in it. Thus, traditionalist countermovements-the
states' rights movement of the 1950s, the anti-ERA and pro-life move-
ments of tie 1970s, and the traditional family values movement of the
1970s-are themselves identity-based mirror images of the social
movements to which they are responding.
Like the social movements that trigger them, countermovements
develop in predictable ways. While many of their members continue
173 A tolerable variation is one that is not as "good" as the norm but is not so "bad"
that it cannot be safely allowed. A benign variation is one that is normatively indistin-
guishable from the mean or median.
174 See Tahi L. Mottl, The Analysis of Countermovements, 27 SoC. PROBS. 620, 620
(1980) (providing a sociological analysis of countermovements).
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to insist that the minority's trait is malign, that position becomes less
tenable once the original social movement has taken off. Hence, the
countermovement's politics of preservation tends to be an effort to hold
the line at tolerable variation: the state should not deprive people of
important freedoms because of their degraded traits, but tolerance
does not require the state to "promote" social deviance at the expense
of traditional values or institutional practices. Arguments for legal
segregation give way to "no promo" arguments. People of color
should no longer be segregated from white people, but the state
should not promote integration at the expense of private choice and
localism. Women ought not be barred from jobs, but the state should
not promote a full equality that would undermine the family. The
state may tolerate some family planning but ought not promote abor-
tion. Gay people ought not be imprisoned but neither should the
state promote homosexuality. The contest between the ongoing poli-
tics of recognition and the responsive politics of preservation is a clash
over essentially cultural issues fought on the battleground of politics.
If the clash is resolved in favor of treating the minority's variation as
benign, then the minority group will join the normal political process
by which state entitlements and benefits are apportioned to salient in-
terest groups in society. This normal political process entails a politics
of redistribution discussed earlier.
This is the life cycle of an IBSM in a nutshell. Consider it in
greater detail.
1. From a Politics of Protection to a Politics of Recognition
During the pre-history of the IBSMs discussed in this Article, both
mainstream society and most members of the minority group assumed
the superiority of the trait that distinguished the majority from those
who were "colored" or "retarded" or "inverted" or "degenerate." So
long as there was this public consensus, there was not much politics
surrounding the malign variation characterizing the minority. The
status quo was a stable apartheid: physical segregation of racial mi-
norities, confinement of women to the domestic sphere and homo-
sexuals to the closet, and shunting off disabled people to hospitals.
If a significant portion of the mainstream ("traditionalists") be-
came alarmed at threats seemingly posed by a socially visible and
normatively threatening vanguard of the minority, however, the poli-
tics changed. Traditionalists would engage in a politics of fear, seeking
to put down those of the minority whom they viewed as threats to the
public order. Examples of this kind of politics were the creation of a
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terrorizing Jim Crow regime in the South, 7" state and federal exclu-
sions of Asian immigrants from the prerequisites of citizenship, 7 ( the
eugenics movement,' v the sexual purity campaigns in most American
cities and then by state and federal officials, 7 and the McCarthy era
crusades against blacks, cross-dressers, and homosexuals. 17 ' The poli-
tics of fear could crop up anytime, anywhere. Such a politics can be
understood as a preemptive strike, a tool of those seeking to forestall
or destroy incipient social movements by reaffirming the malignancy
of trait variation and discouraging minorities from departing from
their traditionally degraded social roles. (Recall that people can be
discouraged from joining a social movement if the state makes the
costs of activism high enough.) For most of the twentieth century, this
politics was highly effective in preventing people of color, disabled
persons, women, and gay people from mobilizing into social move-
ments.
The people caught up in these terror campaigns sometimes tried
to resist with any arguments they could muster. At some point-
when some minority group members believed their trait was not a ma-
lignant variation-the politics of fear generated a responsive politics of
protection. Most twentieth century gaylegal history was little more than
an effort by homosexuals to keep themselves out of jail and to pre-
serve pitifully marginal spaces for their socializing and information-
sharing. The Mattachine Society of Los Angeles in the 1950s, for ex-
ample, billed itself as one seeking to educate the public, but its most
important activities involved protecting homosexuals from police tyr-
175 See LITWACK, supra note 38 (detailing day-to-day experiences of blacks living in
the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century South).
176 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissent-
ing) (documenting legal discriminations against Asians and Asian Americans in federal
immigration law and in state property, family, and contract law); ANCHIETA, supra note
12, at 19-30 (offering a similar account).
177 See KEVLES, supra note 30, at 251-68 (surveying the eugenics movement and its
deployments of the law against people with disabilities).
178 See THOMAS MAcKEY, RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION,
DISORDERLY HOUSES, AND VICE DISTRICTS, 1870-1917, at 5-11 (1987) (exploring the
legal community's response to anti-prostitution crusades); ROSEN, supra note 25, at 14-
37 (discussing campaigns against the "social evil" of prostitution in the American Pro-
gressive Era); Leslie Fishbein, Harlot or Heroine? Changing Views of Prostitution, 1870-
1920, 43 HISTORIAN 23, 28 (1980) (canvassing ideological approaches to solving the
prostitution problem).
179 See D'EMILIO, supra note 14, at 40-53 (discussing McCarthy era campaigns
against homosexuals); ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 57-95 (surveying the state
and federal government's response to homosexuality in the public arena).
20011
HeinOnline -- 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 469 2001-2002
470 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
180
anny. So long as homosexuals considered themselves inferior, as
many of the early homophile leaders did, their normative plea was for
nothing more than tolerance: don't put us in jail; we are no threat to
you; let us live our lives in peace. The Mattachine Society of Washing-
ton (MSW), founded in 1961, announced a new politics for homo-
sexuals. Going beyond the Los Angeles Society's apologetic politics of
protection, the Washington Society insisted that the state treat gay
people no differently than straight people. Frank Kameny, MSW's
leader, sold his slogan, "Gay is Good," to the other homophile organi-
zations in 1967.8 Once gay liberation took off after Stonewall, "Gay is
Good" became the hallmark of this IBSM. The newly mobilized les-
bian, gay, and bisexual groups insisted not only that antigay legal pen-
alties be nullified or repealed but also that full legal equality be rec-
ognized: not only should the state not discriminate against gay
people, but it should bar discrimination by private employers and
public accommodations. Their idea was that the social disrespect
shown to gay people was encouraged and fortified by the law, which, if
transformed, could become an instrument for turning that disrespect
into social tolerance. This was, and remains, an aspiration and not a
reality for gay people.
In moving from a politics of protection to one of recognition, the
gay rights movement followed the path taken by the civil rights and
women's movements. The NAACP and other civil rights groups pio-
neered the politics of recognition. A key moment in that politics
came in 1948-1950, when the NAACP Inc. Fund abandoned its strat-
egy of challenging just the unequal funding of segregated schools and
decided to challenge the system of public school segregation itself.
8s2
The NAACP's argument was that even if black schools were every bit
as good as white ones, black children still suffered intangible injury-
the injury of stigma.8 The implicit argument was that this stigma vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause because its harm to black children
was not justified by any sound reason; race was a benign difference
180 See D'EMILIo, supra note 14, at 70 (noting Mattachine's efforts to expose police
entrapment practices targeted against homosexuals).
181 See David K. Johnson, "Homosexual Citizens": Washington's Gay Community Con-
fronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall/Winter 1994-95, at 62 (examining the influ-
ence of Kameny on the Mattachine Society of Washington).
82 KLUGER, sura note 12, at 294; TUSHNET, supra note 95, at 114-15, 136-37. Be-
fore 1948, the Inc. Fund had argued that the actual operation of southern schools vio-
lated the separate-but-equal formula of Plessy.
183 See TUsINET, supra note 95, at 115-36 (describing the success of the intangible
injury argument against segregation).
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that ought to have no bearing on state policy. Brown of course
adopted these arguments, and they became the premise of a genera-
tion's struggle to integrate southern schools, public facilities, and pri-
vate accommodations and workplaces.
A similar shift occurred within the women's movement in the
1960s. Most women as well as men in the 1950s accepted the proposi-
tions that women were materially different from men, that women's
most satisfying role was motherhood (and men's was supporting a
family), and that abortion was morally questionable unless required by
the physical health of the mother. Many women changed their minds
during the 1960s; they came to conclude that any differences between
the sexes were not material to women's equal participation in the
workplace and in state activities and programs, and that abortion was
a choice that a woman could morally make for the good of her family,
her career, or her emotional well-being."4 With this explicit politics of
recognition, NOW and NARAL replaced the NWP and Planned Par-
enthood as the locus of the women's movement. Their politics of
recognition seemed triumphant when Congress sent the ERA to the
states for ratification in 1972 and the Supreme Court decided Roe v.
Wade in 1973.
2. Culture Clash: The Politics of Recognition Meets a
Counter-Politics of Preservation
Once the civil rights movement won its public victory in Brown,
there coalesced in the South a powerful countermovement, "massive
resistance" against required integration. Like the civil rights move-
ment, the countermovement operated through the mechanisms of
law. Between 1955-1961, southern states adopted almost 200 statutes
defying or seeking to evade Brown's mandate. '' This reaction was it-
self a kind of identity politics: Southerners viewed their disapproval of
"mixing" the races as a normative as well as biological mandate. What
set the Southerner apart from the Yankee as well as the "uppity" Afri-
can American was his self-image as a man who respected tradition,
184 See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 14, 216 (finding that by 1970, most women
supported the ERA, with support strongest among women working outside the home);
STAGGENBORG, supra note 13, at 58 (discussing how women's opinions about abortion
changed during the period of 1967-1973).
185 GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE
SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTr 17-18 (1969); RFD SARRA°tT, THE ORDEAL
OF DESEGREGATION 363 (1966).
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honor, and (most of all) purity. Millions of Southerners were in-
vested in this self-image, and the intensity of their reaction to Brown
cannot be explained by mere economic self-interest. Theirs was the
classic politics of preservation, and it was complex. Extremists in the
movement defended the traditional position that any variation from
whiteness was a degeneration, but the most astute defenders of apart-
heid realized that this defense was untenable outside the South-and
that if the South were isolated on this issue all was lost. Without deny-
ing that racial variation was malignant, these "moderate" defenders of
apartheid sought to shift the debate from the substantive morality of
racism to the procedural morality of localism and states' rights. 8 1
Notwithstanding these smarter arguments, the segregationists' politics
of preservation suffered big setbacks when Congress enacted the Civil
Rights and Voting Rights Acts in the mid-1960s.
The anti-ERA and pro-life countermovements followed the same
pattern. Once women's politics of recognition actually seemed to be
reallocating entitlements and changing the face of American law, tra-
ditionalists reconceptualized the status quo in identity-based terms.
As they redefined it, one's identity as a mother or as a family-oriented
humanitarian is implicated if the state encourages yuppie women to
have careers by barring all traditional sex-based discriminations and
even by allowing what they consider the "murder" of helpless fe-
tuses. "  These were powerful identity-based images, and millions of
women as well as men claimed them. The resulting politics of preser-
vation was, like that of the massive resistance movement, complex.
Radical traditionalists maintained that abortion was always malignant
unless necessary to save the life of the mother and that the differences
between the sexes was significant (but of course not "malignant," un-
less deployed in the wrong way), such that women's primary role was
mother and wife in a traditional marriage. Pragmatists in the coun-
181, See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 35, at 633-35 (arguing that segregation was
ultimately based on the fear that interracial marriage and biracial children would
weaken the white race).
187 For an overview of the southern reaction to Brown, see ROSENBERG, supra note
107, at 78-85; WILKINSON, supra note 105, at 78-95; and Klarman, supra note 107, at 97-
118, showing how the Brown decision catalyzed southern resistance to racial change.
To see how southern judges used the rights rhetoric rather than openly racist rhetoric
to avoid desegregating southern schools, see WILKINSON, suprfa note 105, at 80-84.
188 See LUKER, su/na note 13, at 126-57 (discussing the emergence of the pro-life
movement); id. at 158-91 (comparing systematically different perspectives about gen-
der roles, sexuality, and parenting held by pro-life versus pro-choice women);
MANSBRIDGE, suu/ra note 13, at 98-117 (comparing philosophical attitudes of pro-ERA
versus anti-ERA women).
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termovement realized that these arguments would not stop the ERA
or overturn Roe v. Wade, because they did not appeal to people in the
middle. Thus, pragmatists sought to shift the debate from the sub-
stantive morality of sexism and abortion to the disruption the ERA
and Roe entailed for the healthy husband-wife family"
'' and the desir-
ability of local regulation over federal judicial usurpation.'
0 Unlike
the massive resisters, the pro-life and anti-ERA movements have
scored significant successes in the national arena. The ERA was de-
feated and the Supreme Court has upheld the most deeply rooted sex
discriminations and has allowed significant state regulation of abor-
tion's decision-making process." " Popular opinion remains ambiva-
lent about women who abandon their traditional role as wife and
mother.
Less well developed in the academic literature is what I call the
"traditional family values" (TFV) countermovement."2 Once openly
gay people emerged in the public culture in the late 1960s and early
1970s, many fundamentalist Christians made central to their faith an
anti-homosexual reading of Leviticus 20:13 and Romans 1:26-27."',
Biblical literalism reasserted the value of male-female procreative sex
within marriage; biblical eschatology refocused on homosexual license
as the fulcrum around which civilization would crumble in the mil-
lennial holocaust."' 4 Although religious traditionalists were alarmed
early on, concerns with homosexuality did not gain traction as a social
movement until gay people scored significant changes in the law. The
18 See The Right to Be a Woman, in PHYLLIS SCHAFLY REP., Nov. 1973, at 6, discussed
in MANSBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 110-12 (arguing that the ERA would, inter alia, abol-
ish the husband's duty to support his wife).
' Opponents of both Roe and the ERA (whose open-textured language would
have vested federal courts with considerable interpretive leeway) objected to unelected
federal judges taking regulatory options away from state and local governments.
MANSBRIDGE, sulpra note 13, at 149.
" See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding state
waiting period and parental-consent (for minors) requirements as acceptable burdens
on women seeking abortions); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding
exclusion of women from the draft requirement); Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S.
464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape law applying only to males).
" William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse
and the ChannelingEffect ofJudicialReview, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1337 (2000).
9'. Leviticus 20:13 condemns "men lying with men" as "an abomination." Romans
1:26-27 condemns "unnatural" relations between women and between men.
'94 See DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE
CHRISTIAN RIGiIT 47-48, 61-63 (1997) (noting that Christianity Today was concerned
with sexual promiscuity of all sorts before 1969 but focused on predatory homosexual-
ity with increasing alarm after 1969).
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TFV movement had a test drive in the years 1975-1976, after California
repealed its consensual sodomy law and a coalition of traditionalists
tried (unsuccessfully) to place the repeal before the voters in a refer-
endum. It had greater success after that. Anita Bryant's "Save the
Children" campaign succeeded in overriding Dade County, Florida's
ordinance protecting gay people against discrimination in 1977, and
Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority won its first political battle in 1981,
when it persuaded the U.S. House of Representatives to override the
District of Columbia's repeal of its sodomy and adultery laws. 11'5 As be-
fore, the countermovement was most successful when it was able to
mobilize both extreme traditionalists, who maintained that the varia-
tion (homosexuality) and the associated conduct (sodomy) were ma-
lignant, and middle-of-the-roaders. The latter were persuaded by "no
promo homo" arguments: giving homosexuals "special rights," these
reforms would promote deviant conduct and undermine parental
control over their children's sexuality and gender roles. 19
Notwithstanding these successes, the TFV movement was not able
to prevent most states from repealing their consensual sodomy laws or
many cities and some states from adopting laws and executive orders
barring sexual orientation discrimination by public or private institu-
tions. As to lesbian and gay rights issues, the countermovement
seemed to be waning-until the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the
state's refusal to give same-sex couples the same marriage licenses ac-
corded different-sex couples was impermissible sex discrimination
under the state constitution.1 '7 The TFV movement feasted on the
possibility of Hawaii same-sex marriage like a lion on a gazelle. Over-
night, the countermovement scored victories across the United States,
as thirty-five states and the federal government adopted statutes refus-
ing to recognize same-sex "marriages."'"" In a final coup, TFV advo-
cates persuaded the voters of Hawaii to amend the state constitution
to override the judiciary's cautious move toward same-sex marriage. 199
195 Eskridge, supra note 192, at 1344, 1351-52.
196 See id. at 1343-44 (outlining the structure of the no promo homo argument); id.
at 1352-53 (arguing that the strategy underlying the TFV movement's successful 1992
campaign to amend Colorado's constitution was a no promo homo one).
17 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), affd sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 910
P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), enforced, No. 15689, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996), affd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (mem.), rev'd, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
198 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF GAY RIGHTS 38 (2001) (listing nonrecognition laws adopted as of September 1,
2001).
19 See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (table decision) (reversing trial
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3. From a Politics of Recognition to Normal Politics
What happens if the IBSM's politics of recognition is successful?
Does the social movement end? At least three of the movements have
enjoyed great formal success. The civil rights movement has elimi-
nated almost all invidious race-based discriminations by the state and
has obtained the enactment of laws barring private racial discrimina-
tion as well. The disability rights movement also has been relatively
successful. Many fewer state and federal laws discriminate on their
face against people with disabilities, and a range of statutes protect
against private as well as public discrimination.0 0 The women's rights
movement has also been highly successful in voiding de jure (but not
always de facto) discriminations on the basis of sex.
T0 Success has
changed all three social movements but has not come close to ending
them. All three movements have engaged in concerted efforts to
strengthen the enforcement of the anti-discrimination statutes en-
acted on their behalf, to influence agency and judicial interpretation
of those laws, and to override unfavorable interpretations through leg-
islation.20 2 Significantly, these movements have also lobbied legisla-
tures to distribute state benefits to people of color, people with dis-
abilities, and sometimes women. In contrast, the pro-choice
movement has been unable to prevent or overturn significant restric-
203
tions on abortion or to obtain state subsidies. Lesbian and gay
groups have had the least amount of success in this regard, in part be-
cause their politics of recognition is so far from being fulfilled.
This last stage in an IBSM's life cycle is one in which the move-
ment essentially becomes another group within the pluralist political
system. I do not mean this in a pejorative sense, as in "special inter-
court injunction allowing same-sex marriage in light of state constitutional amendment
adopted by referendum).
200 See generally COLKER, supra note 51 (presenting a mini-history of disability rights
reform and a collection of statutes and interpretations).
201 Notwithstanding the defeat of the ERA, constitutional litigation under the
Equal Protection Clause and legislative recodifications have erased most de jure sex
discriminations.
202 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) (surveying the
history of congressional responses to Supreme Court decisions to show that civil rights,
women's, and disability rights groups have been particularly successful in procuring
legislative overrides of Supreme Court decisions).
203 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (validating congressional Hyde
Amendment which disallowed Medicaid coverage of abortion expenses); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (upholding state refusal to fund abortions for poor women as
part of Medicaid).
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est." A social movement that has succeeded in removing all or almost
all formal legal discriminations against its members has "made it" in
American politics, and there is no reason for it to disband. Indeed,
the organizations that fueled the movement's politics of recognition
can then serve as effective political arms of the group as a player in
normal politics, and the utility of the preexisting organizations helps
the group overcome collective action problems. To be sure, their op-
ponents will claim that laws benefiting the minority are "special"
rights, while the minority will justify the laws as "remedial." But these
are nothing more than the claims of ordinary politics; the supporter
of government price supports for milk presents them as remedying
flaws in the market for agricultural goods, while the opponent charges
that they are rent-seeking subsidies unrelated to the public welfare.
Government set-asides based on race or sex, affirmative action pro-
grams by public employers and colleges, and hate crime laws are all
rather typical products of the pluralist political system. What sets
them apart is that they deploy classifications that remain charged cri-
teria of normative decisions in our polity.
The success of an IBSM does not ensure the eradication of preju-
dice against or stereotypes about the minority group, but it does
deepen the split between the two poles of the countermovement op-
posing it. True to their label, the pragmatists make peace with the
new consensus but seek to preserve private space for traditionalists to
self-segregate. They abandon their substantive stance altogether in
favor of procedural space for tradition-based exclusions to be local-
ized and privatized. In contrast, the true believers-the people for
whom disdain for the formerly stigmatized trait is more deeply inte-
gral to their identities-are radicalized as they become a marginalized
minority themselves. The Ku Klux Klan, the private militia movement,
Operation Rescue, and all-male and all-white social clubs are examples
of private guerilla groups resisting the anti-racism and anti-sexism
norms that are now accepted in public culture. 4
We are now in a position to sum up the dynamic politics of IBSMs.
Table 1 describes the different kinds of politics entailed in trait-based
discourse. The key variables are whether any part of society mobilizes
in a way that focuses on the trait and how much variation in the trait
society finds normatively tolerable or good. Along the lines of the first
204 Good accounts of these groups are hard to find. For a fascinating study of a
marginal traditionalist group, see Susan P. Koniak, Mien Law Risks Madness, 8
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 65 (1996), examining the Christian Common Law Move-
ment in the nation's heartland.
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variable, politics moves from quadrant 1 to 3 if the stigmatized minor-
ity mobilizes to resist social and legal stigmatization, from 1 to 2 if a
group invested in the status quo mobilizes out of fear of a powerless
minority. In the former case, there is a politics of recognition; in the
latter case, there is a politics of protection, where the minority seeks to
protect itself against a fearful majority. If the minority and traditional-
ists both mobilize, there is a culture clash between politics of recogni-
tion and preservation. Along lines of the second variable, a move-
ment from quadrants 1-2 to 3-4 usually reflects an emerging social
consensus tolerating (but not embracing) variation of the trait within
mainstream society. Movement from quadrants 3-4 to 5-6 reflects
widespread public acceptance of the idea that the minority's variation
is benign. Such a movement does not mean that people abandon
their prejudices or stereotypes, only that public culture embraces the
minority as a "good" and notjust "tolerable" social group.
Table 1
Various Politics Arrayed Around a Stigmatized Minority
Marginalized Marginalized Group
Group That Marginalized Assimilated into
Has Not Group Mobilizes Pluralist System
Mobilized
[1] Status Quo [3] Politics of Rec- [51 Normal Politics. The
Politics. Sta- ognition. The minority group succeeds
ble status minority group in becoming part of theTraditionalist
Citizens quo, where asserts the benign pluralist 
political system.





[2] Politics of [41 Culture Clash: [61 Reverse Politics of Pro-
Protection. Politics of Recogni- tection. Conflict contin-
Status quo tion versus Politics ues, but traditionalists
groups of Preservation. are now marginalized
Traditionalist become and seek protection
Citizens alarmed that against public disap-
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Quadrant 1 is the most potentially stable state of affairs: it is pos-
sible for the identity trait to remain a marker for status subordination,
with the subordinated group unable to organize against their subor-
dination and those invested in the status quo happy to leave well
enough alone. There is no inevitability that a group in quadrant 1 will
ever graduate to quadrants 3 or 4. But if for any reason the minority
group mobilizes as a social and then as a political movement, the poli-
tics of recognition (quadrant 3) will likely generate a responsive social
movement seeking to preserve the status quo, such as the traditional
family value movements responding to the gay liberation movement.
This will push politics into that of culture clash (quadrant 4). If quad-
rant 1 is potentially stable, quadrant 4 is not, if history is any guide.
Thus far, most minorities getting as far as a genuine culture clash have
been able to move into the realm of quadrants 5-6 . This is a para-
dox of culture clashes: once the minority has mobilized enough to
trigger a culture clash, it will probably be able to graduate into normal
politics at some point; traditionalists' best hope for suppressing the
minority is by keeping them pacified (quadrant 1) or terrorizing them
(quadrant 2) before they get organized. Traditionalists have been
able to nip potential social movements in the bud through massive
Kulturkampfs against, for example, Mormon polygamists in the late
nineteenth century and pedophiles in the late twentieth.
C. Constitutionalization of Identity-Based Social Movement Politics
and the Channeling Function of Law
IBSMs are normative movements. The central prescription, the
one from which others flow, is that a trait society has treated as a ma-
lign variation from the norm is, in fact, either a tolerable or a benign
variation (or is no significant variation at all). A social group whose
trait has traditionally been considered malign will take as its original
stance (to the outside world at least) that its variation is tolerable: tac-
itly conceding the superiority of the majority's trait, the minority will
initiallyjust ask for tolerance. If that plea makes headway, the minor-
ity will probably seek full acceptance of its variation. So the natural
205 The key variable is whether the trait or its associated conduct genuinely detracts
from the needs of a good, well-functioning society. Homosexuality and most disabili-
ties do not, and so I would expect those minorities to become part of the pluralist sys-
tem. Traits associated with genuinely harmful conduct-pedophilia and drug addic-
tion come to mind-have not yet yielded social movements that have emerged from
quadrants 1 and 2, and it is unlikely that those stigmatized traits will become part of
normal politics or even a serious politics of recognition.
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normative progression in a social movement is this:
malign variation = tolerable variation benign variation
The countermovement will seek to halt or reverse the flow. Rhetori-
cally, its members claim that the minority is challenging the norm it-
self, and other associated norms that are central to society's moral
structure. Hence the traditionalists' talk of Armageddon: if the norm
is sacrificed for "these people," a lot of norms will become fuzzy, and
society will lose the ability to direct its members in productive direc-
tions.
Historically, this normative progression immediately became a
progression of constitutional arguments
0 b Although the terminology
in this Article has shifted to and fro, the social movements I have been
discussing are now called the civil rights movement, the women's rights
movement, the abortion rights movement, the lesbian and gay rights
movement, and the disability rights movement. Identity-based move-
ments early on view themselves as asserting legal and constitutional
rights as well as normative identities. Even within the majority's
frame, whereby the minority trait is a malign variation, minority group
members will maintain that they are entitled to all the protections of
the rule of law, particularly procedural due process and freedom of
speech protections. The majority will have to concede that point, but
efforts will be made to limit expressive freedoms. Once the minority
group starts emerging as a viable social movement, asserting that its
trait is either a tolerable or a benign variation, its constitutional argu-
ments will include equal protection as well as due process and free-
dom of speech claims. If the movement achieves success through the
adoption of anti-discrimination laws (for the best example), the coun-
termovement's politics of preservation will respond with its own con-
stitutional arguments, in most cases rooted in freedom of speech and
association.
Perhaps the biggest gap in sociological theories of social move-
... De Tocqueville's insight about the United States, that big public law issues all
end up in court, is true for the state's stance toward IBSMs. Given the rights-
protecting tradition of the American judiciary, firmly established by 1945, and the spe-
cific text as well as traditions of the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment,
minority groups poorly represented in the political process would naturally seek help
from courts, which have their own interest in arbitrating political disputes through
their super-political power ofjudicial review. Once the minority latches onto constitu-
tional arguments, traditionalists will tend to respond with their own constitutional
counterarguments.
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ments is their neglect of the role of constitutional law and discourse.
Constitutional discourse is pervasive in all the kinds of politics involv-
ing IBSMs. This has the obvious effect of further empowering lawyers
as the ideological leaders and strategists for the social movements,
with the price being the ones I described earlier. A less obvious effect
is that the public rhetoric of IBSMs in the United States has itself be-
come constitutionalized. This is the grand channeling function of con-
stitutional law for IBSMs: constitutional doctrine not only channels
the energies of these social movements and countermovements, but
also channels their rhetoric and perhaps even their ideologies into the
furrows plowed byjudges and law professors.
Consider how the foregoing analysis operates at all levels of the
politics of IBSMs.
1. The Politics of Protection: (Procedural) Due Process and
Freedom of Speech
The minority groups' politics of protection (quadrant 2) was the
first to be constitutionalized. Although private persons and firms can
hassle and commit violence against the minority, middle-class Ameri-
cans are nervous doing these things without the imprimatur of the
state. In our constitutional tradition, anything the state does to an in-
dividual is limited by various procedural and substantive protections,
most of which have been recognized under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth (federal government) and Fourteenth (state governments)
Amendments to the Constitution. Thus, when African-American men
were charged with rape or other serious crimes during apartheid, they
had potential constitutional arguments against being railroaded into a
conviction and a possible death penalty. Concededly, states routinely
ignored or evaded those ostensible protections, but the Supreme
Court sought to thwart this exercise of official power by prohibiting,
tinder the Due Process Clause, railroaded state conviction and pun-
ishment of blacks because of prejudice,0 7 and by prohibiting, under
the Equal Protection Clause, exclusion of blacks from juries.2  Later
207 See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (barring trial by mob); Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requiring state-appointed counsel in capital cases); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (barring state torture to obtain convictions).
208 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1879) (invalidating a statute
limiting juries to "white male persons"); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1953)
(ruling it unconstitutional to exclude blacks from jury venires by unannounced dis-
criminatory practices); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) (ruling that dis-
criminatory use of preemptory challenges is unconstitutional).
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precedents greatly expanded the due process protections for criminal
defendants, which commentators believe to have been inspired by the
Court's concern with state prosecution of racial minorities.
20 9 Once
these expanded protections fell into place, they also provided some
protections for gay men or female sex workers arrested for soliciting
sex in public. These defendants had potential constitutional argu-
ments to challenge their arrests, and other constitutional protections
such as the right to counsel and trial by jury would, if invoked, raise
the costs of prosecution. The homophile movement of the 1950s and
early 1960s publicized these protections to their members and sought
public support for toleration by trying to expose abusive police prac-
tices.11
The politics of protection won many court victories under the
Speech Clause as well as the Due Process Clause. The Warren Court
read the Speech Clause of the First Amendment the way the ACLU
had long urged: whatever society's view of a minority group or an
oddball individual, the Speech Clause guaranteed them rights to
speak and dissent, to associate for such purposes without state inter-
ference, to march and carry on, and otherwise to object to state and
private treatment of them. While this jurisprudence was deployed
to protect political dissidents and racial minorities in the most cele-
brated cases, it was also a shield for gay litigants who wanted the state
to give them their own normative space.12
More important, the Speech Clause gave nascent IBSMs public
space to organize their politics of recognition. The freedom of
speech cases protected the birth control movement from the post of-
fice and other censors and thereby allowed the movement to get out
its message to a larger receptive audience . In the wake of Brown and
the various bus boycotts of the 1950s, southern jurisdictions outlawed
209 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673 (1992)
(explaining the Warren Court's criminal due process activism as inspired by concern
about discriminatory enforcement against African Americans).
210 See, e.g., Your Rights in Case of Arrest, ONE, Jan. 1954, at 14 (providing fourteen
recommendations on how to deal with the police in case of arrest); Editorial, Your
Rights in Case of Arrest, ONE, Mar. 1961, at 4-5 (advising homosexuals on how "to guard
against illegal search and seizure and illegal arrest").
21 See supra text accompanying notes 128-33 (noting the Supreme Court decisions
that created a constitutionally protected space for dissent and protest).
212 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 111-25 (surveying First Amendment
cases).
211 See, e.g., United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936) (interpreting
the Comstock Act as not barring trade in diaphragms); United States v. Dennett, 39
F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) (protecting sex education materials against censorship).
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and investigated the NAACP and constantly harassed Dr. King and
other leaders of the SCLC. Their actions violated virtually every free-
dom guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Although state judges cooper-
ated in the violations, federal judges and executive department offi-
cials disrupted them episodically. And every time King went to jail on
trumped-up charges, the civil rights movement gained nationwide
publicity for its complaints against apartheid. Northerners and fed-
eral officials were forced to conclude that southern jurisdictions were
operating outside the rule of law and that the Constitution as well as
racialjustice were on the line in the civil rights struggle.
The Speech Clause helped make Stonewall the galvanizing event
that turned gay rights into a mass social movement. Under the Su-
preme Court's precedents, there was no doubt that lesbians and gay
men could speak publicly about their sexual orientations, publish
newsletters and magazines that could not be censored by the state
(and under no circumstances be subjected to prior restraints), form
clubs and organizations for associational and speech purposes, con-
gregate pretty much as they wished, march and protest antigay ac-
tions, and so forth. These protections, which did not exist in the
1950s, lowered the costs of coming out of the closet and forming
group organizations. Once the Stonewall riots inflamed the con-
sciousness of thousands of previously closeted gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals, more of them were willing to become involved in that social
movement, engaging in expressive, often obnoxious, activities so
clearly within the protection of the Speech Clause that seething police
and censors did not even try to stop them.
The constitutional arguments associated with the politics of pro-
tection had a price tag for nascent IBSMs. To begin with, by making
these arguments, minorities were subjecting themselves to state appa-
ratuses and were conceding the authority of the state to govern their
affairs. As Dr. King put it, "[o]ur conscience tells us that the [south-
ern] law is wrong and we must resist, but we have a moral obligation
to accept the penalty. 21 4  Another cost rested upon the analytical
structure of due process and freedom of speech arguments, which al-
lowed minorities and judges to sidestep underlying moral and norma-
tive issues. Freedom of speech arguments rest on the supposition that
everyone is entitled to express his views, no matter how wretched they215
are. Due process arguments rest upon the supposition that the state
2"4 GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 12, at 159 (quoting Dr. King).
215 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
[Vol. 150: 419
HeinOnline -- 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 482 2001-2002
IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
cannot discipline people except under the clearly articulated rules of
law and according to traditional procedures, no matter how degraded
those people might be.2 " Thus, the state cannot censor speech be-
cause it is squalid, nor can the state deprive horrible people of their
liberty without following traditional procedures and applying preexist-
ing rules of law. While minorities could protect themselves by appeals
to rights shared by the worst in society, such a stance suggested that
people of color, the disabled, gays and lesbians, and women seeking
abortions were the worst in society. So long as freedom of speech and
procedural due process were the only arguments a minority group was
making to protect its members, minorities might be understood to
have "conceded" their inferiority. Finally, by making appeals to the
most libertarian provisions of the Constitution, these minorities were
not only foregoing appeal to the Equal Protection Clause, but were
contributing to the anti-state tradition in American public law. Be-
cause the primary situs of oppression against most people of color,
women, gay people, and the disabled were private actors, the minor-
ity's early embrace of a libertarian Constitution could, in the longer
term, undermine the minority's ability to seek affirmative aid from the
state.
2. The Politics of Recognition: (Substantive) Due Process and
Equal Protection
As nascent IBSMs moved from the primarily defensive stance of
protecting their members from state persecution to the more offen-
sive one of repealing or nullifying state discriminations against their
members, they moved from procedural to substantive due process
lines of argument. Birth control advocates in the 1920s and 1930s in-
voked the rule of lenity, a procedural due process rule of statutory
construction, to urge narrow construction of anti-contraception
laws;21 pro-choice advocates did the same for anti-abortion laws in the
1960s. 21' As these movements grew stronger, their advocates moved
(agreeing firmly that the Speech Clause protects a flagburning defendant, however
"repellant" he and his conduct are to the Court).
216 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (overturning
crime of being a "dissolute person" as too vague), followed in City of Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invalidating a law aimed at controlling inner city gangs and hood-
lums).
217 See People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637 (N.Y. 1918) (narrowly construing New York's
anti-contraception laws).
218 See People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969) (narrowly construing California's
abortion laws).
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toward substantive due process arguments in the 1940s and 1970s, re-
spectively. Originally, advocates of these movements argued that the
legislature had not clearly enough prohibited their activities; later, they
maintained that the legislature could not regulate their activities. Gris-
219wold and Roe, of course, were the big victories for these movements.
Women in the 1940s and 1950s and gay people in the 1960s and 1970s
similarly relied on substantive due process and (for the latter) privacy
arguments to challenge state discriminations against them. Such ar-
guments succeeded in overturning the federal civil service exclusion
of gay people, some consensual sodomy laws, most cross-dressing pro-
hibitions, and many laws making sexual solicitation illegal. 2 0  The
NAACP's early challenges to segregation measures relied on substan-
tive features of the Due Process Clause, and Bolling v. Sharpe ', (the
companion case to Brown) relied on substantive due process to rule
that the federal government's school segregation in the District of Co-
lumbia was unconstitutional.
The constitutional hallmark of an IBSM's shift to a politics of rec-
ognition, however, was a shift from due process aspirations to equal
.222protection ones. The civil rights movement for African Americans
epitomized this shift and inspired subsequent ones. Before World
War II, the NAACP's court victories were often due process ones, but
after the war its major victories were founded on equal protection• 223
claims. The basic stance was that any discrimination based upon a
219 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating criminal abortion statutes based
on a substantive reading of the Due Process Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (invalidating the state's contraception law based on a constitutional right
of privacy).
220 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 104-11 (discussing the state cases deal-
ing with the substantive right of privacy).
2 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
222 Note, however, that the initiation of a politics of recognition does not obviate
the need for an ongoing politics of protection. Thus gay organizations have continued
to challenge state laws and practices that gay people consider oppressive, while at the
same time making broader equality arguments. Note, further, that equality types of
arguments can and ought to be made under the Due Process Clause; so, for purposes
of the argument in the text, it does not matter exactly what provision of the Constitu-
tion is invoked. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Pro-
tection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183 (2000). Finally, do not forget that the IBSM's ultimate
goal is social acceptance, notjust legal equality.
223 Compare Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) ("[The] attempt to prevent
the alienation of... property.., to a person of color... is in direct violation of the
fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment .. , preventing state interfer-
ence with property rights except by due process of law.") (emphasis added), with Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[T]he plaintiffs and others similarly situ-
ated.., are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protec-
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stigmatized trait was unconstitutional, at least for symbolic reasons.
Although the civil rights movement sought economic advances as well,
its core norm was dignitary: the state is not respecting black people
unless it accords them all the same rights as white peopie.
Directly inspired by the civil rights movement, the first National
Planning Conference of Homophile Organizations adopted this reso-
lution in 1966: "Homosexual American citizens should have precise
equality with all other citizens before the law and are entitled to social
and economic equality of opportunity.2 2 4 This resolution marked a
transition from the old homophile movement, whose core arguments
rested upon the Due Process and Freedom of Speech Clauses, to the
gay rights movement, which after Stonewall (in 1969) increasingly
emphasized equal protection arguments.' Likewise, the women's
movement had long been ambivalent about claims of formal equality,
but resolved those doubts, provisionally, at about the same time as gay
rights advocates. NOW's purpose, also articulated in 1966, was "to
bring women into full participation as the mainstream of American
society NOW, assuming all the privileges and responsibilities thereof
in truly equal partnership with men. ",' This public aspiration of for-
mal equality also expressed itself in the 1970s with constitutional liti-
gation pressed by the ACLU Women's Rights Project and the nearly
successful ERA ratification effort. The birth control and pro-choice
movements had originally founded their constitutional discourse on
the right to privacy, but advocates subsequently augmented those ar-
guments with equal protection ones.7 Indeed, in the 1980s and
1990s, leading feminists argued that Roe v. Wade would have been bet-
ter decided under the Equal Protection Clause than under the pri-
tion of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
224 U.S. Homophile Movenent Gains National Strength, LADDER, Apr. 1966, at 4 (quot-
ing the Conference's resolutions).
225 See ESKRIDGE, GAYILW, supra note 14, at 125-37 (surveying the government em-
ployment exclusion cases).
2" Freeman, supra note 13, at 798-99 (quoting NOW) (emphasis added). On the
longstanding and continuing division between liberal and liberatory feminist thought,
see RH ODE, supra note 13, at 58-62; and Taylor, supra note 80.
227 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 557 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting a gender equality justification for preserving Roe, since the
right to reproductive choice has become vital to the full participation of women in
economic and political life); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) ("[B]y
providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly
situated, [the] Massachusetts [contraception laws] ... violate the Equal Protection
Clause.").
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vacy-protecting Due Process Clause .
Like the due process and speech cases, the equal protection cases
were a tacit concession by potential rebels that they wanted to remain
part of the pluralist constitutional polity.
In one sense, the later cases were an even more striking conces-
sion than the earlier ones. Unlike the due process and speech cases,
the equal protection cases presented, rather than avoided, normative
choices. By arguing that a classification (based on race, sex, sexual
orientation, or disability, for instance) was arbitrary, plaintiffs were
asking courts to make judgments that the minority's distinguishing
trait was a tolerable variation from the norm, at least with regard to
the regulatory matter in suit. 9 Whereas the Speech Clause barred the
state from censoring the sociopath's obnoxious expression, the Equal
Protection Clause did not bar the state from refusing to employ the
sociopath and from denying him other privileges. So long as the state
had a sufficient policy basis for a regulatory discrimination, its rules
would pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause.230
By the end of World War II, the Supreme Court was applying this
standard through a rough sliding scale: suspicious classifications like
race and ethnicity would be scrutinized more carefully to assure that
the classification was strictly necessary to satisfy a more weighty public
interest. Although the Court in Brown did not emphasize the suspi-
ciousness of the race-based classification, the Court applied the
precedent to invalidate most state apartheid laws. After Loving v. Vir-
ginia,3 2 it was apparent that race-based classifications triggered a
wholly different level of judicial scrutiny than others did, and it be-
came the constitutional goal of other groups to persuade the Court
that the differentiating classification to which they were subject should
228 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Reva Siegel, Reasoningfiom the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261,
351 (1992).
21 ) See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating a commercial
laundry ordinance because it was enforced on the basis of ethnicity rather than on the
basis of its stated public safety rationale).
230 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding that sterilization of state-
supported inmates on the basis of feeblemindedness survived rational basis review and
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
231 Korernatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
232 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that statutes that prevent marriages solely on the
basis of race violate both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause).
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be similarly treated. To garner that level of scrutiny, minority
groups developed their own civil rights jurisprudence, which said, in
effect: like people of color, our group is marked by an "immutable"
trait which has served as the basis for discrimination; like race, our dis-
tinguishing trait "bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society. '234 In this way, both judges and minorities were reading the
Equal Protection Clause as a protection for groups that were marked
and different, while at the same time being similar and integrable into
society. Some scholars have read these cases as imposing assimilative
235
strategies on minority groups. I do not go that far and would main-
tain only that these cases placed the burden on minority groups to
show their "worth" to the nation's pluralist and market system, a bur-
den minorities readily undertook
3
A deeper effect of IBSMs' reliance on equal protection and the
other constitutional doctrines is that it empowered moderates within
the social movements and disempowered radicals. These constitu-
tional doctrines were tailor-made for minority leaders who favored in-
tegration of their group into mainstream institutions such as mar-
riage, the workplace, and the armed forces. Win or lose,
constitutional doctrines provided colorable challenges to exclusions
from these institutions, and integrationists could hijack the social
movement's agenda by pressing this kind of litigation, which not only
attracted attention but whose minor successes provided the basis for
quasi-permanent subcultural institutions. Radicals and separatists, in
contrast, did not have this avenue for their claims that minorities
233 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (ruling that sex-based classifications
shall be reviewed under an intermediate scrutiny standard); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (ruling that disability-based classifications
need not be reviewed tinder a heightened scrutiny standard but under a "rational basis
with bite" standard); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (ruling that sexual orienta-
tion-based classifications need to be reviewed tinder a "rational basis with bite" stan-
dard).
... Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan,J., plurality opin-
ion) (urging that sex discrimination be subjected to the same strict scrutiny as race
discrimination, for reasons similar to those advanced in the ACLU brief for the peti-
tioner).
235 See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Pre-
suinption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998) (critiquing the
assimilationist bias in current equal protection doctrine).
236 1 do not think the structure of equal protection arguments press toward assimi-
lation, or at least assimilation as understood by the melting pot. The structure of equal
protection doctrine requires both that the minority be marked and that it be capable
of contributing to society. That situation strikes me as leaving open many possibilities
for diversity within our pluralist polity and our capitalist market.
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should develop their own new institutions to displace patriarchal mar-
riage, capitalistic workplaces, and militaristic armies.13' Nor were radi-
cals and separationists able to create sustained institutions to compete
with those of the integrationists. Hence the assurance game feature
needed for a social movement to take off for the long haul was much
easier to achieve when the goals were integrationist.
3. The Politics of Preservation: Federalism, Free Speech, and
(Substantive) Due Process
So long as traditionalists controlled the organs of state power to
suppress minorities, the former had no positive constitutional politics.
Theirs was a constitutionalism of denial: the minority group did not
have the "rights" it claimed. But once minorities achieved some suc-
cesses in the political orjudicial arenas, traditionalists found their own
affirmative constitutional voice. Between 1954 (when Brown was de-
cided) and 1964 (when the Civil Rights Act was passed), southern seg-
regationists developed a multifaceted constitutional jurisprudence.
The federal government was violating states' rights by forcing national
norms onto local political systems and was infringing on white peo-
ple's rights of association by requiring their integration with people
with whom they did not want to mix.23 8 Critics of Roe v. Wade adopted
a similar combination of constitutional arguments. Their main argu-
ment has been that the Court's recognition of the rights of the
237 Among the radical or separatist subgroups I have in mind are the black nation-
alists of the 1950s and 1960s, who were eclipsed by the NAACP and SCLC racial inte-
grationists, see Gary Peller, Frontier of Legal Thought III: Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758, 767-71 (discussing the shift toward integrationism in the 1960s and '70s);
radical feminism, pro-sex feminism, and the lesbian nation of the 1970s, which were
eclipsed by liberal and then cultural feminism, see ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD:
RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 1967-1975, at 243 (1989) ("After 1975, a year of inter-
necine conflicts between radical and cultural feminists, cultural feminism eclipsed
radical feminism as the dominant tendency within the women's liberation movement,
and, as a consequence, liberal feminism became the recognized voice of the women's
movement."); sexual radicals and queer activists of the 1970s and 1980s, who have
been eclipsed by the moderates of the same-sex marriage movement, see ESKRIDGE,
EQUALITY PRACI'ICE, supra note 198, at chs. I & 6 (providing an account of the same-
sex marriage movement and analyzing the three-pronged nature of the same-sex mar-
riage debate); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage", 79 VA.
L. REV. 1535, 1546 (1993) (opining that "an effort to legalize lesbian and gay marriage
would make a public critique of the institution of marriage impossible").
238 See EARL BLACK, SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1976) (surveying
segregationist rhetoric in southern gubernatorial campaigns of the 1950 s); 8ARRArI,
supra note 185 (surveying segregationist reasoning).
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mother ignored the rights of the fetus, but pro-life advocates also
maintained that the nationalization of the issue violated precepts of
federalism. Opponents charged that the proposed ERA would feder-
alize state law and would deprive women and children of protective
legislation in the fields of employment and family law.2 "0
Once the minority became a regular participant in normal politics
and the state started imposing nondiscrimination obligations on tradi-
tionalists, traditionalists' arguments emphasized freedom of speech
and association. Some of the precedents allowing minorities to asso-
ciate with one another and speak publicly were invoked by traditional-
ists to protect their right to exclude minorities from their private
clubs, associations, parades, and forums.240 And traditionalists insisted
that their free speech rights protected them against government inter-
ference with racist or homophobic speech, or even maliciously racist
conduct.2 4' Embattled traditionalists have argued that the privacy
cases also assure parents rights to control the information, images,
242
and role models to which their children are exposed.
Just as traditionalists deploy free speech and privacy arguments
once a minority gains some degree of state protection, so too do they
sometimes invoke equal protection arguments. Political claims that
the state is giving a minority "special rights" sometimes translate into
constitutional claims that statutes benefiting minorities constitute "re-
verse discrimination" in tension with the Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena ruled that
even remedial race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.
By making, and often winning with, these constitutional argu-
239 See, e.g., MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 13, at 35-53 (reviewing the opposition
posed by Senator Ervin, the leading Senate ERA critic).
240 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding traditional-
ists' rights of association by allowing their groups to exclude gay people); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (rejecting traditionalists' assertion of asso-
ciational rights as basis for their groups' exclusion of women).
211 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1992) (dismissing a
charge of racist cross-burning in violation of a hate-crime ordinance because the ordi-
nance impermissibly infringed upon free speech).
242 See, e.g., STEPHEN BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS. COLORADO AND AMERICA: THE
INSIDE STORY OF AMENDMENT 2, at 70-80 (1994) (arguing that anti-discrimination laws
invade the rights of straight families); ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE
SURVIVAL OF OUR NATION'S FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY
114 (1977) (voicing concerns, as a mother, against "[k]nown homosexual school-
teachers and their possible role-model impact").
243 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to minority preference programs of the Federal
Communications Commission)).
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ments, traditionalists-no less than the minority-are paying homage
to the legitimacy of the polity's regulatory authority. This may be a
trivial feature so long as traditionalists are in the majority but looms
much larger if the minority achieves overall public acceptance. If that
happens, then traditionalists themselves will be the minority and will
be subject to stringent and perhaps escalating state regulations. The
embattled traditionalists may themselves become outlaws, but are less
likely to do so if they trust the legal system to protect them against the
most intrusive minority-rights regulations. At that point, their acqui-
escence in the legal system and its array of rights becomes quite im-
portant.
Whatever their ultimate direction, traditionalist rhetoric and
thought, like that of the minority, are channeled by the law. Thus,
traditionalists have found themselves making arguments that secular-
ize their core religious or natural law vision, which risks losing their
meaning in the translation and even altering their own self-
understanding over time. 44 For example, the devout fundamentalist
who truly believes that same-sex marriage is contrary to the law of God
now finds himself allied with the bigot who says "homosexuals are
child molesters," with the lawyer who says "spouses have a right to de-
fend their marriages against homosexual assault," and with the politi-
cian who says "normal people have a right not to associate with homo-
sexuals and lesbians." Not only do the latter statements ignore the
deep spiritual component of the devout's belief system, but in my
opinion those secularized arguments actually change the belief system
itself. My reading of the Gospels suggests that unfactual accusations
about gay people and dependence on the state to bolster one's faith
are inconsistent with Jesus' philosophy of love-and that the importa-
tion of these views into Christianity certainly changes and arguably
corrupts that philosophy as articulated by Jesus.
Table 2 maps some of the ways that law, especially constitutional
law, influences and even pervades discourse surrounding the emer-
gence of IBSMs such as the gay rights movement.
244 The worldview of most traditionalists draws heavily from premodern modes of
thought, such as natural law and religion. Such thinking does not generate arguments
that a federal court will recognize and so must be "translated" into the modern (rights-
based) mode of thought reflected in constitutional doctrine. Much is lost in the trans-
lation.
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Table 2
Constitutional Discourse and
the Politics of Identity-Based Social Movements
Minority Group's Minority Group's Traditionalist
Politics of Politics of Group's Politics of
Protection Recognition Preservation
Few aspirations. Ambitious. Minority Reactive. Tradition-
Minority seeks to seeks to reassign its alists seek to
Normative reassign its trait trait from a malign 
reaffirm the minor-
from malign toward variation to tolerable ity's trait as a malign
Aspiration a tolerable variation, and then benign variation or no
variation, more than a tolerable
variation.
Constitutional Due Process Equal Protection Freedom of Speech
Bases Freedom of Speech (Substantive) Due Substantive Due
For Discourse Process Process
Acquiescence of Integration of the Modernization of
minority in state's minority into the traditionalist dis-
authority over its pluralist system. course. Alienation
Can members. Suppres- Assimilation or of traditionalists
sion of normative representation of from their root
discourse about the minority as similar beliefs.
minority's trait, to mainstream.
III. IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL GROUPS, PUBLIC LAW, AND
THEORIES OFJUDICIAL REVIEW
The first two Parts of this Article have explored the important and
multifaceted roles that law has played in the creation (Part I) and dy-
namics (Part II) of IBSMs. This Part reverses the inquiry: How have
IBSMs affected the evolution of American public law, especially consti-
tutional law? What role should constitutional courts play in the poli-
tics of identity-based social movements and countermovements?
The first inquiry is a descriptive one; the second is prescriptive.
IBSMs have transformed American law by pressing for a broad range
of anti-discrimination and group-remedial statutes, and by invigorat-
ing the enforcement of these new kinds of laws. Their most dramatic
transformation has been in the arena of constitutional law. These
mass movements have been both the occasion and the motivation for
the Supreme Court to give hard bite to the Speech Clause's protection
of expressive activities, to develop a broad constitutional right of pri-
vacy loosely moored to the Due Process Clause, and to create tiers of
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scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. At a more general level,
IBSMs worked with judges to reconceptualize constitutional law as
vigorously protecting minorities' efforts to bring their interests into
the pluralist democratic process. As I shall argue in concluding this
Part, this new constitutional role for judges can be criticized as both
too timid and too activist, but on the whole it can be and has been
deployed by cautious and thoughtful judges as a productive role for
the judiciary to play in our republic.
A. How IBSMs Have Changed Public (Statutory) Law
The most obvious effect of IBSMs on American law is statutory.
Legislatures have repealed almost all the race- and sex-based discrimi-
nations in American law, as well as many disability- and sexuality-based
discriminations. States and municipalities prohibit a variety of dis-
criminations by private as well as public employers and facilities. The
federal government has adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,245 the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,4 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 , 7 the
245 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
246 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1994).
247 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (Supp. IV 1998).
248 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
249 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. & 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1999)).
250 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
251 See also the proposed Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996 (ENDA), re-
printed in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE
LAW app. 4 at 1165-69 (1997). Although not contributing as deeply to American statu-
tory law, countermovements have been able to enact important statutes of their own,
most notably the first Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439 § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434
(1976). and the Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 11 1996).
252 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (amending the 1964 Act to extend
job discrimination rules to state and federal employers).
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Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) , the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) ,24' the Civil Rights Act of 1991,23" and
other anti-discrimination laws.' The impetus and sustaining push for
all these statutes were IBSMs and their allies. These statutes have not
only revised the rules of American law but have also created a new
model of statutory law.
The new model has these features: pervasiveness, diversification,
preference-transformation. Unlike most earlier American legislation,
these new statutes were usually not limited to one industry or one kind
of institution. Their prototype, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended in 1972 ,2 imposed new rights and duties pervasively
throughout our society and across different kinds of institutions.
Unlike most prior laws, which were usually limited to particular insti-
tutions, the new anti-discrimination laws apply pervasively. They re-
quire employers, governments, landlords, and public accommoda-
tions to diversify, or at least to include or admit people who were
previously excluded. Unlike most prior laws, which sought to solve
social problems by increasing penalties for and therefore discouraging
unproductive conduct, these new statutes seek to solve social prob-
lems by injunctive relief directly altering institutional decision making
and indirectly seeking to change attitudes over time. The success of
these statutes has depended on their ability to synthesize identity poli-
tics with the Weberian model of modern society, where advancement
depends upon acts rather than status, impersonal merit instead of
personal relationships.2 14 This represents a legal-normative revolution
whose success is not assured, but which will continue to affect Ameri-
can law for the foreseeable future.
Indeed, the anti-discrimination laws pressed by IBSMs are em-
blematic of a relatively new form of law that John Ferejohn and I have
dubbed super-statutes.
A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a
new normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over
time does "stick" in the public culture such that (3) the super-statute
and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect on the
213 The generalizations in the text apply also to comprehensive anti-discrimination
statutes adopted by virtually all the states and to the ADA.
24 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 998-1002 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968); see ROSEMARY
PRINGLE, SECRETARIES TALK 84-103 (1988) (applying Weberian ideas to explain the
ideology of modern anti-discrimination rules for workplaces).
2001]
HeinOnline -- 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 493 2001-2002
494 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
law-including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute.'
Such framework statutes, also characteristic of the nation's envi-
ronmental laws, have a constitutive quality that gives them a quasi-
constitutional flavor. The political energy flowing from IBSMs drives
the implementation as well as enactment of these super-statutes."'
Courts and agencies will tend to apply these statutes liberally for three
overlapping reasons: (1) the legislative mandate will be strongly re-
medial, and that will be reflected in the text and legislative history of
the statute, and (2) the minority and its allies will lobby intensely for
liberal constructions, which will be buttressed by (3) public opinion
supporting remedial treatment.257 That tendency will be moderated to
the extent a countermovement has been able to force compromises
into the legislation or reveals its own political muscle after the law's
enactment.
The evolution of Title VII, for example, has been driven more
strongly by norms pressed by the civil rights and women's movements
than by statutory text or legislative history. The statute on its face
prohibits disparate treatment of an employee because of his race but,
reflecting the political clout of employers in the original enactment
255 William N. Eskridge,Jr. &John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001). Although there certainly were super-statutes before 1964, id. at 1223-25 (citing
early institutional super-statutes creating the federal judiciary and the national bank);
id. at 1227 (detailing New Deal super-statutes); id. at 1231-37 (discussing the Sherman
Act and ensuing antitrust laws), the Civil Rights Act is not only an instant classic super-
statute, but it has become an emblematic one in our polity. Anti-discrimination super-
statutes have been deployed in pre-Charter Canada and the United Kingdom as substi-
tutes for our Bill of Rights. Id. at 1265.
256 In two recent cases-the sex discrimination bar in Title VII and the disability
rights provision in the Rehabilitation Act-the IBSM protected by the statute did not
draft and was not primarily responsible for its enactment. See SCOTCH, supra note 15,
at 45-59 (explaining the genesis and drafting of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act);
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RiGHTS ACT 115-18 (1985) (putting in context the oppo-
nents' supposed "killer amendment" adding "sex" to Title VII). In both instances, the
beneficiary group mobilized around the new legal protection. See GRAHAM, supra note
145, at 221-32 (chronicling women's mobilization to force EEOC to enforce a sex dis-
crimination provision); SCOTCH, supra note 15, at 60-120 (providing a detailed account
on grassroots and lobbying pressure by the disability community to force HEW to issue
strong section 504 regulations). The other statutes-the Civil Rights and Voting Rights
Acts (racial minorities), Title IX and the PDA (women), the ADA (people with disabili-
ties), and the proposed ENDA (gay people)-were pushed mainly by the IBSMs whose
members stood to benefit from them, and they played a big role in the implementa-
tion of those statutes by the EEOC and HEW.
257 Table I suggests that an IBSM's success in obtaining broad anti-discrimination
legislation is evidence of an emerging consensus that variations in the identifying trait
are at least tolerable and are moving toward benign.
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process, also permits employers to use job-related tests. 
"" Duke Power
required certain grades of employees to have high school degrees or a
certain score on a standardized test. Because the effect of this re-
quirement was to prevent most black employees from moving up to
better jobs, the NAACP challenged the practice. Relying on specific
legislative history as well as the statutory text, the lower courts dis-
missed the complaint, but the Burger Court-normally attentive to
legislative expectations and compromises-unanimously reversed in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
2 '9 ChiefJustice Burger's opinion relied on the
integrative purpose of the statute to justify lawsuits challenging em-
ployment tests and other practices that had a disparate impact upon
minorities but were without a legitimate job-basedjustification. Griggs
is explicable neither as an exercise in legal analysis nor as an effort by
the Justices to read their own values into the statute . Instead, it re-
flected an emerging political consensus in Washington, D.C., that Ti-
tle VII would be a dead letter unless regulators and judges could ex-
amine employment practices that had discriminatory impacts.
211 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination
because of race), with § 2000e-2(h) (allowing employer use ofjob-related tests, unless
applied with an intent to discriminate on the basis of race).
259 401 U.S. 424 (1971), revg 4 2 0 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
260 See GRAHAM, supra note 145, at 386-90 (analyzing Griggs).
21' Following the EEOC's advice, the Nixon Administration joined the NAACP in
asking the Court to review the lower courts' disposition. See id. at 385-86. Although
the matter was more controversial in Congress, because a disparate impact rule 
ex-
posed businesses to possibly significant litigation, both chambers rejected efforts 
to
override Griggs. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 21-22 (1971), reinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2156-57; S. REP. No. 92-415, at 14 (1971).
2 1, Accounts of the House floor amendment adding "sex" to Title VII can be found
in WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 256, at 115-16; and Francis Vaas, Title VII: Legislative
Hista., 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431,441-42 (1966).
2 " See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-
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An even more dramatic example is the evolution of job discrimi-
nation law for women. Title VII's prohibition of employment dis-
crimination because of sex was added through an opportunistic alli-
ance between the feminist movement and the opponents of the civil
rights billy.2 ' There was no strong congressional mandate for enforc-
ing the provision, and the agency and courts did little with it for the
first decade. Only after women became a politically potent social
movement did enforcement change. For example, the EEOC initially
opined that nothing in Title VII barred employers from discriminat-
ing on the basis of pregnancy, but, under pressure from feminist
groups, reversed its position in 1972, the year Congress passed the
proposed ERA by large margins.2 "' Although the Supreme Court in-
validated the 1972 regulation, Congress swiftly overrode the Court by
amending Title VII to include pregnancy as a form of sex discrimina-
2,,4tion. The Supreme Court was so chastened by the override that it
has construed the PDA very broadly, and for the benefit of women,
whose social movement had engineered the rebuke."" Following the
roadmap laid out by feminist scholars in the 1970s, the agency devel-
oped detailed guidelines regulating workplace harassment in 1980.
Still smarting from the PDA rebuke and alert to the new political equi-
librium (as well as the voice of the nation's first female Supreme
CourtJustice), the Burger Court gave tentative approval to the guide-
lines in 1986.2' ' The Rehnquist Court-ordinarily more text-based in
264 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (overriding
Gilbert).
265 See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204-06 (1991) (constru-
ing the PDA to stop employers from barring pregnant women from working in haz-
ardous parts of the workplace); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
292 (1987) (refusing to construe the PDA to preempt a state law giving unique advan-
tages to pregnant workers).
2,,,; Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1704
(1998).
207 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (ruling that some forms of
workplace sexual harassment are actionable tinder Title VII).
, See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 n.4 (1998) (finding that
Congress had ratified the earlier EEOC regulations); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (creating detailed judge-made rules for an employer's liability
for actions of harassing employees).
269 See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (Blackmun, J.)
(adopting a liberal construction of the PDA); see also id. at 223 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(adoptingJudge Easterbrook's construction in the lower court); School Bd. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 284-86 (1987) (Brennan,J.) (adopting a liberal construction of the Re-
habilitation Act as it applies to persons having contagious diseases).
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its constructions of statutes and no friend to progressive causes-not
only reaffirmed the guidelines in 1998 but created a detailed set of
rules for employer accountability, notwithstanding the lack of statu-
tory support or delegation.2 8 The Court's relatively liberal approach
to sexual harassment owes much to the normative consensus that the
women's movement has brought to the issue: businesses join femi-
nists and Republicans join Democrats in agreeing that sexual harass-
ment does not belong in the workplace.
Thus, when an IBSM has been successful in bringing normative
consensus to an issue of public law, that consensus has affected the
evolution of statutes adopted at the behest of the IBSM. It is for this
reason that conservative as well as progressive judges have construed
the Voting Rights Act, the PDA, and the Rehabilitation Act dynami-
cally and liberally to carry out anti-discrimination purposes that were
once controversial but that have now saturated American public cul-
ture."'1' There has been a political equilibrium as to such issues: even if
a court were to trim back important voting protections, the political
system would amend the statute to reinstate the settled meaning.
Conversely, issues such as race- or sex-based affirmative action or dis-
crimination against people with eyeglasses are not ones where we have
a public consensus. 70 Where there is no such consensus, regulators
and judges have substantial discretion to treat these issues as they
think best. Accordingly, at some point, the agency and courts will set
new limits to the obligations imposed by the statute.
Like other statutes, an anti-discrimination super-statute has an ex-
pected life cycle-from a burst of political energy at birth and in its
youth, through a mature adulthood, culminating in a wasting away
during senescence.27' Anti-discrimination laws have been distin-
guished by the intensity of their remedial purpose, which agencies
and courts usually carry out for a relatively long period of time, and by
the predictable movement from combating de jure forms of discrimi-
211) Cf Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (settling an intense
debate over whether the ADA covers people with correctable vision by holding that it
does not);Johnson v. Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640-42 (1987) (reaffirming, over a
heated dissent, Title VIi's allowance of voluntary affirmative action tinder certain cir-
cumstances).
27 The idea of a statute's life cycle is adapted from MARVER H. BERNSTEIN,
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74-91 (1955).
212 GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION 5 (1991).
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nation ("No women need apply") toward de facto ones (women are
hired but are harassed on the job or are not promoted if they have
children). At some point, courts will halt the IBSM-inspired agency's
expansion of the statute, and the legislature will debate whether to ac-
cept the court's limits. Generally, legislatures will support substantial
effort to eliminate many of the de facto forms of discrimination-until
political support for the statute wanes. At that point, ordinary politics
is the order of the day, and enforcement of the statute will shift from
being considered a moral crusade toward being a strategic game. If
the public comes to see the statute that way, I hypothesize that its po-
litical support will sink and it will be vulnerable to diminishing rele-
vance or even repeal. Diagram 3 illustrates the life cycle I have de-
scribed.
Diagram 3
The Life Cycle of an Anti-Discrimination Super-Statute
IBSM persuades legislature to enact anti-discrimination law
Strong remedial goal, but some compromises to get law
through legislature
IBSM allies staffing agency press for liberal construction of
statute; courts go along
Legislature debates exemptions and expansions, with
IBSM usually prevailing
LI
Dejure discriminatory practices change
Agency tackles de facto discrimination, sometimes limited
by courts
Legislature tends to override courts in favor of attacking de
facto discrimination
LI
Political support for further expansion of statute weakens
Agencies and courts reluctant to expand statute further
LI
[Statute perceived to have higher social costs,
leading to cutbacks]
B. How IBSMs Have Changed Constitutional Law
Social movements can influence constitutional law in no fewer
than three ways. IBSMs have not only affected constitutional law in
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each of these ways but have profoundly affected how each modality of
constitutional change operates.
1. Constitutional Amendments-and Super-Statutes
as a Substitute for Them
One way social movements can change the Constitution is by
sponsoring amendments to it. The American Revolution and the
adoption of the Constitution were, in a genuine sense, the conse-
quence of social movements. 7 2  Several important substantive
amendments to the Constitution have been a direct reflection of im-
portant social movements in American history. Since the advent of
IBSMs as important political phenomena, however, this has not been
an important mechanism for constitutional change. After 1933, there
have been no major substantive amendments; the closest to adoption
was the failed ERA. The coincidence of the rise of IBSMs and the de-
cline of formal amendments to the Constitution is no accident. Iden-
tity politics, as explicated in this Article, raises deep issues regarding
public norms and relative social status that are deeply divisive. They
are too conflictual to be resolved by the lengthy super-majoritarian
processes Article V lays out for changing the Constitution.
Now that formal constitutional amendment has become impracti-
cal, constitutional change has come in other ways. One way is
through super-statutes. The civil rights and women's movements have
effected profound quasi-constitutional changes in part through the
enactment and vigorous enforcement of statutes like Title VII, Title
IX, and the Voting Rights Act. As noted above, these statutes have
reached beyond the command-and-control model of lawmaking and
have deeply affected public norms and, to some extent, private atti-
tudes. A second way that constitutional change now occurs is through
dynamic interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court-
an arena where IBSMs have had an even greater influence.
2. Dynamic Constitutional Interpretation
Social movements can affect constitutional law by generating new
kinds of cases and challenging judges to apply or expand existing con-
stitutional rules and precedents to grant relief in those cases. The
273 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XII-XV (responding to the abolitionist move-
ment), XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (responding to the temperance
movement), and XIX (responding to the women's movement).
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post-Reconstruction Constitution is filled with grand phrases-equal
protection, due process, freedom of speech-that can be applied in a
variety of ways, depending on the case's context, the legal precedents,
and the sympathies of the judge. One goal of a social movement is to
show how its grievances fit within the purpose of a provision of the
Constitution. Many abolitionists, for example, argued that slavery was
contrary to the Constitution and urged narrow readings of the fugitive
slave provision in Article IV. These arguments were generally unsuc-
cessful in court, because cautiousjudges either disagreed with them as
a matter of law or morality or felt they had insufficient political cover
for accepting them.274 IBSMs in the twentieth century were much
more successful in using their cases as vehicles for effecting constitu-
tional change. The classic example is the NAACP's Inc. Fund, whichr r I • 275
won Brown v. Board of Education, the greatest constitutional decision
of the past century. Feminist and disability groups have also enjoyed
successes. All of these groups have persuaded the Supreme Court to
overrule precedents and read the Equal Protection Clause very dy-
namically. 276 Such constitutional dynamism does not operate haphaz-
ardly, however.
Under the premises of political pluralism, constitutional law can
change if a longstanding political equilibrium is destabilized, and it
must change if the public culture settles into a new political equilib-
rium. If public culture is committed to a regime whereby the minor-
ity's trait is generally considered malign and the proper basis for ex-
clusions, the Supreme Court will be very reluctant to strike down any
significant state discrimination in the short term, because the Court
would fear that such an order would not be enforceable 27  and would
274 See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 509, 526 (1859) (Taney, CJ.)
(holding the fugitive slave law constitutional and confirming that the federal district
courts have jurisdictional authority to hear cases arising under it), rev'g In re Booth, 3
Wis. 1 (1854); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND TIHE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 202 (1975) (explaining moral and political dilemmas faced by anti-slavery
judges in fugitive slave cases).
275 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
276 See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 161 (conceding that the Court's sex discrimina-
tion jurisprudence required a "boldly dynamic interpretation" of the Equal Protection
Clause); Earl M. Maltz, Brown v. Board of Education, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 207 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds.,
1998) (arguing that Brown and other race decisions are deeply inconsistent with the
expectations of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratifiers).
277 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) (arguing that courts will pull back from announcing rul-
ings they do not think they can enforce).
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fear political retaliation from Congress. In the medium term, a
Court issuing such an order would be susceptible to packing-and
sooner or later the offending doctrine would be overturned or nar-
rowed by Justices more in tune with the political equilibrium.2 " This
institutional dynamic loses most of its coercive force once the consen-
sus is shattered by an IBSM. At that point, the Court has a great deal
of slack: it can either leave the old rules in place or overturn some of
them without much risk of political retaliation. By overturning segre-
gationist rules, the Court places the old regime on the political
agenda and might hasten its demise. If a national consensus develops
in favor of tolerable or even benign variation in the formerly stigma-
tized trait, the Court will become part of the clean-up process. In this
event, if the Court were to uphold category discriminations the coun-
try was ashamed of, the Court would face strong criticism and short- or
medium-term political pressure to conform.
To illustrate, it was probably not possible for the Supreme Court
to overturn apartheid in the 1890s, when Plessy was decided. But once
the civil rights movement undermined the political consensus in favor
of racial segregation, the door was open for challenge, and the Court
overturned particular exercises in the 1940s and then essentially in-
validated the entire system of laws in Brown and its progeny. Changed
attitudes also gave President Truman slack to desegregate the armed
forces. Both the President and the Court could have ducked the issue
and done nothing in the 1940s, but the normative uneasiness about
apartheid made it possible for them to act without devastating conse-
quences. (Some in both branches already thought the matter no
longer amenable to any action but desegregation.) By the 1960s,
when the Court faced its toughest cases, the constitutionality of bars to
different-race cohabitation and marriage, it may have had little choice
but to invalidate the bars-even though the Court had to overrule
binding precedent and to ignore the likely intent of the framers of the
218 SeeJohn Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent judiciary: Explaining Judicial In-
dependence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 353, 382 (1999) (arguing that when the judiciary goes
against a national consensus, it risks being stripped of its jurisdiction or having its or-
ders overturned by the legislature).
279 Although Congress has never removed a sitting Justice and increasing the size
of the Court backfired against FDR in 1938 and 1939, neither is an idle threat against a
Court defying a political consensus about which people have strong feelings. In any
event, unpopular Courts have been readily enough tamed by the election of Presidents
intent on replacing retiring Justices with more sympathetic ones. This happened dur-
ing the Jackson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, Nixon, and Reagan administrations.
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Equal Protection Clause to do So.28°
Similarly, the birth control movement not only made it possible
for the Court to decide Griswold the way it did, but made it likely. (In-
deed, the main surprise is that it took the Court so long to adjudicate
the Connecticut contraception law on its merits; by 1965, only two
states had such laws, and they were erratically enforced.) The norma-
tive progress made by the pro-choice movement gave the Supreme
Court a lot of discretion in deciding Roe v. Wade, which the Court
chose to exercise by invalidating all the existing abortion-regulatory
laws. The power of the women's movement was such that the Court
felt impelled in the 1970s to rule unconstitutional most invidious sex
discriminations. Because the women's movement did shift public
norms to a relatively anti-discrimination baseline, it was able to do
through the Equal Protection Clause virtually everything the ERA
would have accomplished had it been ratified and added to the Con-
stitution.2 s
The foregoing logic explains why the Supreme Court has borne so
much heat for the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick."  The
Court treated the case as one where the old political equilibrium
(homosexuals should be in jail) may have been destabilized but where
there was no new equilibrium .28  The Court may have been right
about that in 1986, butjust barely so, as the country was in the process
of settling on a public consensus that gay and lesbians should be tol-
erated but not encouraged. The Court's subsequent decision in Ev-
280 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia's statutory ban
of interracial marriages violated the Fourteenth Amendment); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) (holding a Florida statute prohibiting cohabitation of unmar-
ried couples of different races unconstitutional and overruling Pace v. Alabama, 106
U.S. 523 (1883)). Even Professor Michael McConnell, who believes Brown was rightly
decided under originalist premises, Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegre-
gation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995), concedes that Loving was inconsistent with
the original intent of the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
281 See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 45-59 (supporting the proposition in text by
a detailed survey of the cases).
282 478 U.S. 186 (1986). PoorJustice White wrote an opinion for the Court that is
no meaner or more poorly reasoned than any number of other opinions the Court (or
Justice White) handed down in the last generation. For a much harsher and even less
sophisticated opinion, see Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), which held that all
"homosexuals" and even "bisexuals" fell under an immigration exclusion for people
"afflicted with psychopathic personality."
VS3 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 193-94 (emphasizing that half the states still made consen-
sual "homosexual sodomy" a crime, which suggests that there was not the public con-
sensus the Court had found in Loving, for example).
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ans was, as the dissenters charged, functionally inconsistent with
285
Hardwick and unsupported by traditional sources of law, but the
Court suffered little-and, in my view, not a whit-from the decision
because it perfectly reflected the new consensus. Any fear that the
Court would move too fast in protecting gay people was disabused by
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,288 where the Court vigorously protected
the rights of TFV associations to protect themselves against even the
287
perception that they "promoted" or "encouraged" homosexuality. 
s
Political equilibrium theory suggests the following dynamics of
constitutional evolution. So long as the minority is highly unpopular,
judges will do little for that minority beyond ensuring that minimal
rule of law guarantees are applied to its members. Once the minority
organizes, however, judges realizing that the political situation is sud-
denly more fluid will be more careful and usually more protective in
dealing with its members. But the judiciary will not stick out its collec-
tive neck unless the minority persuades the polity that its variation is
at least tolerable. In that event,judges will tend to be more aggressive
against laws penalizing the minority. (Their aggressiveness will be
tempered if a countermovement calls the IBSM's progress into ques-
tion.)
3. Altering the Structure of Constitutional Doctrine
There is a third way social movements can change constitutional
law. In the process of challenging segregation-preserving precedents
and seeking minority-protective ones, social movements can contrib-
ute to changes in the doctrinal structure of constitutional inquiry.
Akhil Amar has shown how the Reconstruction Amendments changed
the Constitution in this way, not only creating new equality and voting
guarantees, but also ensuring that both new and old kinds of individ-
288
ual rights would be directly enforceable against the states.
'8' 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
285 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, j., dissenting) (citing Hardwick and assert-
ing that "[i] fit is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct
criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct"); cf Louis Michael Seidman, Romer s Radicalism: 7he
Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 104 (criticizing Jus-
tice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer).
286 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
287 See id. at 644 (striking down a state anti-discrimination law requiring that the
Boy Scouts allow the gay plaintiff to continue as a scoutmaster, on the grounds that
such requirement violated the Boy Scouts' right of expressive association).
2" AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
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At the most general level, IBSMs had a similarly dramatic impact
in the twentieth century. Their politics contributed to a shift in con-
stitutional focus from the structural Constitution of the founding era
and the freedom-of-contract Constitution of the Lochner era to the
Carolene Constitution of the mid- and late-twentieth century. The
original Constitution sought to protect liberty by making it hard for
the national government to act and by reserving most matters for state
and local regulation. The Civil War Amendments created a new focus
on direct enforcement of individual rights against state and local gov-
ernments; the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment protected economic liberties much more strongly than
other potential rights, such as speech and equality ones. The Carolene
Constitution reflected a move away from protecting economic liber-
ties per se, and toward protecting against state and local efforts to lock
in the power of ruling classes and to seek rents from (and thereby
undermine) interstate markets. 20  The asserted goal of the Supreme
Court in this Carolene phase of its history has not been to impose its
understanding of substantive justice onto governance, but has instead
20!been to referee the functioning of the political process. (" Thus the
(1998).
289 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(Stone, J.) (stating that presumption of constitutionality does not apply when a law
seeks to entrench controlling class or places unfair burdens on "discrete and insular"
minorities).
290 SeeS.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938) (find-
ing that a state may impose safety measures but cannot export costs to other states, in
an opinion written by Justice Stone, who also authored Carolene Products); Mark Tush-
net, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WiS. L. REV. 125 (elaborating on the
Barnwell Brothers idea).
291 SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDIcIAL REVIEW
(1980) (explicating a "representation-reinforcing" theory ofjudicial review that is con-
sistent with underlying democratic assumptions of our judicial system, and is con-
structed to enlist the courts in helping to make these assumptions a reality); Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985) ("[T]he Caro-
lene solution is to seize the high ground of democratic theory and establish that the
challenged legislation was produced by a profoundly defective process."). The Carolene
philosophy of judicial review is part of a larger reconceptualization of the role of
judges that took shape in the 1930s, a remarkable period that saw the New Deal take
shape, the Roosevelt Court announce the outlines of the new philosophy in Carolene
and Barnwell Brothers, and legal academics move toward the refinement of a "legal pro-
cess" school of jurisprudence and law teaching. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE
(1973) (discussing approaches to understanding and teaching the process of jurispru-
dence of the early twentieth century); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradi-
tion in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 601 (1993) (exploring the history
and evolution of process jurisprudence, which is premised on a faith in reason); Wil-
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Court ensures that local elites do not suppress criticism and opposi-
tion to their policies and public norms (freedom of speech), do not
deny fundamental rights to marginalized people (substantive due
process), and do not create a permanent caste of citizens whose sup-
posed inferiority is a basis for state discrimination against them (equal
protection).
The Carolene philosophy was in large part a response to the civil
rights movement. Indeed, it seems tailor-made to address the con-
cerns of IBSMs. The civil rights movement represented the interests
of the classic "discrete and insular minority," and all subsequent
IBSMs claim to be under-represented in the political process because
of "prejudice" (the term in Carolene) against them. The Carolene con-
cern about political insiders suppressing the ability of outsiders to ex-
press themselves and organize politically was most dramatically illus-
trated by the operation of apartheid on people of color. And we know
from archival sources and first-person accounts thatJustice Stone (the
author of Carolene) and some of his colleagues were specifically in-
spired by the dissonance between America's image of freedom and
democracy (contrasted with the totalitarian Nazis and, later, Commu-
nists) and the experience of blacks and other trait-based minorities in
292
this country. Not unimportantly, the Carolene philosophy culmi-
nated in a series of civil rights precedents that over time have brought
the U.S. Supreme Court worldwide acclaim and admiration, enhanced
its legitimacy, and increased its power in our polity. By presenting it-
self as a neutral arbiter of the political process, the Court has involved
itself in most of the interesting issues of the day, enabled its prefer-
ences to affect public discourse-and enhanced its legitimacy even
amid the occasional blunder. This has created a mutual dependence:
new IBSMs have been inspired by what the Court did to empower the
civil rights movement and therefore brought their petitions to the
Court, which has had the luxury of picking and choosing which claims
it wants to advance and which to suppress (for the time being). To
the extent the Carolene philosophy has been a public relations success
for the Court, the Justices owe some debt to IBSMs and their publi-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW, at li, liv-lxxxv, xci-xcvi (1994) (discussing the background and birth of the legal
process school of thought).
292 See Bixby, supra note 97, at 764-67 (discussing the Court's tilt in favor of minor-
ity protection signaled by footnote 4 of Carolene); Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the
Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ. 1 (1942) (presenting an explanation by the law clerk who
drafted Carolene footnote 4 and detailing why it is important to protect minorities).
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cists.
By presenting interesting new cases in the context of the overall
Carolene philosophy, IBSMs have also figured in the major doctrinal
developments for the Court's freedom of speech, due process, and
equal protection jurisprudence. The Supreme Court applied the
Speech Clause with little bite to early radicals and syndicalists (1910s-
1930s), generally allowing the state to suppress illiberal groups alleg-
edly threatening violent disruption or even overthrow of our form of
government.9 The next big wave of cases (1 9 50s-1960s) were
brought by publishers of sexual materials, the NAACP and other civil
294rights associations, and peaceful protest marchers. These cases were
much more congenial to the flourishing of a strong First Amendment,
because the people being censored and suppressed were relatively
peaceful, liberal, and pluralist. The civil rights cases in particular
cried out for strong protection, because southern sheriffs, mayors, and
even judges were seen as acting outside the rule of law, and, indeed, as
acting little differently than the Nazis. From these cases emerged a
Speech Clause that protected not only "speech," but also association
and expressive conduct (such as marching). The cases also strength-
ened the notion that freedom of speech must be guaranteed any per-
son or group, however reprehensible their philosophy, so long as they
are willing to abide by the rules of the game.99 The Speech Clause's
29 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding conviction of
war protesters under the Espionage Act of 1917); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925) (upholding conviction of an anarchist for arson); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding conviction of a Communist under the state's Criminal
Syndicalism Act). On the early cases, see David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern
First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205 (1983).
294 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (overturning
court order requiring NAACP to turn over its membership lists); A Book Named 'John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966)
(overturning designation of a bawdy novel as obscene); Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (overturning conviction of civil rights protest leader).
On the changes in First Amendment doctrine occasioned by the new identity politics
cases, see Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000).
Namely, no violence and adherence to reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions by the state.
296 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (invalidating a
criminal syndicalism statute under which a Klan leader was convicted on grounds that
it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 648 (2000) (holding that a state statute requiring the Boy Scouts to admit a gay
assistant scoutmaster was a violation of the organization's First Amendment rights).
297 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1,9 (1971) (questioning the constitutional legitimacy of Griswold).
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neutrality rendered it relatively immune to moral shifts, for it pro-
tected traditionalist groups, from the Ku Klux Klan to the Boy Scouts
of America.206 This neutrality has made the Speech Clause the first re-
sort of whatever identity group is the current object of state
(re)education-from homosexuals in the 1950s and 1960s, to right-to-
lifers picketing abortion clinics in the 1980s and 1990s.
IBSM-related litigation transformed the Due Process Clause in
three ways. Procedurally, due process now entails a detailed set of
guidelines for criminal arrests and prosecutions, in large part inspired
by black people's politics of protection against racist police forces.
The rule against excessively vague criminal laws is nothing new, but it
has been given deep bite by cases brought against birth control and
abortion advocates, gay men, and cross-dressers. Substantively, the
right to privacy is largely a creature of the birth control and abortion
movements, and its most controversial limiting principle is the Court's
announcement that it does not protect gay people from being ar-
rested for engaging in consensual "homosexual sodomy." Judge
Bork's denunciation of this line of cases brought upon him an IBSM
campaign of vilification that solidified the right of privacy in American
297
constitutional law for the next generation.
Of course, the most significant transformation of American law
due to IBSMs has been the creation of the tiered Equal Protection
Clause. Between 1900 and 1945, before the period of IBSMs, the
Court applied this clause leniently, allowing dejure racial segregation
and compulsory sterilization, for example.
8 The civil rights cases im-
pelled the Court to a non-lenient scrutiny, which it had no option but
to concede was a "strict" contrast to the "rational basis" scrutiny of the
earlier cases. Once race was established as a suspect classification, the
women's, lesbian and gay, and disabled people's movements all
sought to establish their defining traits as similarly suspect. Reluctant
to create new categories of suspect classifications, but also anxious to
strike down some of the statutes that came before them, the Justices
have proceeded to create new gradations, "intermediate" scrutiny for
sex-based classifications (Craig) and "rational basis with bite" for those
involving disability (Cleburne) and, sometimes, sexual orientation (Ev-
ans) .
28 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (analyzing the Equal Protection
Clause leniently and upholding segregation law); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (re-
jecting an equal protection claim against a Virginia statute providing for the steriliza-
tion of the "feeble-minded").
On the Court's current level of scrutiny, see Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick
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Table 3 summarizes, in a more abstract way, the roles different in-
dividual rights provisions of the Constitution have been able to play in
the ongoing politics of recognition by IBSMs and the counter-politics
of preservation by traditionalists.
and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1996). For different conceptions of the Court's ap-
proach, compare the majority opinion in Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985), advo-
cating tiered levels of scrutiny, with Justice Stevens' concurrence, 473 U.S. at 451, view-
ing levels of scrutiny on a continuum, and with Justice Marshall's dissent, 473 U.S. at
460, determining the level of scrutiny based on a sliding scale.
[Vol. 150:419
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C. Normative Inquiry: Justification(s) for the
Supreme Court's Response to IBSMs?
The normative assumption of Table 3 and throughout this Article
is pluralism: the polity consists of numerous and often competing
groups, including notjust economic groups but also social groups; the
goal of politics is moderation and accommodation of the interests of
as many salient groups as possible, without disturbing the ability of the
state and the community to press forward with collective projects." °
In a pluralist system, the role of the judiciary is not to ensure the tri-
umph of any particular group or norm, but is instead to assure that all
groups pursue their interests and normative goals through the regular
organs for change and debate. Under pluralist assumptions, it is not
objectionable, per se, that a trait is disapproved and a minority con-
sidered subordinate. What is problematic is that social and political
resources may be deployed for wasteful conflicts among groups. Con-
sider the implications of this model for the role of the judiciary at
each stage in an IBSM's potential life cycle.
So long as the minority is socially despised and not organized, it
will be subject to pervasive state as well as social discrimination, and
judges will do no more than trim back excessive or unusual state dis-
crimination. Many nascent social movements will be extinguished by
state Kulturkampfs, as the polygamy movement among Mormons was at
the end of the nineteenth century, without the slightest objection
from the Supreme Court.30' Under pluralist assumptions, the Ameri-
300 These features of pluralism are articulated and defended in ROBERT A. DAHL,
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 24 (1967);
THEODORE LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51 (2d ed: 1979); and Nicholas Miller, Plu-
ralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SC. REV. 734, 734 (1983).
301 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 50 (1890) (allowing confiscation of Mormon Church property);
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 344-46 (1890) (establishing that polygamists can be de-
nied the right to vote); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878) (finding
that religiously motivated bigamy constitutes a crime).
102 See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (invali-
dating Florida's effort to obtain NAACP's membership records); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding similarly for Alabama).
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can judiciary cannot stop a nationwide Kulturkampf the populace sup-
ports, butjudges can thwart local and state campaigns and slow down
national ones. Thus, the Supreme Court was able to thwart southern
state campaigns to destroy the NAACP in the 1950S3
2 and state courts
were able to do the same for police campaigns to terrorize gay people
after World War II' Although a judiciary that defies a national Kul-
turkampf risks institutional suicide, one that cheers it on risks aliena-
tion of minority groups from the system of governance and angry re-
taliation at a future date.
The same pluralist premises are attentive to the possibility that to-
day's outlaw minority will be tomorrow's social movement. If the mi-
nority survives the Kulturkampf and is able to organize effectively in its
defense, there will be a shift from a segregation regime toward public
tolerance of the minority. The challenge for the state in this transi-
tion is to accommodate the minority and to encourage it to work
within the pluralist system, but without alienating traditionalists
alarmed by the new status of a group they still fear or despise. The
role of constitutional law in this legal-political shift of regimes is three-
fold. The Speech and Press Clauses assure minority groups that the
state will protect their ability to educate and organize, so long as they
do so within the rules the state lays down. Thus, judges stood ready to
protect the ability of Planned Parenthood, the NAACP, and the Mat-
tachine Societies to educate the community and petition the govern-
ment. The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses provide a
mechanism forjudges to edit the least defensible discriminations from
operative law and sometimes to reverse the burden of political inertia,
to require the system to revisit outdated discriminations. Brown, Roe,
and the sex discrimination cases after the ERA were the most dramatic
burden-shifting decisions. If a countermovement forms, the courts
will mediate the culture clash between it and the social movement.
Courts will tolerate symbolic reaffirmations of traditionalist values but
will discourage both sides from using the state to gain an unfair ad-
vantage against the other. Thus the judiciary went along with state
policies against unduly "promoting" abortion,
3 0 4 homosexuality,40' and
3o See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 84-86, 94-95 (surveying protective deci-
sions by judges in California, the District of Columbia, and New York during anti-ho-
mosexual Kulturkampfof 1946-1957).
"' See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-18 (1980) (upholding federal refusal to
fund nontherapeutic abortions as part of Medicaid for the poor); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (upholding state refusal).
'o' See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (protecting the Boy
Scouts against the possibility that the public would view the organization as encourag-
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racial integration" once the pro-life, traditional family values, and
ing homosexuality if it had gay scoutmasters).306 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974) (finding that a federal court
may not impose a multidistrict, area-wide remedy for single-district school segregation
violations), discussed in JOIN C. JE'FFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,.JR. 286 (1994)
(suggesting that the Burger Court was reluctant to require school integration when
whites flee to suburbs); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (illustrating the
Court's more aggressive stance in the direction of local choice and away from state
promotion of integration).
,7 Thus the Supreme Court struck down miscegenation laws that had been aban-
doned everywhere outside the South, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); contra-
ception laws repealed everywhere except Connecticut, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and Massachusetts, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and a
local zoning law having no statewide analogues, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Contrast these cases with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), where the Court upheld a consensual sodomy law like those then in effect in
twenty-fotur other states and the District of Columbia.
3 8 Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAI'ER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
ANDT TIE LAW (1997) (advocating text-based originalism), with Owen Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms offuistice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) (utilizing
justice-based public Values in constitutional interpretation).
309 THE FEDERALjI' No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Hamilton defended judicial independence so that the Court could protect the
will of the people and mitigate the ills of "unjust and partial laws." Id. at 470. Hamilton
observed that the courts would act contrary to "the will of the legislature" sometimes,
"but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience, or in any sensi-
ble degree to affect the order of the political system." THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 484-
85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). There were other checks toassure that jidges would not grab power under the guise of either statutory or consti-
tutional constructions: "the general nature of the judicial power" and "the manner in
which it is exercised"; the "comparative weakness" of the judiciary vis-A-vis the political
branches; and the possibility of impeachment, which "is alone a complete security." Id.
at 485.
IN). This is the famous-and controversial-argument of ELY, supra note 291. Al-
though assailed from all quarters, Ely's theory remains for many the most persuasive
theory ofjudicial review.
311 Marbnay v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (announcing the Court's
power ofjudicial review), perfectly fits the model, as ChiefJustice Marshall (an impor-
tant federalist at the Virginia ratifying convention) avoided conflict with the President
and Congress by strategic choices not supported by standard legal criteria. See William
VanAlstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbuty v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. I (providing a critical
in-depth analysis of the opinion in its context). For other examples, see Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, (1821), invalidating more forthrightly a wayward state
law, but strategically narrowing a federal lottery law to the restlt Marshall wanted; and
McCullough v. Mamyland, 17 U.S. 316, 432-35 (1819), striking down parochial state law
and setting forth an early version of a representation-reinforcing jistification for ag-
gressive judicial review.
M12 This argument is elaborately presented in ESKRIDGE, supra note 198, at chs. 4-5.
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states' rights movements had proven their political potency.
The gay rights and pro-choice movements are currently stuck in
the tolerance zone, but the social movements seeking rights for peo-
ple of color, women, and many of the disabled have for the most part
moved to the next level-normal politics. Having persuaded the
community that their trait variations ought to be deemed benign for
most if not all purposes, these movements have become part of the
pluralist system. At this point, constitutional protections become
clean-up operations, removing outlier discriminations and fine-tuning
the terms of clashing group interests. Examples of constitutional
housecleaning include Loving, Griswold, and perhaps Cleburne. Each
was a landmark constitutional decision-but one not handed down
until after civil rights, birth control, and disability rights groups had
won nationwide recognition of their equality rights.
7 Once a minor-
ity group has become a part of normal politics, the judiciary will gen-
erally enforce remedial laws with enthusiasm, occasionally protecting
traditionalists against undue invasions of their liberties. Table la
summarizes the pluralism-inspired regime I have just described.
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Table la
Legal Regimes and Judicial Role in the Life Cycle of an IBSM
Marginalized Marginalized
Group Marginalized Group
That Has Not Group Mobilizes Assimilated
Mobilized (Tolerable Varia- into Politics
(Malign Varia- tion) (Benign Varia-
tion) tion)
[1] Apartheid Re- [3] Tolerance Re- [5] Pluralist Re-
gime. Laws dis- gime. Courts gime. Anti-
criminating assure minority discrimination
against rights to super-statutes
minority and protest and vigorously
segregating it organize enforced. State
from the norm. (NAACP cases). subsidies or rules
Traditionalist Judiciary acqui- Minority gains helping the
Citizens Are esces (Plessy), but legislative repeal minority. Courts
Not Fearful insists that rule orjudicial invali- clean up outlier
of law applies dation of state discriminations
(Cases enforcing discriminations (Loving, Griswold,





[2] Terror Regime. [4] No Promo Re- [6] Guerilla Re-
Kulturkampfs gime. Equality gime. Tradition-
seeking to sup- moves more alists' ongoing
press the minor- slowly and bows war against mi-
ity may be slowed to arguments nority becomes
down by courts, that the state not illegal in part.
Courts ought to promote nontra- Still, courts as-
Traditionalist intervene to pre- ditional conduct sure space for
Citizens vent the state (Abortion fund- traditionalists
Are Fearful from being a tool ing cases, Hard- (KKK cases, Op-
of private venge- wick). Localism eration Rescue
ance against mi- concerns (deseg- cases).
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There are three ways one might criticize the judiciary's performance
under the regime described by Table la.
1. Should the Court Consider the Effect of Its Decisions on the
Operation of Pluralist Politics?
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism is that the foregoing plu-
ralist model misconceives the role of the Supreme Court under a
proper understanding of the Constitution. The role of the Court,
these critics would maintain, is to declare the nation's public law by
interpreting the great mandates of the Constitution. Decisions like
Brown are great and correct, not because they nudged along the po-
litical system toward integrating minorities (however laudable a goal
that might be), but because they correctly deduced the meaning of
the Constitution as applied to widespread legal practices and boldly
announced precisely the meaning so derived, without flinching.
Some of these critics believe the Court should follow text-based or
originalist modes of reasoning; others believe the Court should reason
from the justice-based purposes and principles of the great constitu-
tional provisions. But they all resist a philosophy whereby the Court
behaves strategically and the constitutional rule might change with
public opinion. That the Supreme Court does act in this way, as an
institution, is no justification for how it ought to act.
For starters, one can debate what approach to constitutional in-
terpretation best reflects the Constitution's vesting the 'judicial
Power" in the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts. It is far
from obvious that Article III requires or even authorizes the federal
judiciary to do nothing more than apply standard rule of law orjustice
criteria to constitutional issues. Any theory of constitutional interpre-
tation insisting that the Court plays no role in the proper operation of
the democratic process and ought to ignore the reactions of the body
politic to its decisions must respond to arguments such as these: (1)
The federalists, defending Article III, assured the states that the Court
was the "least dangerous branch" that would not defy the political
process over long stretches of time.: (2) The structure of the Consti-
tution is proceduralist, as are most of the individual rights, suggesting
that the primary role of courts in judicial review is to referee the po-
litical process, neither dictating substantive results nor avoiding en-
tanglement.3 0  (3) The early history of judicial review reveals that
judges as well as the founders expected the Court to defer to the po-
litical process for the most part, but to intervene strategically when the
process was operating too hastily or in a biased way.3" These are pro-
2001]
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visional arguments only.
In my view, no one can establish to a reasonable certainty that the
Constitution requires a particular substantive theory of judicial review
and that it forbids the Court from engaging in strategic behavior. In
that event, one must defend a non-strategic approach to judicial re-
view from the perspective of abstract theory. For example, one might
say that the rule of law or the sense of shared justice unravels if the
Court is not unbending in its discernment and application. One
might say that, but no one has ever demonstrated it to be true in fact,
and there is every reason to believe that abstract rule of law or justice
theories cannot exclude a pragmatic element. If the Court cannot en-
force its judgments because the political process refuses to back up
the Justices, then the abstract value of the rule of law evaporates and
abstract justice becomes concrete chaos or injustice. Once abstract
theory concedes that the Court must at least move cautiously, and
perhaps implement controversial interpretations incrementally rather
than immediately (precisely the strategy in Brown I1), that theory must
account for the operation of the pluralist process.'
A final question is this: What is the Supreme Court's comparative
advantage? A lot of lawyers say it is applying texts to concrete cases, an
idea that academics have discredited in the hard cases. Academics
generally think the Court, because of its independence and life ten-
ure, operates best as a source of justice, but the Court's performance
in this arena has been unimpressive as well. Ely maintains that the
Supreme Court is best situated to be a process-oriented referee. This
remains an open, much-debated question. On the one hand, the Su-
preme Court has often intervened in a productive way. Although
Gerald Rosenberg seems right to say that actual integration did not
come to the South until the President and Congress got involved, Mi-
chael Klarman seems equally right to respond that Brown advanced
the matter on the national agenda, even if indirectly" Aside from
the critical role Brown played in resolving the Montgomery bus boy-
cott, it helped solve the free rider problem with collective action by
turning the civil rights struggle into an, assurance game, as discussed
above. Other examples of this point are cases like Griswold and Lov-
ing, where the Court cleaned up normatively obsolescent state laws
313 Compare ROSENBERG, supra note 107, at 49-54 (utilizing statistical data to meas-
Lre the contribution of the courts vis- -vis Congress and the executive branch in deseg-
regating public schools), with Klarman, supra note 107, at 85 ("Brown was indirectly re-
sponsible for the landmark civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s by catalyzing
southern resistance to racial change.").
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whose repeal was thwarted by local politics, and the dozens of due
process and freedom of speech cases where the Court insisted on the
rights of lesbians and gay men, people of color, and women to their
own private spaces and to publish unpopular ideas, to march and pro-
test, and to form associations to change public law and social norms.
On the other hand, there are cases where the Court blundered.
How common are these blunders? They call into question the Court's
skill in considering strategic politics. Are the blunders correctable?
That is, are they the result of the Court's excessive caution, which
leaves the political process no worse off and able to be corrected later
on? How often are they the result of the Court's excessive meddling,
which leaves the political process worse off?
2. Is the Court Too Passive a Player in Pluralist Politics?
Another kind of criticism, therefore, would operate from within
the pluralist model's assumptions: such and such decision under-
mined the goals of pluralism. Because there are so many interlinked
variables, it is hard to tell exactly what effects any Supreme Court deci-
sion has had on the operation of American politics; because of the
counterfactual nature of the inquiry, it is impossible to figure out what
would have happened if the Court had taken a different path. None-
theless, educated guesses can be essayed, and one can intelligently be-
lieve that the Supreme Court has miscalculated the political conse-
quences of its decisions in some important IBSM cases.
Within the assumptions of pluralism, the Court has sometimes
been too reluctant to slow down state campaigns that impose extraor-
dinary burdens on minorities who are not hurting other people. The
political equilibrium of the era might have prevented the Court from
barring states from sterilizing people with mental disabilities in Buck v.
Bell, for example, but the Court could certainly have required extra
procedures before the state could sterilize such a person-or could
have required a better factual record showing harm to the body politic
before allowing the legislature to impose such a penalty. Similarly, in
Korematsu, the Court should have held federal incarceration of inno-
cent Japanese-American citizens to higher procedural scrutiny at the
very least. I believe this is the best criticism of the Court.
Many have criticized Hardwick and Dale as judicial acquiescence in
antigay prejudice, and Hardwick was certainly a blunder under the
pluralist model. But Dale fits the model quite well and is narrowly (or
confusingly) enough written to leave enough space for anti-
discrimination laws to operate against employers and traditional pub-
20011
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lic accommodations such as hotels and restaurants. 4 The Court in
Evans distanced itself from Hardwick, and the faster it fades as a prece-
dent the better; unfortunately, it still serves as cover for lower court
judges who acquiesce in state policies that penalize gay people more
concretely than Georgia's little-enforced consensual sodomy law."
While gay people, such as I, do not appreciate the perseverance of
Hardwick as the law of the land, its damage is ameliorated by the ag-
gressive review of sodomy laws by state courts under state constitu-
tions."1" For thoughtful critics of the Supreme Court's decision, it is
not clear how harmful an error Hardwick was.
Likewise, one might criticize the Supreme Court for moving too
slowly in scrutinizing race- and sex-based classifications. The Court
moved deliberately, which left many such classifications in place for
years, but its pace had advantages for these social movements: little
victories attracted new members to the social movement, both because
there was tangible evidence that success was forthcoming and because
there remained formal exclusions that people were eager to chal-
lenge. In my view, the better criticism of the Court is that it has been
.4 I am amazed that the NewJersey courts construed their law to situate the Boy
Scouts as a "public accommodation," and I have counseled against this kind of con-
struction in William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homo-
sexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411
(1997).
315 See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding
that a state employer's revocation of plaintiff's employment offer because of her pur-
ported same-sex marriage did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights).
Since Hardwick, state sodomy laws have been authoritatively invalidated in
Georgia (the Hardwick law!), Kentucky, Montana, and Tennessee. See ESKRIDGE &
HUNTER, supra note 251, at 54-55 (discussing state grounds for sodomy law chal-
lenges); id. at 7-9 (Supp. 2001). As of September 2001, lower courts have invalidated
the laws in Arkansas, Maryland, and Minnesota. See id. State constitutional challenges
have lost in Kmsas, Louisiana, and Missouri. See id. They are pending in Massachu-
setts and Texas. See id. at 8-22.
317 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979) (holding that Massachusetts did not discriminate
against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by granting absolute life-
time employment preference to veterans).
31 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW:
AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987) (discussing how European coun-
tries, through legislative reform without judicial pressure, have achieved about the
same abortion regime as the United States, after 30 years of judicial review);
ROSENBERG, sulra note 107, at 185-201 (arguing that Roe had little effect on public
opinion and helped galvanize private as well as public opposition to abortion on de-
mand).
[Vol. 150:419
HeinOnline -- 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 518 2001-2002
IDEN77TY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
too acquiescent in state policies that indirectly harm women and ra-
cial minorities and has not required the legislature to present better
justifications for such policies. For example, the state's strong veter-
ans' preference for civil service positions litigated in Personnel Adminis-
trator v. Feeney31 had a ridiculously discriminatory effect against
women, who were largely excluded from the military and therefore
from the preference. The state's reasons were largely symbolic and
hortatory, and ought not to have passed muster given the strength of
the preference. Some of the policies (no one knows how many) hav-
ing adverse effects on women and racial minorities have been
changed as a result of legislative or agency attention as well as Title
VII litigation.
3. Has the Court Been Too Aggressive a Player in Pluralist Politics?
The most serious criticism of the Court would be that it has med-
dled so much in the political process as to have "corrupted" it. For
example, a standard critique of Roe v. Wade is that it was not only
countermajoritarian, but that it preempted the normal operation of
politics, which was in the process of reforming or repealing abortion
laws state by state.31 "8 The Court may have performed a service by re-
versing the burden of inertia: before Roe, pro-choice women had the
tough battle, unwinnable in most states, of pressing reform or repeal
legislation through two chambers of the state legislature and obtain-
ing the governor's signature. Roe therefore corrected a political dys-
function (albeit one whose pervasiveness might be questioned, as
many states reformed their laws beforehand), but at the cost of hard-
wiring the political process against pro-life people: after Roe, they
could not persuade any legislature to reinstate old abortion bars. In
my view, the pluralist model would have preferred that the Court have
invalidated the Texas abortion law in Roe on grounds of due process
obsolescence: the law was adopted, before women had the right to
vote, to solve problems that medical technology subsequently solved;
therefore, the statutory bar to all abortions no longer fit its rationale,
3191
and it essentially should have been remanded to the legislature . In
subsequent cases, the Court could then have developed a nuanced
equal protection and due process (privacy) approach to sorting out
319 This was the approach taken by Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 805 (D. Conn.
1972) (Newman, J., concurring), invalidating a Connecticut abortion statute because
its original legislative purpose, protecting women's health, was no longer rationally re-
lated, discussed in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 27-29
(1982).
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statutes that still placed too great a burden on women's reproductive
freedom, basically the approach the Court adopted after twenty years
of hand-wringing over Roe.320
Roe illustrates the central problem with a philosophy that rejects
pragmatic considerations in constitutional jurisprudence: it doesn't
protect rights or the rule of law. If a woman truly has a constitutional
right to choose abortion on demand (under the "proper" theory of
constitutional interpretation), but the Court announces it in a politi-
cally insensitive way, the Court can undermine the right by stimulating
extra opposition to it. Before Roe, increasing numbers of Americans
were changing their-minds about abortion, the large majority con-
cluding that it is sometimes permissible, and many concluding that it
should always be the mother's choice. The debate was focused on the
issue and the stories of women like Sherri Finkbine. After Roe, the
debate's focus became diffused, in (large) part because pro-life peo-
ple articulated stories of aborted human beings and in part because
people objected that the issue had been taken away from the demo-
cratic process. This hard-to-determine legitimacy factor was a price of
Roe. I do not agree, however, that Roe is responsible for the pro-life
countermovement. The descriptive model of IBSMs in this Article
suggests that any substantial success on the part of the pro-choice
movement would have triggered a strong countermovement, for it
would have altered important status entitlements and gender roles.
The pro-life countermovement was already well under way by the time
Roe was handed down; it did pick up steam after Roe, in part because
the decision's abrogation of all abortion laws was a nationwide shift in
gender role and status."'
Apart from Roe, it is remarkable how few Supreme Court decisions
involving identity-based status and conduct have been widely or per-
suasively criticized as too aggressive. My candidate for next-most-
activist blunder is Adarand and the other affirmative action cases, but
the damage done by those cases is not large yet. 22 Decisions as activist
4' See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (joint opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court) (reaffirming the essential holding of Roe, but
rejecting the trimester framework in favor of undue burden analysis).
321 Compare LUKER, supra note 13, at 133-37 (describing the emergence of the right-
to-life movement in California right after abortion reform law was adopted in 1967),
with id. at 137-45 (discussing the influx of many more pro-life commitments after Roe).
322 Adarand is hard to defend on rule of law grounds, because it is judicial activism
unsupported by constitutional text, original expectations, or precedent. As an applica-
tion ofjudicialized social policy (race cannot be a criterion), the opinions are intellec-
tually weak and empirically defenseless at the present time. By disrupting the opera-
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(and hard to defend solely by reference to standard legal criteria) as
Brown, Loving, Griswold, Cleburne, Evans, Craig, and NAACP have been
praised from a variety of perspectives and criticized mainly for not go-
ing far enough. Because academics are likely to underappreciate
practical considerations and are politically to the left, this is some evi-
dence that the Court is not being too aggressive and that Roe stands
alone as a blunder (with of course great debate over how much of a
blunder, if any).
In sum, the normative question, What role should the Court play
in the evolution of IBSMs?, remains open to debate. There are no
certain answers at this point, but my hypotheses are the following:
The Court ought to provide procedural protections to all minori-
ties, however despised, and ought to impose caution onto law en-
forcement when the political system is engaged in a Kulturkampf
against a minority. (Quadrants 1 and 2 of Table 3.)
Once a minority starts to mobilize as a social movement, the Court
ought to protect the minority group's expression and association from
state interference and ought to strike down the most serious state
penalties against the group. (Quadrants 3 and 4.)
If a minority becomes part of the normal political process, the
Court ought to support legislative efforts at remediation and apply su-
per-statutes vigorously, but also ought to protect minoritized tradi-
tionalists from losing their own social spaces. (Quadrants 5 and 6.)
CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT FOR IDENTITY-BASED
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LAW?
The IBSMs discussed in this Article flourished as social move-
ments and transformed American public law in the latter half of the
twentieth century. At the dawn of the new millennium, the develop-
ments described here will continue: gay rights and disability rights
movements will continue to press for revocation of de jure state dis-
criminations against their members; culture clashes will remain
prominent between those who are pro-choice and pro-life, pro-gay
and pro-traditional family values, pro- and anti-affirmative action, and
constitutional law will continue to be a situs for these clashes; identity
groups and their counter-groups will contend with one another about
how aggressively anti-discrimination super-statutes should be applied.
These sociopolitical struggles will continue to affect public law and
tion of normal politics, and some degree of remedial justice, decisions like this might
do harm. How much harm is impossible for me to tell.
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drive its evolution into new directions. We may also be certain, how-
ever, that the social movement patterns we saw in the late twentieth
century will be overtaken by new patterns, but we cannot be certain
what those patterns will be. I have a few speculations about the new
patterns, and their ramifications for American constitutional law.
1. Shi from Stigmatizing Traits to Stigmatizing Conduct. I speculate
that over the long term there will be a gradual withering of the tradi-
tional totalizing traits, namely, race, ethnicity, disability, and sexual
orientation. Just as those traits replaced religion and class as norma-
tively charged characteristics in the twentieth century, so they will
erode as prominent legal and even social categories in the twenty-first,
for three different reasons. First, even as prejudice continues, the
state will continue the process of abandoning discriminations and ex-
clusions that have proven to be nonfunctional and, in some cases, vi-
cious. State rules classifying on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, sexual
orientation, and most disabilities now bear a burden of suspicion that
few can withstand. Second, although for the foreseeable future the
state will continue to adopt anti-discrimination laws as well, the longer
term will see a falling off of minorities' enthusiasm for them. Minori-
ties are already ambivalent about the prominence of their defining
trait in identity politics,"3 and that ambivalence will only grow as a
third factor comes into play: the categories themselves will blur, as
different racial groups intermarry, as technology allows more disabled
people to function well in the world, and as bisexuals, cross-dressers,
intersexuals, and other gender-benders become more prominent in
public culture. If the human race is still viable in 2101, race, sex, dis-
ability, and sexual orientation will be like religion in 2001-once a fo-
cus of hysterical concern, but domesticated as a situs of considerable
benign variation among individuals.
What will take the place of these traditional categories? In my
view, stigmatizing discourse and legal regulation will shift from traits
to conduct. This has already been a theme of identity politics. Tradi-
tionalist opponents of rights for women seeking abortions and for gay
people have long focused on conduct rather than trait: it is the (bad)
acts of abortion and sodomy that the state should disapprove, not
323 For example, some lesbians and gay men not only oppose state rules discriminat-
ing against them on the basis of their sex or sexual orientation, but are also skeptical of
state rules protecting them against sexual orientation discrimination. Although the two
kinds of rules are obviously different, they are similar in retaining sex and sexual ori-
entation as significant state classifications.
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women or gay people generally 2 4 What we shall probably see in this
century is the erosion of state regulations differentiating people solely
on the basis of a trait (race, sex, sexual orientation, most disabilities)
and the perseverance of state regulations differentiating on the basis
of conduct (sexual activities in particular). Because we are forming a
public consensus that explicit trait-based differentiation is unaccept-
able de jure discrimination, political contests will focus on minority
arguments that conduct-based regulations place unfair burdens on its
members and constitute unacceptable de facto discrimination .
5
2. Regulatory Focus on the Health of the Body (Politic) and New Forms of
Identity Politics. I do not expect trait-based discrimination to disap-
pear, however. Such discrimination will persevere, but its focal loca-
tions will shift away from race, sex, disability, and sexual orientation
per se and in the direction of categories that relate to the integrity
and health of the body politic.3
26 As the world gets smaller and more
dangerous for us Americans, the country's old obsession with immi-
gration exclusions and regulations, which abated after the 1950s, will
return, perhaps with a vengeance. Security fears combined with a re-
newed nationalism will yield new and unpredictable immigration and
naturalization regulations. Because those regulations will have race-
and ethnicity-based effects, the old categories will persevere, but in
the new form suggested above: the barricaded state of the twenty-first
century will deny that its security measures involve race- or ethnicity-
based profiling or exclusions, but certain (and perhaps shifting) racial
and ethnic minorities will claim that this is the (intended) effect of fa-
cially neutral state rules and of unexplained state practices.
A different kind of body politic concern will preserve sexual orien-
tation and sex as categories of closeted relevance, for they will map
12' To be sure, the role of the disapproved conduct differs in the two cases in text.
For traditionalists, the trait of homosexuality is repeatedly confused with homosexual
conduct, whereas opposition to abortion does not confuse gender with the disap-
proved act.
... Examples of the debates described in the text are pro-choice arguments that
abortion availability is necessary for women's equality; arguments by people of color
that certain laws (such as the penalty disparity between crack and powdered cocaine)
have dramatic racially discriminatory consequences; arguments by some ethnic and
racial minorities (especially Latinos) that language and accent discrimination bears
unfairly on them; and arguments by people with physical disabilities that lack of ac-
commodations prevents them from participating in the workplace and other forums.
326 As before, this is not an entirely new theme. The eugenics movement and vari-
ous antigay campaigns in the last century emphasized the dangers that certain people,
like sex workers, the disabled, gay people, and degenerates of all sorts, posed to the
body politic.
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onto state concerns about disease and contagion. Just as the body
politic is threatened by new foreign enemies, so can it be weakened by
new foreign diseases. Gay men and women have long been stigma-
tized as carriers of disease. Subgroups will no doubt find themselves
objects of Trojan Horse fears, and that scrutiny will bestir some of
them toward new kinds of social movements. As for disability, its new
name will be the eugenics flowing from the genome project. Once
the state can predict the consequences of procreation, there will be
pressures for rules and regulations, which will in turn beget new iden-
tity movements.
3. Changing Role of the State: From Persecutor to Normalizing Problem-
Solver. AIDS activism is one face of identity politics in the new century.
It is animated by a group defined by a disease that resists that defini-
tion at the same time it seeks more state funding and programs. Its
members cut across traditional lines but are dominated by the poor,
people of color (especially blacks and latinos), drug addicts, (decreas-
ingly) gay and bisexual men, and (increasingly) women, especially
women of color. AIDS activism suggests a final speculation about
identity politics in the new millennium: the changing role of state as
regulator, as the state sustains or increases its role as a potential prob-
lem-solver. Recall the list of state discriminations on the basis of race,
ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, and disability (circa 1945) which was
the lead-in to Part I of this Article. All of the identity groups coming
together between 1945 and 1975 were driven by the civil rights model,
with variations. The civil rights model, encapsulated in the various
diagrams and tables in this Article, will be imperfectly applicable to
the IBSMs forming after 1975. By and large, such IBSMs will not be
inspired by de jure or vicious de facto state discrimination against
their members, for such laws have been declawed or threatened by the
civil rights era. So many or most of the new IBSMs will accuse the
state of discriminatory neglect rather than discriminatory aggression
and will be seeking state subsidies and other interventions. One chal-
lenge faced by these IBSMs will be to solve collective action problems
through private mobilization (such as the Internet) and to enlist the
state immediately as an ambivalent ally.
A larger challenge faced by these IBSMs is that state subsidies usu-
ally come with strings attached. Thus, an IBSM seeking affirmative
state assistance not only invites a political debate over whether or how
much such assistance is justified but also introduces new debates
about the conditions that should be attached to the assistance. The
subsidizing or facilitating state, moreover, will still be a highly regula-
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tory state. The mode for regulating nonconformity will shift away
from a persecutorial model that regulates by disapproving and penal-
izing and toward a conditional subsidy model that regulates by selec-
tively approving and subsidizing. This shift in state policy toward mi-
norities presents new challenges to constitutional doctrine as well as
public policy in this new century.
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